49 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2023 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2016Ealy, 2015 IL App (2d) 131106, ¶ 66 (citing People v. Johnson, 218 Ill. 2d 125, 140 (2005)). ¶ 33 We furthermore reject Mr. Romanowski’s argument that Bock “ignore[s] the maxim of statutory construction that when a statute expressly includes one thing—evidence that a motorist refused a breathalyzer—it may be inferred that all omissions therefrom—the contents of the warning to motorists—are intended to be excluded.” As Bock points out, the statute does not expressly make “only” the fact of the defendant’s refusal admissible, but rather “evidence of refusal,” a phrase that invokes something broa 2016Ealy, 2015 IL App (2d) 131106, ¶ 66 (citing People v. Johnson, 218 Ill. 2d 125, 140 (2005)). ¶ 33 We furthermore reject Mr. Romanowski’s argument that Bock “ignore[s] the maxim of statutory construction that when a statute expressly includes one thing—evidence that a motorist refused a breathalyzer—it may be inferred that all omissions therefrom—the contents of the warning to motorists—are intended to be excluded.” As Bock points out, the statute does not expressly make “only” the fact of the defendant’s refusal admissible, but rather “evidence of refusal,” a phrase that invokes something broa | 3 | 3 |
People v. Sheehangreen2 sentences2006See People v. Sheehan, 168 Ill. 2d 298, 308-09 (1995) (“We do not believe that using an offense that resulted in *** supervision to enhance a subsequent charge is inconsistent with the ‘without adjudication of guilt’ provision of the supervision statute. *** [T]he use of a prior DUI violation resulting in supervision as an enhancing offense in subsequent felony DUI proceedings is not a ‘disqualification or disability imposed by law’ and thus does not offend that portion of the supervision statute”); People v. Johnson, 128 Ill. 2d 253, 286-87 (1989) (order of supervision may be used as evidence 2006See People v. Sheehan, 168 Ill. 2d 298, 308-09 (1995) (“We do not believe that using an offense that resulted in *** supervision to enhance a subsequent charge is inconsistent with the ‘without adjudication of guilt’ provision of the supervision statute. *** [T]he use of a prior DUI violation resulting in supervision as an enhancing offense in subsequent felony DUI proceedings is not a ‘disqualification or disability imposed by law’ and thus does not offend that portion of the supervision statute”); People v. Johnson, 128 Ill. 2d 253, 286-87 (1989) (order of supervision may be used as evidence | 2 | 4 |
People v. Kavanaughgreen2 sentences2019People v. Kavanaugh, 362 Ill. 2019People v. Kavanaugh, 362 Ill. | 2 | 3 |
People v. Ealygreen2 sentences2016Ealy, 2015 IL App (2d) 131106, ¶ 66 (citing People v. Johnson, 218 Ill. 2d 125, 140 (2005)). ¶ 33 We furthermore reject Mr. Romanowski’s argument that Bock “ignore[s] the maxim of statutory construction that when a statute expressly includes one thing—evidence that a motorist refused a breathalyzer—it may be inferred that all omissions therefrom—the contents of the warning to motorists—are intended to be excluded.” As Bock points out, the statute does not expressly make “only” the fact of the defendant’s refusal admissible, but rather “evidence of refusal,” a phrase that invokes something broa 2016Ealy, 2015 IL App (2d) 131106, ¶ 66 (citing People v. Johnson, 218 Ill. 2d 125, 140 (2005)). ¶ 33 We furthermore reject Mr. Romanowski’s argument that Bock “ignore[s] the maxim of statutory construction that when a statute expressly includes one thing—evidence that a motorist refused a breathalyzer—it may be inferred that all omissions therefrom—the contents of the warning to motorists—are intended to be excluded.” As Bock points out, the statute does not expressly make “only” the fact of the defendant’s refusal admissible, but rather “evidence of refusal,” a phrase that invokes something broa | 2 | 3 |
People v. Winninghamgreen2 sentences2015Typically, the potential DUI defendant—sip by sip, swallow by swallow, - 13 - drink by drink—becomes intoxicated with the full understanding and expectation that, at some point, he will get behind the steering wheel, drive drunk, and perhaps kill someone.' " (Emphasis in original.) People v. Winningham, 391 Ill. 2015Typically, the potential DUI defendant–sip by sip, swallow by swallow, drink by drink–becomes intoxicated with the full understanding and expectation that, at some point, he will get behind the steering wheel, drive drunk, and perhaps kill someone.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) People v. Winningham, 391 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2006See People v. Sheehan, 168 Ill. 2d 298, 308-09 (1995) (“We do not believe that using an offense that resulted in *** supervision to enhance a subsequent charge is inconsistent with the ‘without adjudication of guilt’ provision of the supervision statute. *** [T]he use of a prior DUI violation resulting in supervision as an enhancing offense in subsequent felony DUI proceedings is not a ‘disqualification or disability imposed by law’ and thus does not offend that portion of the supervision statute”); People v. Johnson, 128 Ill. 2d 253, 286-87 (1989) (order of supervision may be used as evidence 2006See People v. Sheehan, 168 Ill. 2d 298, 308-09 (1995) (“We do not believe that using an offense that resulted in *** supervision to enhance a subsequent charge is inconsistent with the ‘without adjudication of guilt’ provision of the supervision statute. *** [T]he use of a prior DUI violation resulting in supervision as an enhancing offense in subsequent felony DUI proceedings is not a ‘disqualification or disability imposed by law’ and thus does not offend that portion of the supervision statute”); People v. Johnson, 128 Ill. 2d 253, 286-87 (1989) (order of supervision may be used as evidence | 2 | 2 |
