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30 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1995–2025 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Coopergreen2 sentences2021App. 3d 971, 973 , 544 N.E.2d 1273, 1274 (1989)). “[T]o satisfy the personal-knowledge requirement of the statute, ‘the witness must have observed, and not merely heard, the subject matter underlying the statement.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Hastings, 161 Ill. 2021App. 3d 971, 973 , 544 N.E.2d 1273, 1274 (1989)). “[T]o satisfy the personal-knowledge requirement of the statute, ‘the witness must have observed, and not merely heard, the subject matter underlying the statement.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Hastings, 161 Ill. | 4 | 6 |
People v. McCartergreen2 sentences2015The appellate court rejected the State’s argument, finding that “[f]or a witness’s out-of-court statement to satisfy the personal knowledge requirement, the witness must have actually seen the events that form the subject matter of the statement.” 2013 IL App (1st) 111914, ¶ 18 (citing People v. McCarter, 385 Ill. 2015The appellate court rejected the State’s argument, finding that “[f]or a witness’s out-of-court statement to satisfy the personal knowledge requirement, the witness must have actually seen the events that form the subject matter of the statement.” 2013 IL App (1st) 111914, ¶ 18 (citing People v. McCarter, 385 Ill. | 3 | 5 |
Kugler v. Southmark Realty Partners IIIgreen2 sentences2020(And again, he would have to lay foundation for those documents.) - 19 - ¶ 145 The long and short is this: the personal-knowledge requirement of Rule 191(a) is satisfied if “ ‘it appears that the affidavit is based upon the personal knowledge of the affiant and there is a reasonable inference that the affiant could competently testify to its contents at trial.’ ” Zamora v. Lewis, 2019 IL App (1st) 181642, ¶ 67 (quoting Kugler v. Southmark Realty Partners III, 309 Ill. 2009However, “[i]f, from the document as a whole, it appears that the affidavit is based upon the personal knowledge of the affiant and there is a reasonable inference that the affiant could competently testify to its contents at trial, Rule 191 is satisfied.” Kugler v. Southmark Realty Partners III, 309 Ill. | 3 | 3 |
People v. Saundersgreen2 sentences2005App. 3d 278, 290 (1993); People v. Saunders, 220 Ill. 2005App. 3d 278, 290 (1993); People v. Saunders , 220 Ill. | 2 | 3 |
People v. Hastingsgreen2 sentences2021App. 3d 971, 973 , 544 N.E.2d 1273, 1274 (1989)). “[T]o satisfy the personal-knowledge requirement of the statute, ‘the witness must have observed, and not merely heard, the subject matter underlying the statement.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Hastings, 161 Ill. 2000In other words, to satisfy the personal-knowledge requirement of the statute, “the witness must have observed, and not merely have heard, the subject matter underlying the statement.” People v. Hastings, 161 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Harveygreen2 sentences2016People v. Harvey, 366 Ill. 2016However, the court concluded that the error was harmless because “the jury was permitted to consider substantively virtually identical evidence contained in the recanting witnesses’ grand jury testimonies.” Harvey, 366 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Younggreen2 sentences2015See Wilson, 2012 IL App (1st) 101038, ¶¶ 39-40 . -9- ¶ 33 Given the quarter of a century that the appellate court has repeatedly and consistently interpreted the statute as noted above, it seems clear that the statute has a settled meaning and it would not be appropriate for us to change it (see Young, 2011 IL 111886, ¶ 16 ), especially in light of the State’s less than persuasive argument for a contrary interpretation. 1 We note, however, that if the legislature disagrees with interpretation placed on section 115-10.1(c)(2) by the courts, it should of course feel free to amend the statute. ¶ 2015See Wilson, 2012 IL App (1st) 101038, ¶¶ 39-40 . ¶ 33 Given the quarter of a century that the appellate court has repeatedly and consistently interpreted the statute as noted above, it seems clear that the statute has a settled meaning and it would not be appropriate for us to change it (see Young, 2011 IL 111886, ¶ 16 ), especially in light of the State’s less than persuasive argument for a contrary interpretation. 1 We note, however, that if the legislature disagrees with the interpretation placed on section 115-10.1(c)(2) by the courts, it should of course feel free to amend the statute. ¶ | 2 | 2 |
People v. Simpsongreen2 sentences2015The appellate court rejected the State’s argument, finding that “[f]or a witness’s out-of-court statement to satisfy the personal knowledge requirement, the witness must have actually seen the events that form the subject matter of the statement.” 2013 IL App (1st) 111914, ¶ 18 (citing People v. McCarter, 385 Ill. 2015The appellate court rejected the State’s argument, finding that “[f]or a witness’s out-of-court statement to satisfy the personal knowledge requirement, the witness must have actually seen the events that form the subject matter of the statement.” 2013 IL App (1st) 111914, ¶ 18 (citing People v. McCarter, 385 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Wilsongreen2 sentences2015See Wilson, 2012 IL App (1st) 101038, ¶¶ 39-40 . -9- ¶ 33 Given the quarter of a century that the appellate court has repeatedly and consistently interpreted the statute as noted above, it seems clear that the statute has a settled meaning and it would not be appropriate for us to change it (see Young, 2011 IL 111886, ¶ 16 ), especially in light of the State’s less than persuasive argument for a contrary interpretation. 1 We note, however, that if the legislature disagrees with interpretation placed on section 115-10.1(c)(2) by the courts, it should of course feel free to amend the statute. ¶ 2015See Wilson, 2012 IL App (1st) 101038, ¶¶ 39-40 . ¶ 33 Given the quarter of a century that the appellate court has repeatedly and consistently interpreted the statute as noted above, it seems clear that the statute has a settled meaning and it would not be appropriate for us to change it (see Young, 2011 IL 111886, ¶ 16 ), especially in light of the State’s less than persuasive argument for a contrary interpretation. 1 We note, however, that if the legislature disagrees with the interpretation placed on section 115-10.1(c)(2) by the courts, it should of course feel free to amend the statute. ¶ | 2 | 2 |
