personal knowledge requirement in District of Columbia

2020Implicitly, therefore, this same rationale applies to satisfy the “pursuant-to-a-duty” requirement because the official who prepares an authentic court document necessarily carries out a duty “imposed by law or implied by the nature of the office,” id. at 378, and thus does so routinely, in the “ordinary course” of the court’s business id. at 379. 10 as an “expert” when explaining “standard courtroom practice.” 11 Years earlier, we affirmed another BRA conviction after recognizing unchallenged “expert” testimony by a trial court employee laying the foundation for admission of government exhibi

2020Implicitly, therefore, this same rationale applies to satisfy the “pursuant-to-a-duty” requirement because the official who prepares an authentic court document necessarily carries out a duty “imposed by law or implied by the nature of the office,” id. at 378, and thus does so routinely, in the “ordinary course” of the court’s business id. at 379. 10 as an “expert” when explaining “standard courtroom practice.” 11 Years earlier, we affirmed another BRA conviction after recognizing unchallenged “expert” testimony by a trial court employee laying the foundation for admission of government exhibi

2020Implicitly, therefore, this same rationale applies to satisfy the “pursuant-to-a-duty” requirement because the official who prepares an authentic court document necessarily carries out a duty “imposed by law or implied by the nature of the office,” id. at 378, and thus does so routinely, in the “ordinary course” of the court’s business id. at 379. 10 as an “expert” when explaining “standard courtroom practice.” 11 Years earlier, we affirmed another BRA conviction after recognizing unchallenged “expert” testimony by a trial court employee laying the foundation for admission of government exhibi

2020Implicitly, therefore, this same rationale applies to satisfy the “pursuant-to-a-duty” requirement because the official who prepares an authentic court document necessarily carries out a duty “imposed by law or implied by the nature of the office,” id. at 378, and thus does so routinely, in the “ordinary course” of the court’s business id. at 379. 10 as an “expert” when explaining “standard courtroom practice.” 11 Years earlier, we affirmed another BRA conviction after recognizing unchallenged “expert” testimony by a trial court employee laying the foundation for admission of government exhibi

2020Implicitly, therefore, this same rationale applies to satisfy the “pursuant-to-a-duty” requirement because the official who prepares an authentic court document necessarily carries out a duty “imposed by law or implied by the nature of the office,” id. at 378, and thus does so routinely, in the “ordinary course” of the court’s business id. at 379. 10 as an “expert” when explaining “standard courtroom practice.” 11 Years earlier, we affirmed another BRA conviction after recognizing unchallenged “expert” testimony by a trial court employee laying the foundation for admission of government exhibi

2020Implicitly, therefore, this same rationale applies to satisfy the “pursuant-to-a-duty” requirement because the official who prepares an authentic court document necessarily carries out a duty “imposed by law or implied by the nature of the office,” id. at 378, and thus does so routinely, in the “ordinary course” of the court’s business id. at 379. 10 as an “expert” when explaining “standard courtroom practice.” 11 Years earlier, we affirmed another BRA conviction after recognizing unchallenged “expert” testimony by a trial court employee laying the foundation for admission of government exhibi

2020Implicitly, therefore, this same rationale applies to satisfy the “pursuant-to-a-duty” requirement because the official who prepares an authentic court document necessarily carries out a duty “imposed by law or implied by the nature of the office,” id. at 378, and thus does so routinely, in the “ordinary course” of the court’s business id. at 379. 10 as an “expert” when explaining “standard courtroom practice.” 11 Years earlier, we affirmed another BRA conviction after recognizing unchallenged “expert” testimony by a trial court employee laying the foundation for admission of government exhibi

2020Implicitly, therefore, this same rationale applies to satisfy the “pursuant-to-a-duty” requirement because the official who prepares an authentic court document necessarily carries out a duty “imposed by law or implied by the nature of the office,” id. at 378, and thus does so routinely, in the “ordinary course” of the court’s business id. at 379. 10 as an “expert” when explaining “standard courtroom practice.” 11 Years earlier, we affirmed another BRA conviction after recognizing unchallenged “expert” testimony by a trial court employee laying the foundation for admission of government exhibi

2020Implicitly, therefore, this same rationale applies to satisfy the “pursuant-to-a-duty” requirement because the official who prepares an authentic court document necessarily carries out a duty “imposed by law or implied by the nature of the office,” id. at 378, and thus does so routinely, in the “ordinary course” of the court’s business id. at 379. 10 as an “expert” when explaining “standard courtroom practice.” 11 Years earlier, we affirmed another BRA conviction after recognizing unchallenged “expert” testimony by a trial court employee laying the foundation for admission of government exhibi

