16 California opinions name it 2 courts 1970–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Cortezgreen2 sentences2026The personal knowledge requirement extends to statements of hearsay declarants. ( Cortez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 123–124.) Escandon relies on the rule that the proponent of a hearsay statement must show that the hearsay declarant has personal knowledge of his statement when it is admitted for its truth. 2018Code, §§ 403, subd. (a)(2) [proponent of evidence has the burden of establishing a witness's personal knowledge], 702; see generally People v. Cortez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 101 , 123-124, 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 846 , 369 P.3d 521 ["California courts have extended this personal knowledge requirement to statements of hearsay declarants"].) A trial court may exclude a witness's testimony for lack of knowledge " ' only if no jury could reasonably find that [the witness] has such knowledge.' " ( People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543 , 573, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575 , 22 P.3d 347 .) Once that low threshold is sati | 2 | 3 |
People v. Andersongreen2 sentences2018Code, §§ 403, subd. (a)(2) [proponent of evidence has the burden of establishing a witness's personal knowledge], 702; see generally People v. Cortez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 101 , 123-124, 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 846 , 369 P.3d 521 ["California courts have extended this personal knowledge requirement to statements of hearsay declarants"].) A trial court may exclude a witness's testimony for lack of knowledge " ' only if no jury could reasonably find that [the witness] has such knowledge.' " ( People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543 , 573, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575 , 22 P.3d 347 .) Once that low threshold is sati 2018Code, §§ 403, subd. (a)(2) [proponent of evidence has the burden of establishing a witness's personal knowledge], 702; see generally People v. Cortez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 101 , 123-124, 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 846 , 369 P.3d 521 ["California courts have extended this personal knowledge requirement to statements of hearsay declarants"].) A trial court may exclude a witness's testimony for lack of knowledge " ' only if no jury could reasonably find that [the witness] has such knowledge.' " ( People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543 , 573, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575 , 22 P.3d 347 .) Once that low threshold is sati | 2 | 2 |
People v. Leongreen2 sentences2010The condition in this case, too, failed to give Victor notice of which individuals he must avoid. 5 (Accord, People v. Leon (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 943, 949-951 [ 104 Cal.Rptr.3d 410 ] [condition of adult probation prohibiting association with gang members modified to include knowledge requirement].) *912 In light of the foregoing authorities and the Attorney General’s concession, we hold the first-listed condition of probation is unconstitutionally vague and will modify it to include a personal knowledge requirement. 2010The condition in this case, too, failed to give Victor notice of which individuals he must avoid. 5 (Accord, People v. Leon (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 943, 949-951 [ 104 Cal.Rptr.3d 410 ] [condition of adult probation prohibiting association with gang members modified to include knowledge requirement].) *912 In light of the foregoing authorities and the Attorney General’s concession, we hold the first-listed condition of probation is unconstitutionally vague and will modify it to include a personal knowledge requirement. | 2 | 2 |
In Re Justin S.green2 sentences2015(Compare Victor L., supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at pp. 931-932 [modifying probation condition to preclude a minor from, inter alia, being “ ‘in any areas where gang members are known by Minor to meet or get together, or areas known by Minor for gang-related activity’ ”]; 13 People v. Leon ( 181 Cal.App.4th 943, 952 [modifying probation condition to preclude defendant from visiting or remaining in any location “which you know to be or which the probation officer informs you” is an area of gang-related activity].) Nor do we agree that this condition must be modified to clarify the meaning of the word 2013(See, e.g., In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 911-912 [probation condition modified to include a personal knowledge requirement]; In re Justin S. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 811, 816 [court modified a condition prohibiting a minor’s association with “gang members” to prohibit only association with “persons known to the probationer to be associated with a gang”].) Minor acknowledges that the challenged conditions here contain a knowledge requirement, i.e., “Not have any direct or indirect contact with anyone known to be disapproved . . . .” He, however, argues that the challenged conditions | 2 | 2 |
People v. Valenciagreen2 sentences2026(People v. Valencia (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 92 , 103–104 [inadmissible testimony about a statement by a declarant offered for its truth that defendant molested her for more than three months to prove element of continuous sexual abuse]; Cortez, at pp. 123–124 [ample evidence from which a rational trier of fact could conclude hearsay declarant had personal knowledge of the admissible hearsay statements suggesting defendant knew of and went along with a plan to commit a shooting].) 44 We can dismiss Escandon’s challenge because the statement was not admitted for its truth. 2016(People v. Valencia (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 92, 103-104 [ 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 649 ].) When a witness’s personal knowledge is in question, the trial court must make a preliminary determination of whether “there is evidence sufficient to sustain a finding” that the witness has the requisite knowledge. | 1 | 2 |
