judge finds only aggravating factors (Florida) · Go Syfert
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judge finds only aggravating factors in Florida

6 Florida opinions name it 1 courts 2004–2005 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (1)

CaseFollowedCited
Schriro v. Summerlingreen
scotus · 2004 · cited in 6 Florida opinions naming this issue, 2004–2005
2 sentences

2005As to retroactivity, the Court concluded that "[i]f under DeStefano a trial held entirely without a jury was not impermissibly inaccurate, it is hard to see how a trial in which a judge finds only aggravating factors could be." Id. at 2526. [5] Nor does the failure to submit an element of a crime to the jury always require a remedy.

2004The Court concluded that "[i]f under DeStefano a trial held entirely without a jury was not impermissibly inaccurate, it is hard to see how a trial in which a judge finds only aggravating factors could be." Summerlin, 124 S.Ct. at 2526 .

16

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (3)

CaseCitedYears
DeStefano v. Woods green
scotus · 1968
2 sentences

2005Second, the Court relied upon its own prior decision in DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 , 88 S.Ct. 2093 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1308 (1968) (declining to give retroactive application to a 1968 decision that extended the jury-trial guarantee to the states), and concluded that Ring did not establish a “watershed rule[ ] of criminal procedure”: If under DeStefano a trial held entirely without a jury was not impermissibly inaccurate, it is hard to see how a trial in which a judge finds only aggravating factors could be.

2005Second, the Court relied upon its own prior decision in DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 , 88 S.Ct. 2093 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1308 (1968) (declining to give retroactive application to a 1968 decision that extended the jury-trial guarantee to the states), and concluded that Ring did not establish a “watershed rule[ ] of criminal procedure”: If under DeStefano a trial held entirely without a jury was not impermissibly inaccurate, it is hard to see how a trial in which a judge finds only aggravating factors could be.

52005–2005
United States v. Gaudin green
scotus · 1995
2 sentences

2005In Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8-9 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999), the Supreme Court held that a trial court's determination of materiality in a tax fraud case, which violated United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 , 115 S.Ct. 2310 , 132 L.Ed.2d 444 (1995) (holding that materiality is an element for the jury), was not a structural error that rendered the trial fundamentally unfair.

2005In Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8-9 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999), the Supreme Court held that a trial court's determination of materiality in a tax fraud case, which violated United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 , 115 S.Ct. 2310 , 132 L.Ed.2d 444 (1995) (holding that materiality is an element for the jury), was not a structural error that rendered the trial fundamentally unfair.

12005–2005
Neder v. United States green
scotus · 1999
2 sentences

2005In Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8-9 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999), the Supreme Court held that a trial court's determination of materiality in a tax fraud case, which violated United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 , 115 S.Ct. 2310 , 132 L.Ed.2d 444 (1995) (holding that materiality is an element for the jury), was not a structural error that rendered the trial fundamentally unfair.

2005In Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8-9 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999), the Supreme Court held that a trial court's determination of materiality in a tax fraud case, which violated United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 , 115 S.Ct. 2310 , 132 L.Ed.2d 444 (1995) (holding that materiality is an element for the jury), was not a structural error that rendered the trial fundamentally unfair.

12005–2005

Statutes the citing opinions construe

FL § 775.082 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

FL 6 (2004–2005) CO 2 (2006–2006)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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