future claim in California

2026(O’Connor v. Village Green Owners Assn. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 790, 792 .) In 1991, the Supreme Court “created a three-part analytic framework for determining whether a future claim of discrimination, involving a category not enumerated in the statute or added by prior judicial construction, should be cognizable under the [Unruh] Act.” (Koebke v. Bernardo Heights Country Club (2005) 36 Cal.4th 824, 840 (Koebke), citing Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1142 (Harris), superseded by statute on another ground as noted in Munson v. Del Taco, Inc. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 661, 664 .) The t

2026(O’Connor v. Village Green Owners Assn. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 790, 792 .) In 1991, the Supreme Court “created a three-part analytic framework for determining whether a future claim of discrimination, involving a category not enumerated in the statute or added by prior judicial construction, should be cognizable under the [Unruh] Act.” (Koebke v. Bernardo Heights Country Club (2005) 36 Cal.4th 824, 840 (Koebke), citing Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1142 (Harris), superseded by statute on another ground as noted in Munson v. Del Taco, Inc. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 661, 664 .) The t

2026(O’Connor v. Village Green Owners Assn. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 790, 792 .) In 1991, the Supreme Court “created a three-part analytic framework for determining whether a future claim of discrimination, involving a category not enumerated in the statute or added by prior judicial construction, should be cognizable under the [Unruh] Act.” (Koebke v. Bernardo Heights Country Club (2005) 36 Cal.4th 824, 840 (Koebke), citing Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1142 (Harris), superseded by statute on another ground as noted in Munson v. Del Taco, Inc. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 661, 664 .) The t

2026(O’Connor v. Village Green Owners Assn. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 790, 792 .) In 1991, the Supreme Court “created a three-part analytic framework for determining whether a future claim of discrimination, involving a category not enumerated in the statute or added by prior judicial construction, should be cognizable under the [Unruh] Act.” (Koebke v. Bernardo Heights Country Club (2005) 36 Cal.4th 824, 840 (Koebke), citing Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1142 (Harris), superseded by statute on another ground as noted in Munson v. Del Taco, Inc. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 661, 664 .) The t

2026The upper term sentence could have been imposed based on only the aggravating factors of victim vulnerability and taking 11 advantage of a position of trust, which were found true by the jury. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2).) Therefore, the upper term is not a sentence that “could not lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in the particular case.” (Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 354 ; People v. Achane (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1037 , 1043.) However, to forestall a future claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we exercise our discretion to excuse any possible forfeiture and address defendant’s claim

2024(Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 351 .) 6 Pedro interprets the juvenile court’s comments about his behavioral issues as having more to do with a future hearing to reduce his baseline term than with the length of the term needed to rehabilitate him.

2023(See Davis, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 532 ; Nieves, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 508 .) With no discussion of what a “977 waiver” was, it is hard to see how Cooks impliedly waived his right to be present at a future hearing by failing to object or contradict his counsel.

2023(See Davis, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 532 ; Nieves, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 508 .) With no discussion of what a “977 waiver” was, it is hard to see how Cooks impliedly waived his right to be present at a future hearing by failing to object or contradict his counsel.

2024As both the California and United States Supreme Courts have recognized, the judiciary has a “substantial state interest in protecting the integrity of the process from improper ‘sandbagging’ by a defendant” in cases where “ ‘[s]trong tactical considerations would militate in favor of [a defendant] delaying the raising of the claim in the hopes of an acquittal, with the thought that if those hopes did not materialize, the claim could be used to upset an otherwise valid conviction at a time when reprosecution might well be difficult.’ ” (People v. Simon (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1082, 1104 ; Davis v. U

2024As both the California and United States Supreme Courts have recognized, the judiciary has a “substantial state interest in protecting the integrity of the process from improper ‘sandbagging’ by a defendant” in cases where “ ‘[s]trong tactical considerations would militate in favor of [a defendant] delaying the raising of the claim in the hopes of an acquittal, with the thought that if those hopes did not materialize, the claim could be used to upset an otherwise valid conviction at a time when reprosecution might well be difficult.’ ” (People v. Simon (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1082, 1104 ; Davis v. U

2024As both the California and United States Supreme Courts have recognized, the judiciary has a “substantial state interest in protecting the integrity of the process from improper ‘sandbagging’ by a defendant” in cases where “ ‘[s]trong tactical considerations would militate in favor of [a defendant] delaying the raising of the claim in the hopes of an acquittal, with the thought that if those hopes did not materialize, the claim could be used to upset an otherwise valid conviction at a time when reprosecution might well be difficult.’ ” (People v. Simon (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1082, 1104 ; Davis v. U

2024As both the California and United States Supreme Courts have recognized, the judiciary has a “substantial state interest in protecting the integrity of the process from improper ‘sandbagging’ by a defendant” in cases where “ ‘[s]trong tactical considerations would militate in favor of [a defendant] delaying the raising of the claim in the hopes of an acquittal, with the thought that if those hopes did not materialize, the claim could be used to upset an otherwise valid conviction at a time when reprosecution might well be difficult.’ ” (People v. Simon (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1082, 1104 ; Davis v. U

2024(See § 189, subd. (e)(2).) Following “the denial of a section 1172.6 petition after an evidentiary hearing, we review the superior court’s factual findings for substantial evidence and the court’s application of the law to those facts de novo.” (People v. Hill (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1055 , 1066.) We review the entire record in the light most favorable to the findings made 3 After the trial court issued its ruling on defendant’s section 1172.6 petition, the court allowed defendant to create a record that could potentially be important to a future hearing conducted pursuant to People v. Franklin

2024On September 13, 2024, by order of this court, we accepted the filing of defendant’s brief and vacated the opinion issued on September 9, 2024, noting the issues raised by defendant would be addressed in a new opinion. 3 After the trial court issued its ruling on defendant’s section 1172.6 petition, the court allowed defendant to create a record that could potentially be important to a future hearing conducted pursuant to People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 .

