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6 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1973–2013 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
DEPT. OF HWY. SAFETY v. Stewartgreen1 sentence2013Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Stewart, 625 So.2d 123, 124 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Matthewsgreen1 sentence2007See State v. Matthews, 891 So.2d 479, 483-84 (Fla.2004). | 1 | 1 |
Cottrell v. Amerkangreen2 sentences1980The administrative order under review is affirmed upon a holding that: (a) the standard of proof employed by the hearing examiner in reaching the findings of fact in this cause was not one of preponderance of the evidence, as both parties to this appeal have mistakenly assumed, and, accordingly, we have no occasion to determine whether the utilization of such a standard would in the abstract, constitute reversible error, as urged by appellant, it being abundantly clear that such an alleged error did not occur in this case, Cottrell v. Amerkan, 160 Fla. 390 , 35 So.2d 383, 384 (1948) (court syl 1980The administrative order under review is affirmed upon a holding that: (a) the standard of proof employed by the hearing examiner in reaching the findings of fact in this cause was not one of preponderance of the evidence, as both parties to this appeal have mistakenly assumed, and, accordingly, we have no occasion to determine whether the utilization of such a standard would in the abstract, constitute reversible error, as urged by appellant, it being abundantly clear that such an alleged error did not occur in this case, Cottrell v. Amerkan, 160 Fla. 390 , 35 So.2d 383, 384 (1948) (court syl | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Evangelical United Brethren Church v. State
green
2 sentences1981As a tool to assist in questions of this type, the court in Commercial Carrier Corp. commended the utilization of the test outlined in Evangelical United Brethren Church v. State, 67 Wash.2d 246 , 407 P.2d 440 (1965): "Whatever the suitable characterization or label might be, it would appear *1142 that any determination of a line of demarcation between truly discretionary and other executive and administrative processes, so far as susceptibility to potential sovereign tort liability be concerned, would necessitate a posing of at least the following four preliminary questions: (1) Does the chal 1981As a tool to assist in questions of this type, the court in Commercial Carrier Corp. commended the utilization of the test outlined in Evangelical United Brethren Church v. State, 67 Wash.2d 246 , 407 P.2d 440 (1965): "Whatever the suitable characterization or label might be, it would appear *1142 that any determination of a line of demarcation between truly discretionary and other executive and administrative processes, so far as susceptibility to potential sovereign tort liability be concerned, would necessitate a posing of at least the following four preliminary questions: (1) Does the chal | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Jones v. US Steel Credit Corporation
neutral
1 sentence1981In Jones v. U. S. Steel Credit Corporation, 382 So.2d 48 (Fla.2d DCA 1979) the opinion concluded: We agree with the trial court’s decision that, under the compelling facts before the court, the doctrine of equitable estop-pel, as set forth in Town of Largo v. Imperial Homes Corp., 309 So.2d 571 (Fla.2d DCA 1975), although by its terms available only to property owners, in equity and good conscience should be applicable here. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Town of Largo v. Imperial Homes Corp.
green
1 sentence1981In Jones v. U. S. Steel Credit Corporation, 382 So.2d 48 (Fla.2d DCA 1979) the opinion concluded: We agree with the trial court’s decision that, under the compelling facts before the court, the doctrine of equitable estop-pel, as set forth in Town of Largo v. Imperial Homes Corp., 309 So.2d 571 (Fla.2d DCA 1975), although by its terms available only to property owners, in equity and good conscience should be applicable here. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COM'N v. Webb
green
1 sentence1980Florida Real Estate Commission v. Webb, 367 So.2d 201 (Fla.1979). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Schwob Co. v. Florida Industrial Commission
green
2 sentences1973In Schwob Co. v. Florida Industrial Commission, 152 Fla. 203 , 11 So.2d 782 (1942), The Supreme Court laid down the strict guidelines for the utilization of the rule permitting certified questions when it stated: “The petition must be denied because it attempts to transfer the jurisdiction of the circuit court to this court, which cannot be done. 1973In Schwob Co. v. Florida Industrial Commission, 152 Fla. 203 , 11 So.2d 782 (1942), The Supreme Court laid down the strict guidelines for the utilization of the rule permitting certified questions when it stated: “The petition must be denied because it attempts to transfer the jurisdiction of the circuit court to this court, which cannot be done. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.