In Re HCgreen2 sentences2015The second probation condition challenged by appellant provides: “That [appellant] not wear or display items or emblems reasonably known to be associated with or symbolic of gang membership.” Appellant argues that this condition should be modified to provide a personal knowledge requirement in place of the words “reasonably known.” (See In re H.C. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1067, 1071-1072 [finding that similar use of word “known” in passive voice left unclear identity of person who had knowledge; court changed condition to read “known to you”].) Respondent does not oppose this change, and further 2010In that respect, the “gang-related activity” condition meets the minimum requirements established by H.C., supra, 175 Cal.App.4th 1067 , which recently grappled with similar language. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Shaun R.green1 sentence2015The second probation condition challenged by appellant provides: “That [appellant] not wear or display items or emblems reasonably known to be associated with or symbolic of gang membership.” Appellant argues that this condition should be modified to provide a personal knowledge requirement in place of the words “reasonably known.” (See In re H.C. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1067, 1071-1072 [finding that similar use of word “known” in passive voice left unclear identity of person who had knowledge; court changed condition to read “known to you”].) Respondent does not oppose this change, and further | 1 | 1 |
Mabry v. Superior Courtgreen1 sentence2014LEXIS 19647 at p. 24 ]; see also Mabry v. Superior Court (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 208, 233 [“The way [Civil Code] section 2923.5 is set up, too many people are necessarily involved in the process for any one person to likely be in the position where he or she could swear that all three requirements of the declaration required by subdivision (b) were met.”].) Nor, in our research, have we found any other provision imposing a personal knowledge requirement. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Victor L.green1 sentence2013(See, e.g., In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 911-912 [probation condition modified to include a personal knowledge requirement]; In re Justin S. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 811, 816 [court modified a condition prohibiting a minor’s association with “gang members” to prohibit only association with “persons known to the probationer to be associated with a gang”].) Minor acknowledges that the challenged conditions here contain a knowledge requirement, i.e., “Not have any direct or indirect contact with anyone known to be disapproved . . . .” He, however, argues that the challenged conditions | 1 | 1 |
People v. Norwoodgreen2 sentences1975The plain wording of section 538.5 negates such incorporation. “ ‘Where a statute, with reference to one subject contains a given provision, the omission of such provision from a similar statute concerning a related subject is significant to show that a different intention existed.’ ” (City of Port Hueneme v. City of Oxnard, 52 Cal.2d 385 , at p. 395 [ 341 P.2d 318 ]; see also People v. Norwood, 26 Cal.App.3d 148 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 7 ].) Furthermore, even though the original Samuels’ declaration does not expressly state that it is based on his personal knowledge, the rule of Weathers v. Kaiser Fo 1975The plain wording of section 538.5 negates such incorporation. “ ‘Where a statute, with reference to one subject contains a given provision, the omission of such provision from a similar statute concerning a related subject is significant to show that a different intention existed.’ ” (City of Port Hueneme v. City of Oxnard, 52 Cal.2d 385 , at p. 395 [ 341 P.2d 318 ]; see also People v. Norwood, 26 Cal.App.3d 148 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 7 ].) Furthermore, even though the original Samuels’ declaration does not expressly state that it is based on his personal knowledge, the rule of Weathers v. Kaiser Fo | 1 | 1 |
Weathers v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitalsgreen2 sentences1975The plain wording of section 538.5 negates such incorporation. “ ‘Where a statute, with reference to one subject contains a given provision, the omission of such provision from a similar statute concerning a related subject is significant to show that a different intention existed.’ ” (City of Port Hueneme v. City of Oxnard, 52 Cal.2d 385 , at p. 395 [ 341 P.2d 318 ]; see also People v. Norwood, 26 Cal.App.3d 148 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 7 ].) Furthermore, even though the original Samuels’ declaration does not expressly state that it is based on his personal knowledge, the rule of Weathers v. Kaiser Fo 1975The plain wording of section 538.5 negates such incorporation. “ ‘Where a statute, with reference to one subject contains a given provision, the omission of such provision from a similar statute concerning a related subject is significant to show that a different intention existed.’ ” (City of Port Hueneme v. City of Oxnard, 52 Cal.2d 385 , at p. 395 [ 341 P.2d 318 ]; see also People v. Norwood, 26 Cal.App.3d 148 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 7 ].) Furthermore, even though the original Samuels’ declaration does not expressly state that it is based on his personal knowledge, the rule of Weathers v. Kaiser Fo | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Espejo v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group
green
2 sentences2025(See, e.g., Espejo, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 1052 & fn. 1 [declaration by a systems consultant who maintained the online system used to secure the plaintiff’s electronic signature]; Zamudio v. Aerotek, Inc. 18 (E.D.Cal. 2024) 733 F.3d 931, 940 [declaration by the manager of technology products including the onboarding program used by the plaintiff to sign an electronic arbitration agreement]; see also LAOSD Asbestos Cases (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 939 , 947 [Evidence Code does not exempt from the personal knowledge requirement a corporate representative who has conducted an investigation or re 2025(See, e.g., Espejo, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 1052 & fn. 1 [declaration by a systems consultant who maintained the online system used to secure the plaintiff’s electronic signature]; Zamudio v. Aerotek, Inc. 18 (E.D.Cal. 2024) 733 F.3d 931, 940 [declaration by the manager of technology products including the onboarding program used by the plaintiff to sign an electronic arbitration agreement]; see also LAOSD Asbestos Cases (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 939 , 947 [Evidence Code does not exempt from the personal knowledge requirement a corporate representative who has conducted an investigation or re | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Kasky v. Nike, Inc.
