continuous negligent medical treatment doctrine in Delaware

2025Here, the Court does not take the liberty of coining a new name for the doctrine but nevertheless recognizes that Delaware law requires the focus to remain on the last inextricably intertwined negligent conduct within the continuum. 34 See Ewing, 520 A.2d at 663 (recognizing the continuous negligent medical treatment doctrine). 35 Id. at 664-65 .

2025Here, the Court does not take the liberty of coining a new name for the doctrine but nevertheless recognizes that Delaware law requires the focus to remain on the last inextricably intertwined negligent conduct within the continuum. 34 See Ewing, 520 A.2d at 663 (recognizing the continuous negligent medical treatment doctrine). 35 Id. at 664-65 .

2020That is not to say that any act by the medical professional in relation to the condition for which the plaintiff received negligent treatment can constitute the “last act.”40 The act must be one that, together with other acts taken during the course of treatment, forms the negligent whole. 39 Id. (emphasis added). 40 See Benge, 553 A.2d at 1183 (“The difference between the [continuing treatment doctrine and the continuous negligent medical treatment doctrine] . . . is that under the doctrine of continuous negligent medical treatment, the focus is limited to the last act in the negligent contin

2020That is not to say that any act by the medical professional in relation to the condition for which the plaintiff received negligent treatment can constitute the “last act.”40 The act must be one that, together with other acts taken during the course of treatment, forms the negligent whole. 39 Id. (emphasis added). 40 See Benge, 553 A.2d at 1183 (“The difference between the [continuing treatment doctrine and the continuous negligent medical treatment doctrine] . . . is that under the doctrine of continuous negligent medical treatment, the focus is limited to the last act in the negligent contin

2021Co., 327 N.W.2d 55, 64 (Wis. 1982) (emphasis in original)). 23 Id. (citing Streitz v. LeRoy, C.A.

2021Co., 327 N.W.2d 55, 64 (Wis. 1982) (emphasis in original)). 23 Id. (citing Streitz v. LeRoy, C.A.

2020Continuous Negligent Medical Treatment A. The two-year statute of limitations began to run on March 23, 2016 Delaware recognizes the doctrine of continuous negligent medical treatment as a separate cause of action that is applicable “[w]hen there is a continuum of negligent medical care related to a single condition occasioned by negligence.”26 “If 25 Id. at 902. 26 Ewing v. Beck, 520 A.2d 653, 662 (Del. 1987). 9 any act of medical negligence falls within the period during which suit may be brought, the plaintiff . . . may bring suit for the consequences of the entire course of conduct.”27 Bar

2020With respect to the second prong, Defendants argue that the limitations period “begins on the date of the last negligent act in the continuum of negligent medical care.”35 Defendants correctly note that the Delaware Supreme Court has distinguished the “continuing treatment doctrine,” which is not recognized in Delaware, from the “doctrine of continuous negligent medical treatment,” which is 32 Id. 33 Id. 34 Id. 35 Defs.’ Reply Br.

2020Continuous Negligent Medical Treatment A. The two-year statute of limitations began to run on March 23, 2016 Delaware recognizes the doctrine of continuous negligent medical treatment as a separate cause of action that is applicable “[w]hen there is a continuum of negligent medical care related to a single condition occasioned by negligence.”26 “If 25 Id. at 902. 26 Ewing v. Beck, 520 A.2d 653, 662 (Del. 1987). 9 any act of medical negligence falls within the period during which suit may be brought, the plaintiff . . . may bring suit for the consequences of the entire course of conduct.”27 Bar

2018Moreover, Plaintiff" s apparent argument that the “discovery rule” may also toll the statute of limitations as to his due process claim is unavailing Plaintiff argues that tolling is not at issue here, except possibly as to Count 1, where it could be argued that the statute began to run upon the discovery of facts “constituting the basis of the cause of action or the existence of facts sufficient to put a person of ordinary to a single condition occasioned by negligence.” The difference between the two doctrines, for statute of limitation purposes, is that under the doctrine of continuous negl