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6 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1996–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gearinger v. Leegreen2 sentences2023Co., 214 Ga. App. 715, 717 ( 448 SE2d 747 ) (1994) (holding that the inclusion of a semicolon, along with the disjunctive “or,” in a policy definition of “residence premises” as “the one- or two-family dwelling, other structures and grounds; or that part of any other building where you live, shown as the residence premises on the Declarations[ ]” “clearly show[ed]” that “where you live” was only intended to modify “that part of any other building”). 6 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Gearinger v. Lee, 266 Ga. 167, 169 (2) ( 465 SE2d 440 ) (1996) (construing former OCGA § 42-8-34.1 (c), whi 2023Co., 214 Ga. App. 715, 717 ( 448 SE2d 747 ) (1994) (holding that the inclusion of a semicolon, along with the disjunctive “or,” in a policy definition of “residence premises” as “the one- or two-family dwelling, other structures and grounds; or that part of any other building where you live, shown as the residence premises on the Declarations[ ]” “clearly show[ed]” that “where you live” was only intended to modify “that part of any other building”). 6 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Gearinger v. Lee, 266 Ga. 167, 169 (2) ( 465 SE2d 440 ) (1996) (construing former OCGA § 42-8-34.1 (c), whi | 3 | 4 |
May v. Morgan Cnty.green2 sentences2023Co., 214 Ga. App. 715, 717 ( 448 SE2d 747 ) (1994) (holding that the inclusion of a semicolon, along with the disjunctive “or,” in a policy definition of “residence premises” as “the one- or two-family dwelling, other structures and grounds; or that part of any other building where you live, shown as the residence premises on the Declarations[ ]” “clearly show[ed]” that “where you live” was only intended to modify “that part of any other building”). 6 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Gearinger v. Lee, 266 Ga. 167, 169 (2) ( 465 SE2d 440 ) (1996) (construing former OCGA § 42-8-34.1 (c), whi 2023Co., 214 Ga. App. 715, 717 ( 448 SE2d 747 ) (1994) (holding that the inclusion of a semicolon, along with the disjunctive “or,” in a policy definition of “residence premises” as “the one- or two-family dwelling, other structures and grounds; or that part of any other building where you live, shown as the residence premises on the Declarations[ ]” “clearly show[ed]” that “where you live” was only intended to modify “that part of any other building”). 6 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Gearinger v. Lee, 266 Ga. 167, 169 (2) ( 465 SE2d 440 ) (1996) (construing former OCGA § 42-8-34.1 (c), whi | 1 | 1 |
Hill v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurancegreen2 sentences2023Co., 214 Ga. App. 715, 717 ( 448 SE2d 747 ) (1994) (holding that the inclusion of a semicolon, along with the disjunctive “or,” in a policy definition of “residence premises” as “the one- or two-family dwelling, other structures and grounds; or that part of any other building where you live, shown as the residence premises on the Declarations[ ]” “clearly show[ed]” that “where you live” was only intended to modify “that part of any other building”). 6 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Gearinger v. Lee, 266 Ga. 167, 169 (2) ( 465 SE2d 440 ) (1996) (construing former OCGA § 42-8-34.1 (c), whi 2023Co., 214 Ga. App. 715, 717 ( 448 SE2d 747 ) (1994) (holding that the inclusion of a semicolon, along with the disjunctive “or,” in a policy definition of “residence premises” as “the one- or two-family dwelling, other structures and grounds; or that part of any other building where you live, shown as the residence premises on the Declarations[ ]” “clearly show[ed]” that “where you live” was only intended to modify “that part of any other building”). 6 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Gearinger v. Lee, 266 Ga. 167, 169 (2) ( 465 SE2d 440 ) (1996) (construing former OCGA § 42-8-34.1 (c), whi | 1 | 1 |
Georgia Paper Stock Co. v. State Tax Boardgreen2 sentences1996Under OCGA § 42-8-34.1 (c), a probation violation can result from “the commission of a felony offense or the violation of a special condition.” (Emphasis supplied.) The natural meaning of “or,” where used as a connective, is “ ‘to mark an alternative and present choice, implying an election to do one of two things ....’” Ga. Paper Stock Co. v. State Tax Bd., 174 Ga. 816, 819 ( 164 SE 197 ) (1932). 1996Under OCGA § 42-8-34.1 (c), a probation violation can result from “the commission of a felony offense or the violation of a special condition.” (Emphasis supplied.) The natural meaning of “or,” where used as a connective, is “ ‘to mark an alternative and present choice, implying an election to do one of two things ....’” Ga. Paper Stock Co. v. State Tax Bd., 174 Ga. 816, 819 ( 164 SE 197 ) (1932). | 1 | 1 |
Whitaker v. Stategreen2 sentences1996While the word “or” can be interpreted either as a disjunctive term or as a reiterative term, Whitaker v. State, 11 Ga. App. 208, 211 (5) ( 75 SE 258 ) (1912), where a legislative provision is phrased in the disjunctive, it must be so construed absent a clear indication that a disjunctive construction is contrary to the legislative intent. 1996While the word “or” can be interpreted either as a disjunctive term or as a reiterative term, Whitaker v. State, 11 Ga. App. 208, 211 (5) ( 75 SE 258 ) (1912), where a legislative provision is phrased in the disjunctive, it must be so construed absent a clear indication that a disjunctive construction is contrary to the legislative intent. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Manville v. Hampton
green
2 sentences2000(Emphasis supplied.) Citing Gearinger v. Lee, 266 Ga. 167 , 465 S.E.2d 440 (1996) and Manville v. Hampton, 266 Ga. 857 , 471 S.E.2d 872 (1996), the Court of Appeals concluded that this Court "implicitly recognized that the phrase `imposed pursuant to this Code section' is meaningless, as § 42-8-34.1 does not authorize the imposition of any special conditions of probation." Glover v. State, supra at 158(1), 521 S.E.2d 84 . 2000(Emphasis supplied.) Citing Gearinger v. Lee, 266 Ga. 167 , 465 S.E.2d 440 (1996) and Manville v. Hampton, 266 Ga. 857 , 471 S.E.2d 872 (1996), the Court of Appeals concluded that this Court "implicitly recognized that the phrase `imposed pursuant to this Code section' is meaningless, as § 42-8-34.1 does not authorize the imposition of any special conditions of probation." Glover v. State, supra at 158(1), 521 S.E.2d 84 . | 2 | 1999–2000 |
Glover v. State
green
1 sentence2000(Emphasis supplied.) Citing Gearinger v. Lee, 266 Ga. 167 , 465 S.E.2d 440 (1996) and Manville v. Hampton, 266 Ga. 857 , 471 S.E.2d 872 (1996), the Court of Appeals concluded that this Court "implicitly recognized that the phrase `imposed pursuant to this Code section' is meaningless, as § 42-8-34.1 does not authorize the imposition of any special conditions of probation." Glover v. State, supra at 158(1), 521 S.E.2d 84 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.