People v. Lattogreen2 sentences2003A person commits aggravated DUI when he or she drives a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and is involved in a motor vehicle accident that results in great bodily harm to another, when the DUI violation was a proximate cause of the injuries. 625 ILCS 5/11-501(d)(1)(C) (West 2000); People v. Latto , 304 Ill. 2003A person commits aggravated DUI when he or she drives a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and is involved in a motor vehicle accident that results in great bodily harm to another, when the DUI violation was a proximate cause of the injuries. 625 ILCS 5/11-501(d)(1)(C) (West 2000); People v. Latto , 304 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Popeckgreen2 sentences2018App. 3d 806, 807 , 899 N.E.2d 324, 325 (2008), the State sought to obtain a DUI defendant’s medical records by filing a motion for leave to issue a subpoena duces tecum and a HIPAA qualified protective order with the trial court. 2017App. 3d 806 , 807, 326 Ill.Dec. 107 , 899 N.E.2d 324 , 325 (2008), the State sought to obtain a DUI defendant's medical records by filing a motion for leave to issue a subpoena duces tecum and a HIPAA qualified protective *1115 order with the trial court. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2012This ruling on the motion in limine prevented the State from introducing the blood test results on grounds that police obtained the blood sample by force, contrary to our supreme court's ruling in People v. Jones, 214 Ill.2d *200 187, 291 Ill.Dec. 663 , 824 N.E.2d 239 (2005). ¶ 36 I agree Jones establishes that force cannot be used to compel the collection of a blood test after the driver refuses to consent to the test when the DUI violation does not involve a death or serious injury to another person. 2012This ruling on the motion in limine prevented the State from introducing the blood test results on grounds that police obtained the blood sample by force, contrary to our supreme court's ruling in People v. Jones, 214 Ill.2d *200 187, 291 Ill.Dec. 663 , 824 N.E.2d 239 (2005). ¶ 36 I agree Jones establishes that force cannot be used to compel the collection of a blood test after the driver refuses to consent to the test when the DUI violation does not involve a death or serious injury to another person. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Bannistergreen2 sentences2012"Absent due process concerns, the validity of a plea agreement is generally governed by contract law." People v. Bannister, 236 Ill.2d 1, 9 , 337 Ill.Dec. 685 , 923 N.E.2d 244 (2009). ¶ 24 The resolution of the aggravated DUI case is not severable from the resolution of the intimidation case. 2012"Absent due process concerns, the validity of a plea agreement is generally governed by contract law." People v. Bannister, 236 Ill.2d 1, 9 , 337 Ill.Dec. 685 , 923 N.E.2d 244 (2009). ¶ 24 The resolution of the aggravated DUI case is not severable from the resolution of the intimidation case. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Enochgreen2 sentences2022See, e.g., People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988) (to preserve an error for appeal, the defendant must object at trial and raise the issue in a written posttrial motion). ¶ 14 Defendant asserts that the State’s failure to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is not subject to forfeiture. 2022See, e.g., People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988) (to preserve an error for appeal, the defendant must object at trial and raise the issue in a written posttrial motion). ¶ 14 Defendant asserts that the State’s failure to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is not subject to forfeiture. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Tateragreen2 sentences2020See People v. Tatera, 2018 IL App (2d) 160207, ¶ 72 , 103 N.E.3d 1059 (aggravated DUI defendant with nine prior DUI convictions sentenced to eight years in prison); People v. Morrow, 2014 IL App (2d) 130718 , ¶ 20, 39 N.E.3d 44 (aggravated DUI defendant with seven prior DUI convictions sentenced to 13 years’ imprisonment); People v. Dryden, 2015 IL App (2d) 130683-U , ¶¶ 6, 10, 12 (aggravated DUI defendant with 9 to 11 prior DUI convictions sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment); People v. Vanderark, 2012 IL App (2d) 110044-U , ¶¶ 7, 11 (aggravated DUI defendant with nine prior DUI convictions s 2020See People v. Tatera, 2018 IL App (2d) 160207, ¶ 72 , 103 N.E.3d 1059 (aggravated DUI defendant with nine prior DUI convictions sentenced to eight years in prison); People v. Morrow, 2014 IL App (2d) 130718 , ¶ 20, 39 N.E.3d 44 (aggravated DUI defendant with seven prior DUI convictions sentenced to 13 years’ imprisonment); People v. Dryden, 2015 IL App (2d) 130683-U , ¶¶ 6, 10, 12 (aggravated DUI defendant with 9 to 11 prior DUI convictions sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment); People v. Vanderark, 2012 IL App (2d) 110044-U , ¶¶ 7, 11 (aggravated DUI defendant with nine prior DUI convictions s | 1 | 1 |