green
1 sentence2022(See Kasky, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 955 .) To the contrary, the rationale presumes that sometimes commercial speech may not be more easily verifiable or may not be known to the speaker as true or false. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Leon
green
1 sentence2022The personal knowledge requirement is satisfied so long as the witness is “familiar with defendant’s appearance around the time of the crimes.” (Leon, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 601 .) Moreover, “[q]uestions about the extent of [Dhillon’s] familiarity with defendant’s appearance went to the weight, not the admissibility, of [her] testimony.” (Ibid.) Since the body camera footage was taken a day before the incident, and Dhillon interviewed defendant shortly after the incident, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in determining that Dhillon had gained sufficient familiarity with def | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Moreno
green
1 sentence2021Because Y.’s trial testimony and her prior statement to the detective regarding R. having money taken from him are both unsupported by any evidence she had personal knowledge such a taking occurred, and because “these statements appear to be the only evidence the prosecution was prepared to offer to satisfy its burden of establishing [the taking element of the robbery charges], we can conceive of no tactical reason whatsoever which might have dictated trial counsel’s decision not to object.” (Moreno, supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 1191 .) Turning to prejudice, having concluded the alternative mea | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Sanchez
green
2 sentences2020Analysis Johnson contends the trial court violated state law and his federal due process rights by admitting expert testimony of case-specific facts that were beyond the expert’s personal knowledge in violation of Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th 665 . 2020Analysis Johnson contends the trial court violated state law and his federal due process rights by admitting expert testimony of case-specific facts that were beyond the expert’s personal knowledge in violation of Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th 665 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Richardson
green
1 sentence2006“Courts require that declarants of a hearsay statement have firsthand knowledge before the hearsay statement is admissible, however. [Citations.] The party offering a statement has the burden of proving personal knowledge.” (State v. Richardson (Minn. 2003) 670 N.W.2d 267, 282 .) “In a hearsay situation, the declarant is, of course, a witness, and neither this rule[, Federal Rules of Evidence, rule 803,] nor Rule 804 dispenses with the requirement of firsthand knowledge.” (Advisory Com. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
City of Port Hueneme v. City of Oxnard
green
2 sentences1975The plain wording of section 538.5 negates such incorporation. “ ‘Where a statute, with reference to one subject contains a given provision, the omission of such provision from a similar statute concerning a related subject is significant to show that a different intention existed.’ ” (City of Port Hueneme v. City of Oxnard, 52 Cal.2d 385 , at p. 395 [ 341 P.2d 318 ]; see also People v. Norwood, 26 Cal.App.3d 148 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 7 ].) Furthermore, even though the original Samuels’ declaration does not expressly state that it is based on his personal knowledge, the rule of Weathers v. Kaiser Fo 1975The plain wording of section 538.5 negates such incorporation. “ ‘Where a statute, with reference to one subject contains a given provision, the omission of such provision from a similar statute concerning a related subject is significant to show that a different intention existed.’ ” (City of Port Hueneme v. City of Oxnard, 52 Cal.2d 385 , at p. 395 [ 341 P.2d 318 ]; see also People v. Norwood, 26 Cal.App.3d 148 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 7 ].) Furthermore, even though the original Samuels’ declaration does not expressly state that it is based on his personal knowledge, the rule of Weathers v. Kaiser Fo | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Price v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1970“In common usage, ‘personal knowledge’ is not always the equivalent of T saw’ but often refers, merely to matters which the informer heard or read from a source which he credits, and the test is not whether the informer had doubts about his-information but whether an independent magistrate should credit the in- - former's information.” (Italics added.) (Price v. Superior Court, 1 Cal.3d 836 ; 841 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 369 , 463 P.2d 721 ].) The informer here could not make his allegation based on personal observation, which if his vision were satisfactory, would prove a highly reliable report. 1970“In common usage, ‘personal knowledge’ is not always the equivalent of T saw’ but often refers, merely to matters which the informer heard or read from a source which he credits, and the test is not whether the informer had doubts about his-information but whether an independent magistrate should credit the in- - former's information.” (Italics added.) (Price v. Superior Court, 1 Cal.3d 836 ; 841 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 369 , 463 P.2d 721 ].) The informer here could not make his allegation based on personal observation, which if his vision were satisfactory, would prove a highly reliable report. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.