2023Committee v. Burton (1982) 455 U.S. 1301, 1302 .) As a recipe to ward off federal review, this is not a theory I am reading into the case law based on hindsight.

2023Committee v. Burton (1982) 455 U.S. 1301, 1302 .) As a recipe to ward off federal review, this is not a theory I am reading into the case law based on hindsight.

2022Analysis The trial court imposed the specific sentence the parties bargained for and, therefore, the error defendant now complains of was not a future error outside of defendant’s contemplation at the time he waived his appellate rights. ( Panizzon, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 85–86.) As explained in Panizzon, “Not only did the plea agreement in this case specify the sentence to be imposed, but by its very terms the waiver of appellate rights also specifically extended to any right to appeal such sentence.

2002Moreover, given the validly executed plea agreement and waiver form and the acknowledgments contained therein, Foster's waiver of the right to appeal is enforceable even though the court did not specifically admonish Foster that he would be giving up his appellate rights. ( People v. Panizzon, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 83-84, 51 Cal. Rptr.2d 851 , 913 P.2d 1061 .) Foster also contends his claim is cognizable on appeal because the court's imposition of hormone suppression treatment upon parole, which was ordered more than a month after the 30-year prison term was imposed, (1) was a future error

2019Employee Pension Plan (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1497 .) "[T]he Brown Act [also] authorizes injunctive relief that is based on, in relevant part, a showing of 'past actions and violations that are related to present or future ones' " (Shapiro v. San Diego City Council (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 904, 917 , italics omitted), and therefore the trial court may enjoin "future such actions and violations." (Ibid.) In Center for Local Government Accountability v. City of San Diego (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1146 we analyzed what constituted a future violation of the Brown Act.

2018Employee Pension Plan (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1487 , 1497, 59 Cal.Rptr.3d 587 .) "[T]he Brown Act [also] authorizes injunctive relief that is based on, in relevant part, a showing of 'past actions and violations that are related to present or future ones' " ( Shapiro v. San Diego City Council (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 904 , 917, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 631 , italics omitted), and therefore the trial court may enjoin "future such actions and violations." ( Ibid. ) In Center for Local Government Accountability v. City of San Diego (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1146 , 202 Cal.Rptr.3d 629 we analyzed what constituted

2026(See People v. Miracle (2018) 6 Cal.5th 318, 337 [“‘We will not … adjudicate hypothetical claims or render purely advisory opinions.’”]; People v. Buza (2018) 4 Cal.5th 658, 693 [“We … abide by … a ‘“cardinal principle of judicial restraint—if it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more.”’”]; People v. Mosley (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1044 , 1054–1055, fn. 7 [“true adherence to judicial restraint and economy counsels against an unnecessary detour into an analysis of … statutory meaning [on an issue not before the court].”].) Therefore, we find the People’s reliance on the la

2025(See In re Marriage of Ellis (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 400 , 402–403.) Kevin contends that the court-appointed receiver, Jeffrey Stinnett, impartially and unlawfully imposed penalties on Kevin at a June 26, 2024, ex parte hearing.

2024(See People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 146 ; People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6 [“An appellate court is generally not prohibited from reaching a question that has not been preserved for review by a party”]; People v. Frederickson (2020) 8 Cal.5th 963 , 1031 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.) [courts “regularly excuse forfeiture where the defendant has asserted the deprivation of a fundamental constitutional right”].) On the merits, the People argue the error was harmless.

2023(See Davis, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 532 ; Nieves, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 508 .) With no discussion of what a “977 waiver” was, it is hard to see how Cooks impliedly waived his right to be present at a future hearing by failing to object or contradict his counsel.

2023(See, e.g., City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 757 [citing cases that have invalidated releases of 1 Not all pre-dispute releases of future tort claims are invalid.

2022(Ostrowski v. Miller (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 79, 87 [entering judgment with prejudice for failing to obtain leave from the appointing court was error; explaining the possibility of a future claim against the receiver in another action consented to by the appointing court].) 18 NRG Resources, Inc. (W.D.La. 1986) 64 B.R. 643, 647 ; contrast 11 U.S.C. § 521 [“Debtor’s duties”] with 11 U.S.C. § 1107 [“Rights, powers, and duties of debtor in possession”]; cf. Lamie v. United States Trustee (2004) 540 U.S. 526, 532 [appointment of a Chapter 7 trustee in proceedings initiated under Chapter 11 “terminat

2022(Brennan v. Townsend & O’Leary Enterprises, Inc. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1336, 1360-1361 ; see also Lopez v. Routt (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 1006, 1017 [noting that harassment and retaliation claims are “fundamentally different”].) 2 Hiraishi alsoasserts that Stephenson repeatedly broke promises to her, but the pages of the record cited do not support this assertion. 11 We also reject Hiraishi’s assertion that the “social context” in which Stephenson’s alleged conduct occurred supports her gender harassment claim.