6 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1964–1999 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Solimando v. International Med. Centersgreen2 sentences1992Centers, 544 So.2d 1031, 1033 (Fla. 2d DCA), review dismissed, 549 So.2d 1013 (Fla.1989). 1992Solimando v. International Medical Centers, 544 So.2d 1031, 1033-34 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (cited with approval in Hospital Corp. of Am. v. Lindberg, 571 So.2d 446 (Fla. 1990)). | 2 | 2 |
Rhoades v. SW FLA. REGIONAL MED. CTR.green1 sentence1999See Weinstock v. Groth, 629 So.2d 835, 838 (Fla. 1993) (observing that presuit requirements of chapter 766 are meant "to alleviate the high cost of medical malpractice claims through early determination and prompt resolution of claims"); Fort Walton Beach Medical Ctr., Inc. v. Dingler, 697 So.2d 575, 579 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (reaffirming purpose of chapter 766's presuit notice of intent as providing "the defendants notice of the incident in order to allow investigation of the matter and promote presuit settlement of the claim"); Stone v. Rosenthal, 665 So.2d 276, 277 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (explai | 1 | 1 |
Stone v. Rosenthalgreen1 sentence1999See Weinstock v. Groth, 629 So.2d 835, 838 (Fla. 1993) (observing that presuit requirements of chapter 766 are meant "to alleviate the high cost of medical malpractice claims through early determination and prompt resolution of claims"); Fort Walton Beach Medical Ctr., Inc. v. Dingler, 697 So.2d 575, 579 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (reaffirming purpose of chapter 766's presuit notice of intent as providing "the defendants notice of the incident in order to allow investigation of the matter and promote presuit settlement of the claim"); Stone v. Rosenthal, 665 So.2d 276, 277 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (explai | 1 | 1 |
Nowling v. Walton Regional Hospitalgreen1 sentence1999In conjunction with section 766.106, the "reasonable investigation" requirement of section 766.104 is another component of the statutory scheme which "obviously attempts to ensure good faith and limit frivolous filings." Nowling v. Walton Regional Hosp., 711 So.2d 631, 632 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 719 So.2d 892 (Fla.), and review denied, 719 So.2d 894 (Fla. 1998). | 1 | 1 |
Weinstock v. Grothgreen1 sentence1999See Weinstock v. Groth, 629 So.2d 835, 838 (Fla. 1993) (observing that presuit requirements of chapter 766 are meant "to alleviate the high cost of medical malpractice claims through early determination and prompt resolution of claims"); Fort Walton Beach Medical Ctr., Inc. v. Dingler, 697 So.2d 575, 579 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (reaffirming purpose of chapter 766's presuit notice of intent as providing "the defendants notice of the incident in order to allow investigation of the matter and promote presuit settlement of the claim"); Stone v. Rosenthal, 665 So.2d 276, 277 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (explai | 1 | 1 |
FORT WALTON BEACH MED. CENTER v. Dinglergreen1 sentence1999See Weinstock v. Groth, 629 So.2d 835, 838 (Fla. 1993) (observing that presuit requirements of chapter 766 are meant "to alleviate the high cost of medical malpractice claims through early determination and prompt resolution of claims"); Fort Walton Beach Medical Ctr., Inc. v. Dingler, 697 So.2d 575, 579 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (reaffirming purpose of chapter 766's presuit notice of intent as providing "the defendants notice of the incident in order to allow investigation of the matter and promote presuit settlement of the claim"); Stone v. Rosenthal, 665 So.2d 276, 277 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (explai | 1 | 1 |
Castro v. Davisgreen1 sentence1995See Castro v. Davis, 527 So.2d 250 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hospital Corp. of America v. Lindberg
green
1 sentence1992Solimando v. International Medical Centers, 544 So.2d 1031, 1033-34 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (cited with approval in Hospital Corp. of Am. v. Lindberg, 571 So.2d 446 (Fla. 1990)). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
State ex rel. Manatee County ex rel. Manatee County Sheriff's Department v. Kruysman
green
2 sentences1989In [ Manatee County v. ] Kruysman, [ 475 So.2d 1007 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), rev. denied, 486 So.2d 598 (Fla. 1986)] this court stated that "[w]hile a claimant must allege compliance with section 768.28(6) in order to state a cause of action, the failure to do so does not affect subject matter jurisdiction." Kruysman, 475 So.2d at 1009 . 1989In [ Manatee County v. ] Kruysman, [ 475 So.2d 1007 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), rev. denied, 486 So.2d 598 (Fla. 1986)] this court stated that "[w]hile a claimant must allege compliance with section 768.28(6) in order to state a cause of action, the failure to do so does not affect subject matter jurisdiction." Kruysman, 475 So.2d at 1009 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Norwich Union Indemnity Co. v. Willis
green
1 sentence1964This result is similar to that reached in Norwich Union Indemnity Co. v. Willis, 1936, 124 Fla. 137 , 168 So. 418 , wherein the Supreme Court held that notice to an agent of the insurance company was sufficient, even though the policy required such notice to be given to the home office. | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Norwich Union Indemnity Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.
green
1 sentence1964This result is similar to that reached in Norwich Union Indemnity Co. v. Willis, 1936, 124 Fla. 137 , 168 So. 418 , wherein the Supreme Court held that notice to an agent of the insurance company was sufficient, even though the policy required such notice to be given to the home office. | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.