2020Implicitly, therefore, this same rationale applies to satisfy the “pursuant-to-a-duty” requirement because the official who prepares an authentic court document necessarily carries out a duty “imposed by law or implied by the nature of the office,” id. at 378, and thus does so routinely, in the “ordinary course” of the court’s business id. at 379. 10 as an “expert” when explaining “standard courtroom practice.” 11 Years earlier, we affirmed another BRA conviction after recognizing unchallenged “expert” testimony by a trial court employee laying the foundation for admission of government exhibi

2020Implicitly, therefore, this same rationale applies to satisfy the “pursuant-to-a-duty” requirement because the official who prepares an authentic court document necessarily carries out a duty “imposed by law or implied by the nature of the office,” id. at 378, and thus does so routinely, in the “ordinary course” of the court’s business id. at 379. 10 as an “expert” when explaining “standard courtroom practice.” 11 Years earlier, we affirmed another BRA conviction after recognizing unchallenged “expert” testimony by a trial court employee laying the foundation for admission of government exhibi

2020Implicitly, therefore, this same rationale applies to satisfy the “pursuant-to-a-duty” requirement because the official who prepares an authentic court document necessarily carries out a duty “imposed by law or implied by the nature of the office,” id. at 378, and thus does so routinely, in the “ordinary course” of the court’s business id. at 379. 10 as an “expert” when explaining “standard courtroom practice.” 11 Years earlier, we affirmed another BRA conviction after recognizing unchallenged “expert” testimony by a trial court employee laying the foundation for admission of government exhibi

2022Evid. 602 (“A witness may testify to a matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.”); Smith v. United States, 583 A.2d 975, 983 (D.C. 1990) (endorsing the personal knowledge requirement in Fed.

2022Evid. 701 (“If a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the form of an opinion is limited to one that is: (a) rationally based on the witness’s perception; (b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to determining a fact in issue; and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702 [governing testimony of expert witnesses]”); Johnson v. United States, 116 A.3d 1246, 1249 (D.C. 2015) (endorsing the personal knowledge requirement of Fed.

2019The government argues that in this case “[t]he declarant’s proximity to the site of the shooting supports the inference that the declarant had been there when the shooting occurred.” Although “proximity to the scene at the time of the incident” may “provide[] some circumstantial evidence of firsthand knowledge,” Bemis, 45 F.3d at 1373 , Mr. Sims is correct to caution that “[a]n unidentified declarant making a purported present-sense impression . . . will, almost by definition, be present at the scene of the event in its aftermath.” Thus, the weight reasonably attributed to evidence of physical

2019The government argues that in this case “[t]he declarant’s proximity to the site of the shooting supports the inference that the declarant had been there when the shooting occurred.” Although “proximity to the scene at the time of the incident” may “provide[] some circumstantial evidence of firsthand knowledge,” Bemis, 45 F.3d at 1373 , Mr. Sims is correct to caution that “[a]n unidentified declarant making a purported present-sense impression . . . will, almost by definition, be present at the scene of the event in its aftermath.” Thus, the weight reasonably attributed to evidence of physical

1991See Howard, 108 U.S.App.D.C. at 39-40 , 278 F.2d at 873-74 (United States Commissioner’s report disclosing details of narcotics transaction admissible upon defense request under public record exception without opportunity for government to cross-examine Commissioner or whoever prepared report for him).

1991See Howard, 108 U.S.App.D.C. at 39-40 , 278 F.2d at 873-74 (United States Commissioner's report disclosing details of narcotics transaction admissible upon defense request under public record exception without opportunity for government to cross-examine Commissioner or whoever prepared report for him).

1990Under Fed.R.Evid. 602, objections to lack of personal knowledge “should be made at the earliest possible time; once a witness has given testimony, a motion to strike is the only available remedy.” Saltzburg & Martin, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual, supra, at 530; cf. Pyne v. Jamaica Nutrition Holding, Ltd., 497 A.2d 118, 128 (D.C.1985) (failure to object to earlier like evidence does not preclude a later objection or a motion to strike).

1990Fed.R.Evid. 701 on lay opinion incorporates the same personal knowledge requirement. 18 Id; see Samples v. City of Atlanta, 846 F.2d 1328, 1334 (11th Cir.1988) (opinion of witness who worked in a police department for a long time that the department had a policy or practice of encouraging brutality was admissible because it was based on his own personal observations).