Watts test in Florida

2011He suggests that the majority decision in this case conflicts with Cruz v. State, 956 So.2d 1279 , 1282 n. 4 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007), where in a footnote we said, quoting State v. Mitchell, 719 So.2d 1245, 1248 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998): The Grappin/Watts test is drawn from two decisions, Grappin v. State, 450 So.2d 480 (Fla.1984), and State v. Watts, 462 So.2d 813 (Fla.1985), and stands for the proposition that when a question arises regarding the unit of prosecution intended by the legislature in a particular criminal statute, use of the article `a' will result in the conclusion that the legislature c

2007Collins v. State, 577 So.2d 986 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991); see also Carawan v. State, 515 So.2d 161 (Fla.1987). [3] Sub-section (1), also known as the rule of lenity, reads: "The provisions of this code and offenses defined by other statutes shall be strictly construed; when the language is susceptible of differing constructions, it shall be construed most favorable to the accused." § 775.021(1), Fla. Stat. [4] The Grappin/Watts test is drawn from two decisions, Grappin v. State, 450 So.2d 480 (Fla.1984), and State v. Watts, 462 So.2d 813 (Fla.1985), and stands for the proposition that when a questi

2011He suggests that the majority decision in this case conflicts with Cruz v. State, 956 So.2d 1279 , 1282 n. 4 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007), where in a footnote we said, quoting State v. Mitchell, 719 So.2d 1245, 1248 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998): The Grappin/Watts test is drawn from two decisions, Grappin v. State, 450 So.2d 480 (Fla.1984), and State v. Watts, 462 So.2d 813 (Fla.1985), and stands for the proposition that when a question arises regarding the unit of prosecution intended by the legislature in a particular criminal statute, use of the article `a' will result in the conclusion that the legislature c

2007Collins v. State, 577 So.2d 986 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991); see also Carawan v. State, 515 So.2d 161 (Fla.1987). [3] Sub-section (1), also known as the rule of lenity, reads: "The provisions of this code and offenses defined by other statutes shall be strictly construed; when the language is susceptible of differing constructions, it shall be construed most favorable to the accused." § 775.021(1), Fla. Stat. [4] The Grappin/Watts test is drawn from two decisions, Grappin v. State, 450 So.2d 480 (Fla.1984), and State v. Watts, 462 So.2d 813 (Fla.1985), and stands for the proposition that when a questi

2011He suggests that the majority decision in this case conflicts with Cruz v. State, 956 So.2d 1279 , 1282 n. 4 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007), where in a footnote we said, quoting State v. Mitchell, 719 So.2d 1245, 1248 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998): The Grappin/Watts test is drawn from two decisions, Grappin v. State, 450 So.2d 480 (Fla.1984), and State v. Watts, 462 So.2d 813 (Fla.1985), and stands for the proposition that when a question arises regarding the unit of prosecution intended by the legislature in a particular criminal statute, use of the article `a' will result in the conclusion that the legislature c

2011Cruz, however, is factually distinguishable and did not consider Bautista v. State, 863 So.2d 1180 (Fla.2003), upon which the majority relies.

2007See United States v. Dorcely, 454 F.3d 366, 371 (D.C.Cir.2006) (discussing continuing vitality of Watts , holding "that a sentencing court may base a sentence on acquitted conduct without offending the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury," and observing that "[i]n so holding, we agree with every circuit that has considered the question post- Booker "); United States v. Duncan, 400 F.3d 1297 , 1304 (11th Cir.2005) (applying the Watts rule and stating that " Booker does not suggest that the consideration of acquitted conduct violates the Sixth Amendment as long as the judge does n

2007See United States v. Dorcely, 454 F.3d 366, 371 (D.C.Cir.2006) (discussing continuing vitality of Watts , holding "that a sentencing court may base a sentence on acquitted conduct without offending the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury," and observing that "[i]n so holding, we agree with every circuit that has considered the question post- Booker "); United States v. Duncan, 400 F.3d 1297 , 1304 (11th Cir.2005) (applying the Watts rule and stating that " Booker does not suggest that the consideration of acquitted conduct violates the Sixth Amendment as long as the judge does n

2007Collins v. State, 577 So.2d 986 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991); see also Carawan v. State, 515 So.2d 161 (Fla.1987). [3] Sub-section (1), also known as the rule of lenity, reads: "The provisions of this code and offenses defined by other statutes shall be strictly construed; when the language is susceptible of differing constructions, it shall be construed most favorable to the accused." § 775.021(1), Fla. Stat. [4] The Grappin/Watts test is drawn from two decisions, Grappin v. State, 450 So.2d 480 (Fla.1984), and State v. Watts, 462 So.2d 813 (Fla.1985), and stands for the proposition that when a questi

1998Cf. Pierce v. State, 681 So.2d 873 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (applying the Grappin/ Watts test and holding that pursuant to section 843.01, Florida Statutes, which proscribes "knowingly and willfully resist[ing], obstruct[ing], or oppos[ing] any [law enforcement] officer," only one conviction was permitted notwithstanding that the defendant resisted or opposed three officers during a single incident).

1998He contends that the correct rule is that employed in cases such as Hallman v. State, 492 So.2d 1136 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986).

1992Watts raises the following claims in this appeal: (1) the trial court erred in failing to appoint the diagnosis and evaluation team of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) to examine Watts when the issue of his mental retardation was raised; (2) the court erred in finding Watts competent to stand trial; (3) the court erred in failing to advise Watts of his right to represent himself and in failing to conduct an inquiry pursuant to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); (4) the court erred in overruling Watts' objection to the prosecut

1992Watts raises the following claims in this appeal: (1) the trial court erred in failing to appoint the diagnosis and evaluation team of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) to examine Watts when the issue of his mental retardation was raised; (2) the court erred in finding Watts competent to stand trial; (3) the court erred in failing to advise Watts of his right to represent himself and in failing to conduct an inquiry pursuant to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); (4) the court erred in overruling Watts' objection to the prosecut

1985On appeal the circuit court rejected Watts' challenge to the facial constitutionality of section 856.021 based upon the United States Supreme Court decision in Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 , 103 S.Ct. 1855 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983), which held the California loitering statute unconstitutionally vague.

1985On appeal the circuit court rejected Watts' challenge to the facial constitutionality of section 856.021 based upon the United States Supreme Court decision in Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 , 103 S.Ct. 1855 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983), which held the California loitering statute unconstitutionally vague.

1985The district court denied review after agreeing with the circuit *206 court that section 856.021, as construed in State v. Ecker, 311 So.2d 104 (Fla.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 , 96 S.Ct. 455 , 46 L.Ed.2d 391 (1975), did not suffer from the vagueness problems found in the California loitering statute overturned in Kolender .

1985The district court denied review after agreeing with the circuit *206 court that section 856.021, as construed in State v. Ecker, 311 So.2d 104 (Fla.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 , 96 S.Ct. 455 , 46 L.Ed.2d 391 (1975), did not suffer from the vagueness problems found in the California loitering statute overturned in Kolender .

1985The district court denied review after agreeing with the circuit *206 court that section 856.021, as construed in State v. Ecker, 311 So.2d 104 (Fla.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 , 96 S.Ct. 455 , 46 L.Ed.2d 391 (1975), did not suffer from the vagueness problems found in the California loitering statute overturned in Kolender .