sex offender registration requirement in Texas

2015Because the sex-offender registration requirement “is a direct consequence” of an appellant’s plea of guilt, see Mitschke v. State, 129 S.W.3d 130, 136 (Tex. Crim.

2010The sex offender registration requirement is a direct and significant, albeit non-punitive, consequence of pleading guilty to attempted sexual assault, (7) Anderson v. State , 182 S.W.3d 914, 919-20 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006); Mitschke v. State , 129 S.W.3d 130, 135 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004), and it could be relevant to a reasonable defendant in deciding whether to plead guilty.

2020After the court of appeals rendered its decision in this case, R.R.S. successfully completed his probation 8 requirements and the trial court excused him from registering as a sex offender. 9 See also State v. Collazo, 264 S.W.3d 121, 128 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d) (citing Anderson, 182 S.W.3d at 918 (“The failure to admonish a defendant as to the non-punitive consequence of mandatory sex offender registration does not violate the due process clause or render his plea involuntary.”)); Ducker v. State, 45 S.W.3d 791, 796 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.) (“[W]e hold that th

2010The sex offender registration requirement is a direct and significant, albeit non-punitive, consequence of pleading guilty to attempted sexual assault, (7) Anderson v. State , 182 S.W.3d 914, 919-20 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006); Mitschke v. State , 129 S.W.3d 130, 135 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004), and it could be relevant to a reasonable defendant in deciding whether to plead guilty.

2011See, e.g., Bessey v. State, 239 S.W.3d 809, 813 (Tex.Crim.App.2007); Anderson v. State, 182 S.W.3d 914, 918 (Tex.Crim.App.2006).

2011See, e.g., Bessey v. State, 239 S.W.3d 809, 813 (Tex. Crim.

2023See Rodriguez, 93 S.W.3d at 79 ; Barker, 2003 WL 21513617 , at *4; see also Mariana-Rivera v. State, No. 13-17-00136-CR, 2018 WL 3583576 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg July 26, 2018, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.7(a), which made the unpublished criminal case lack precedential value and determining that although the case is unpublished it was persuasive).

2009The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has already held that the sex offender registration requirement is civil and remedial in nature and that it does not constitute punishment.2 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has also already held that because the sex offender registration statute is essentially remedial in nature, its application to a particular defendant does not violate the ex post facto clause of the state and federal constitutions. 3 We therefore hold that Appellant may be tried for his failure to register as a sex offender without implicating either his rights to be free from double

2004Ann . art. 26.13(a)(1), (5). 10: See Aguirre-Mata , 125 S.W.3d at 476-77 ; Rachuig v. State , 972 S.W.2d 170, 176 (Tex. App.—Waco 1998, pet. ref’d). 11: See Lopez v. State , 71 S.W.3d 511, 516 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.); Alvarez , 63 S.W.3d at 583 ; Anderson v. State , 62 S.W.3d 304, 307 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, pet. filed). 12: Appellant even admits in his brief that if the trial court’s failure to admonish regarding the sex offender registration requirement were his only complaint, his “visit before this court would be short lived.” 13: See Tex. R.

2003The issue Appellant raises is controlled by our previous decisions in Lopez v. State , 71 S.W.3d 511 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.), Alvarez v. State , 63 S.W.3d 578 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.), and Anderson v. State , 62 S.W.3d 304 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, pet. filed). (footnote: 3) In Lopez , we stated that “the sex offender registration requirement under article 26.13(a)(5) is only a collateral consequence of a guilty plea, and a trial court’s failure to admonish an appellant regarding registration, alone, does not invalidate a plea.” 71 S.W.3d at 515 -16 (citing Alvarez ,

2004Ann . art. 26.13(a)(1), (5). 10: See Aguirre-Mata , 125 S.W.3d at 476-77 ; Rachuig v. State , 972 S.W.2d 170, 176 (Tex. App.—Waco 1998, pet. ref’d). 11: See Lopez v. State , 71 S.W.3d 511, 516 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.); Alvarez , 63 S.W.3d at 583 ; Anderson v. State , 62 S.W.3d 304, 307 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, pet. filed). 12: Appellant even admits in his brief that if the trial court’s failure to admonish regarding the sex offender registration requirement were his only complaint, his “visit before this court would be short lived.” 13: See Tex. R.