People v. Hubbardgreen2 sentences2012See People v. Hubbard, 276 Ill.App.3d 98, 105 , 212 Ill. 2012See People v. Hubbard, 276 Ill.App.3d 98, 105 , 212 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2005App. 3d 695, 700 (1996) (holding that the personal-knowledge requirement is not satisfied when the witness merely testifies as to what another claims to have done); People v. Williams, 264 Ill. 2005App. 3d 695, 700 (1996) (holding that the personal-knowledge requirement is not satisfied when the witness merely testifies as to what another claims to have done); People v. Williams , 264 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
Selby v. O'Deagreen2 sentences2025See Selby v. O’Dea, 2020 IL App (1st) 181951, ¶ 148 (“The personal-knowledge requirement forces affiants only to testify about facts within their personal knowledge, and if that knowledge was gleaned from an external source ***, the affiant must say so. 2022Plaintiff asserts that the personal knowledge requirement forces affiants to only testify to facts that they have personal knowledge of, otherwise they must provide the external source from where they received the information, citing Selby v. O’Dea, 2020 IL App (1st) 181951 , ¶148 as support. | 1 | 3 |
People v. Wilsongreen2 sentences2012Rev. 1565 (1977))); accord People v. Wilson, 302 Ill.App.3d 499, 507-08 , 236 Ill.Dec. 152 , 706 N.E.2d 1026 (1998) ("In the legislative debate, lawmakers acknowledged that the [section 115-10.1] had its genesis in that article."). ¶ 40 Second, the State's reading of the statute would keep the personal knowledge requirement from doing what it was designed to do: ensure that the out-of-court statements are trustworthy. 2012Rev. 1565 (1977))); accord People v. Wilson, 302 Ill.App.3d 499, 507-08 , 236 Ill.Dec. 152 , 706 N.E.2d 1026 (1998) ("In the legislative debate, lawmakers acknowledged that the [section 115-10.1] had its genesis in that article."). ¶ 40 Second, the State's reading of the statute would keep the personal knowledge requirement from doing what it was designed to do: ensure that the out-of-court statements are trustworthy. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Richardsongreen1 sentence2022“It does not violate the personal knowledge rule to allow witnesses to testify to their observations so long as they do not provide their own interpretation of those observations.” See People v. Richardson, 2013 IL App (2d) 120119, ¶ 10 (a witness’ opinion may be admitted if the opinion is based on the witness’ personal observations, is one that a person is generally capable of making, is helpful to a clear understanding of an issue at hand and does not provide a legal conclusion). | 1 | 1 |
Zamora v. Lewisgreen1 sentence2020(And again, he would have to lay foundation for those documents.) - 19 - ¶ 145 The long and short is this: the personal-knowledge requirement of Rule 191(a) is satisfied if “ ‘it appears that the affidavit is based upon the personal knowledge of the affiant and there is a reasonable inference that the affiant could competently testify to its contents at trial.’ ” Zamora v. Lewis, 2019 IL App (1st) 181642, ¶ 67 (quoting Kugler v. Southmark Realty Partners III, 309 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
People v. McCartergreen2 sentences2011Supra ¶ 55, 352 Ill.Dec. at 650, 954 N.E.2d at 733 (trial counsel "rendered deficient representation by failing to object to the portions of Ms. Johnson's prior inconsistent statement that were not based on her personal knowledge"). 2011Supra ¶ 55, 352 Ill.Dec. at 650, 954 N.E.2d at 733 (trial counsel "rendered deficient representation by failing to object to the portions of Ms. Johnson's prior inconsistent statement that were not based on her personal knowledge"). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Morales
green
2 sentences2006People v. Morales, 281 Ill. 2006People v. Morales, 281 Ill. | 4 | 1996–2006 |
People v. Thomas
green
2 sentences2015We also note that counsel allowed the 1 The State attempts to counter the voluminous number of appellate decisions rejecting its argument by claiming that in People v. Thomas, 178 Ill. 2d 215 (1997), this court left open the question of how the personal knowledge requirement should be interpreted. 2015Under these circumstances, we believe that defendant has shown that his counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 1 The State attempts to counter the voluminous number of appellate decisions rejecting its argument by claiming that in People v. Thomas, 178 Ill. 2d 215 (1997), this court left open the question of how the personal knowledge requirement should be interpreted. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Speed
green
1 sentence2021Speed, 315 Ill. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Brothers
green
1 sentence2021Brothers, 2015 IL App (4th) 130644, ¶ 68 ; Hallbeck, 227 Ill. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Hallbeck
green
1 sentence2021Brothers, 2015 IL App (4th) 130644, ¶ 68 ; Hallbeck, 227 Ill. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Wesley
green
1 sentence2021January 1, 2011); People v. Wesley, 2019 IL App (1st) 170442 , ¶ 23. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Simpson
green
1 sentence2021People v. Simpson, 2015 IL 116512 , ¶¶ 28-34. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.