reverter clause in Florida

1994In Continental Equities, Inc. v. Jacksonville Transportation Authority, 360 So.2d 1101 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), cert. denied, 368 So.2d 1364 (Fla.1979), this Court affirmed Judge Shave’s ruling on the counterclaims, finding that Galardi was the owner of the land at the time of the taking and had the right to the proceeds from the condemnation action, and that “[t]he mortgagee’s interest of Continental in the condemnation proceedings is not before us but can be disposed of by the trial court in appropriate supplementary proceedings.” 2 Judge Goodfriend took over the case, and in 1980 entered an ord

1984Cf. Chianese v. Culley, 397 F. Supp. 1344 .

1973The Supreme Court of Florida defined the difference between a private and public hospital in the case of West Coast Hospital Ass'n v. Hoare, Fla. 1953, 64 So.2d 293 , a case almost identical to the one sub judice.

1972The petition for writ of certiorari reflected probable jurisdiction with us because of conflict with Kirk v. Kennedy, DCA-2, 1970, 231 So.2d 246 , however, after argument and upon further review, we fail to find any case construing the 1970 statutory amendment and upon which conflict certiorari could be based.

1956Counsel for the defendant Servando has cited the case of State by Burnquist v. Marcks, 1949, 228 Minn. 129 , 36 N.W.2d 594, 596 , in which the dedicatory plat contained a clause declaring that the "reversionary title" of any vacated street was expressly reserved to the "`original platting company'" and providing that "`the fee and any part of any street is declared not to be included in or as any part of any lot therein.'" It will be seen that this reverter clause is couched in somewhat stronger language than that involved in the instant case, and it was apparently undisputed that the assignee

1956Counsel for the defendant Servando has cited the case of State by Burnquist v. Marcks, 1949, 228 Minn. 129 , 36 N.W.2d 594, 596 , in which the dedicatory plat contained a clause declaring that the "reversionary title" of any vacated street was expressly reserved to the "`original platting company'" and providing that "`the fee and any part of any street is declared not to be included in or as any part of any lot therein.'" It will be seen that this reverter clause is couched in somewhat stronger language than that involved in the instant case, and it was apparently undisputed that the assignee

1956In Plumer v. Johnston, 1886, 63 Mich. 165 , 29 N.W. 687, 689 , the exact question with which we are here concerned was presented, under a reservation contained in the instrument dedicating the plat, as follows: "`Reserving to ourselves, however, said street and alleys, whenever the same may be discontinued by law.'" In upholding the title of the original owner to a vacated street as against the claim of the owner of abutting lots, the court said: "Whether this reservation amounts to a condition upon which the dedication was made, need not now be determined.

1956In Plumer v. Johnston, 1886, 63 Mich. 165 , 29 N.W. 687, 689 , the exact question with which we are here concerned was presented, under a reservation contained in the instrument dedicating the plat, as follows: "`Reserving to ourselves, however, said street and alleys, whenever the same may be discontinued by law.'" In upholding the title of the original owner to a vacated street as against the claim of the owner of abutting lots, the court said: "Whether this reservation amounts to a condition upon which the dedication was made, need not now be determined.