2003The issue Appellant raises is controlled by our previous decisions in Lopez v. State , 71 S.W.3d 511 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.), Alvarez v. State , 63 S.W.3d 578 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.), and Anderson v. State , 62 S.W.3d 304 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, pet. filed). (footnote: 3) In Lopez , we stated that “the sex offender registration requirement under article 26.13(a)(5) is only a collateral consequence of a guilty plea, and a trial court’s failure to admonish an appellant regarding registration, alone, does not invalidate a plea.” 71 S.W.3d at 515 -16 (citing Alvarez ,

2020After the court of appeals rendered its decision in this case, R.R.S. successfully completed his probation 8 requirements and the trial court excused him from registering as a sex offender. 9 See also State v. Collazo, 264 S.W.3d 121, 128 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d) (citing Anderson, 182 S.W.3d at 918 (“The failure to admonish a defendant as to the non-punitive consequence of mandatory sex offender registration does not violate the due process clause or render his plea involuntary.”)); Ducker v. State, 45 S.W.3d 791, 796 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.) (“[W]e hold that th

2004The court concluded that “although the sex-offender registration requirement is a direct consequence of appellant’s plea, it is a non-punitive measure, and failure to admonish does not necessarily render a plea involuntary”; thus, the failure to admonish Mitschke “did not violate due process or render his plea involuntary.” Id. at 136 .

2009This court recently addressed the same issue in Hirsch v. State , 282 S.W.3d 196, 201 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.) (reasoning that two bills passed in the same legislative session, each relating to sex offender registration requirements, are reconcilable and holding that the trial court did not err by requiring appellant, who committed the offense of online solicitation of a minor on June 14 and 17, 2007, to register as a sex offender).

2009This court recently addressed the same issue in Hirsch v. State, 282 S.W.3d 196, 201 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.) (reasoning that two bills passed in the same legislative session, each relating to sex offender registration requirements, are reconcilable and holding that the trial court did 2 … The trial court permitted Ebeling to appeal the denial of his motion to exempt him from sex offender registration. 2 not err by requiring appellant, who committed the offense of online solicitation of a minor on June 14 and 17, 2007, to register as a sex offender).

2006We may also presume that appellant's counsel explained this requirement to appellant before or "at the relevant time." See Gardner, 164 S.W.3d at 399 (trial strategy may make guilty plea seem the desirable course).

2006We may also presume that appellant's counsel explained this requirement to appellant before or "at the relevant time." See Gardner, 164 S.W.3d at 399 (trial strategy may make guilty plea seem the desirable course).

2003See Black , 26 S.W.3d at 901 n.4; Heitman , 815 S.W.2d at 691 n.23. 14: Neither the Texas Family Code nor Chapter 62 of the Code of Criminal Procedure prohibits a court from requiring a DNA specimen as a condition of probation for a juvenile who has succeeded in having the sex offender registration requirement excused.

2003See Black, 26 S.W.3d at 901 n. 4; Heitman, 815 S.W.2d at 691 n. 23. [14] Neither the Texas Family Code nor Chapter 62 of the Code of Criminal Procedure prohibits a court from requiring a DNA specimen as a condition of probation for a juvenile who has succeeded in having the sex offender registration requirement excused.

2004Ann . art. 26.13(a)(1), (5). 10: See Aguirre-Mata , 125 S.W.3d at 476-77 ; Rachuig v. State , 972 S.W.2d 170, 176 (Tex. App.—Waco 1998, pet. ref’d). 11: See Lopez v. State , 71 S.W.3d 511, 516 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.); Alvarez , 63 S.W.3d at 583 ; Anderson v. State , 62 S.W.3d 304, 307 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, pet. filed). 12: Appellant even admits in his brief that if the trial court’s failure to admonish regarding the sex offender registration requirement were his only complaint, his “visit before this court would be short lived.” 13: See Tex. R.

2003The issue Appellant raises is controlled by our previous decisions in Lopez v. State , 71 S.W.3d 511 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.), Alvarez v. State , 63 S.W.3d 578 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.), and Anderson v. State , 62 S.W.3d 304 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, pet. filed). (footnote: 3) In Lopez , we stated that “the sex offender registration requirement under article 26.13(a)(5) is only a collateral consequence of a guilty plea, and a trial court’s failure to admonish an appellant regarding registration, alone, does not invalidate a plea.” 71 S.W.3d at 515 -16 (citing Alvarez ,

2020After the court of appeals rendered its decision in this case, R.R.S. successfully completed his probation 8 requirements and the trial court excused him from registering as a sex offender. 9 See also State v. Collazo, 264 S.W.3d 121, 128 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d) (citing Anderson, 182 S.W.3d at 918 (“The failure to admonish a defendant as to the non-punitive consequence of mandatory sex offender registration does not violate the due process clause or render his plea involuntary.”)); Ducker v. State, 45 S.W.3d 791, 796 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.) (“[W]e hold that th

2020After the court of appeals rendered its decision in this case, R.R.S. successfully completed his probation 8 requirements and the trial court excused him from registering as a sex offender. 9 See also State v. Collazo, 264 S.W.3d 121, 128 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d) (citing Anderson, 182 S.W.3d at 918 (“The failure to admonish a defendant as to the non-punitive consequence of mandatory sex offender registration does not violate the due process clause or render his plea involuntary.”)); Ducker v. State, 45 S.W.3d 791, 796 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.) (“[W]e hold that th

2020After the court of appeals rendered its decision in this case, R.R.S. successfully completed his probation 8 requirements and the trial court excused him from registering as a sex offender. 9 See also State v. Collazo, 264 S.W.3d 121, 128 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d) (citing Anderson, 182 S.W.3d at 918 (“The failure to admonish a defendant as to the non-punitive consequence of mandatory sex offender registration does not violate the due process clause or render his plea involuntary.”)); Ducker v. State, 45 S.W.3d 791, 796 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.) (“[W]e hold that th

2019Dewalt v. State, 417 S.W.3d 678, 690 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, pet. ref’d). “[T]he failure of the trial judge to do so [is] not an error of judicial reasoning but rather an error of a clerical nature.” Id. (quoting Ex parte Poe, 751 S.W.2d 873, 876 (Tex. Crim.

2019Robinson v. State, 466 S.W.3d 166, 170, 172 (Tex. Crim.

2019Dewalt v. State, 417 S.W.3d 678, 690 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, pet. ref’d). “[T]he failure of the trial judge to do so [is] not an error of judicial reasoning but rather an error of a clerical nature.” Id. (quoting Ex parte Poe, 751 S.W.2d 873, 876 (Tex. Crim.

2019Dewalt v. State, 417 S.W.3d 678, 690 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, pet. ref’d). “[T]he failure of the trial judge to do so [is] not an error of judicial reasoning but rather an error of a clerical nature.” Id. (quoting Ex parte Poe, 751 S.W.2d 873, 876 (Tex. Crim.

2019White v. State, 988 S.W.2d 277, 279 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, no pet.).

2018Citing the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), Stacy argues the jury was required to unanimously determine whether he committed the offense by violating or abusing the complainant sexually because the sex offender registration requirement increased his punishment.

2018The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has explained the application of Apprendi as follows: The Supreme Court determined in Apprendi v. New Jersey that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” [ 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)].

2014See Blanton v. State, 369 S.W.3d 894, 898 (Tex. Crim.

2012See TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 26.13(h); see also James, 258 S.W.3d at 317 (“Because [appellant’s] sole complaint about his plea in the sexual assault case is the court’s failure to admonish him concerning the sex offender registration requirement, we resolve [appellant’s] -3- third issue against him.”), quoting Standifer v. State, No. 05-06-00078-CR, 2006 WL 3057903 , *2 (Tex.App.--Dallas Oct. 30, 2006, no pet.)(mem. op., not designated for publication).