First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp.green2 sentences2016Therefore, we decide this case pursuant to the holding in First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133 (1976). 2016Therefore, we decide this case pursuant to the holding in First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133 (1976). | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Rolfingsmeyergreen | 1 | 1 |
People v. Garriottgreen1 sentence2015See People v. Johnson, 218 Ill. 2d 125, 140 (2005); People v. Rolfingsmeyer, 101 Ill. 2d 137, 141 (1984) (because a motorist has no constitutional right to refuse a breath test and may be - 21 - 2015 IL App (2d) 131106 compelled by the State to take such a test, evidence of the driver’s refusal to take such a test does not violate the self-incrimination privilege and may properly be admitted at trial); People v. Garriott, 253 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Grazianogreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Winklergreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Lambertgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| People v. Harrisongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Martin
green
2 sentences2018“The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent, and the plain language of the statute is the best indication of that intent.” Martin, 2011 IL 109102, ¶ 21 , 955 N.E.2d 1058 . ¶ 147 Here, defendant was convicted of aggravated DUI, in that he committed a DUI offense—in this case, driving with a BAC of 0.08 or greater (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(1) (West 2012))—and “was involved in a motor vehicle accident that resulted in great bodily harm *** to another, when the violation was a proximate cause of the injuries.” (Emphasis added.) 625 ILCS 5/11 2018“The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent, and the plain language of the statute is the best indication of that intent.” Martin, 2011 IL 109102, ¶ 21 , 955 N.E.2d 1058 . ¶ 147 Here, defendant was convicted of aggravated DUI, in that he committed a DUI offense—in this case, driving with a BAC of 0.08 or greater (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(1) (West 2012))—and “was involved in a motor vehicle accident that resulted in great bodily harm *** to another, when the violation was a proximate cause of the injuries.” (Emphasis added.) 625 ILCS 5/11 | 3 | 2012–2018 |
People v. Martin
green
2 sentences2018“The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent, and the plain language of the statute is the best indication of that intent.” Martin, 2011 IL 109102, ¶ 21 , 955 N.E.2d 1058 . ¶ 147 Here, defendant was convicted of aggravated DUI, in that he committed a DUI offense—in this case, driving with a BAC of 0.08 or greater (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(1) (West 2012))—and “was involved in a motor vehicle accident that resulted in great bodily harm *** to another, when the violation was a proximate cause of the injuries.” (Emphasis added.) 625 ILCS 5/11 2018“The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent, and the plain language of the statute is the best indication of that intent.” Martin, 2011 IL 109102, ¶ 21 , 955 N.E.2d 1058 . ¶ 147 Here, defendant was convicted of aggravated DUI, in that he committed a DUI offense—in this case, driving with a BAC of 0.08 or greater (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(1) (West 2012))—and “was involved in a motor vehicle accident that resulted in great bodily harm *** to another, when the violation was a proximate cause of the injuries.” (Emphasis added.) 625 ILCS 5/11 | 3 | 2012–2018 |
People v. 2000 GMC VIN 3GNFK16T2YG169852
green
2 sentences2018It rejected the owner’s eighth amendment challenge simply by citing, without discussion, People v. One 2000 GMC, 357 Ill. 2018It rejected the owner's eighth amendment challenge simply by citing, without discussion, People v. One 2000 GMC , 357 Ill. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Vasquez
green
2 sentences2018App. 3d at 186 , 913 N.E.2d at 62 , which concerned the admissibility of statements a DUI defendant made to police while in the hospital - 15 - following a motor vehicle accident. 2017App. 3d at 186 , 332 Ill.Dec. 465 , 913 N.E.2d at 62 , which concerned the admissibility of statements a DUI defendant made to police while in the hospital following a motor vehicle accident. | 2 | 2017–2018 |
People v. Way
green
2 sentences2018Way, 2017 IL 120023, ¶ 23 . 2018Way, 2017 IL 120023, ¶ 23 . | 2 | 2017–2018 |
Schmerber v. California
green
2 sentences2008The court noted, however, that the statute afforded protection to DUI defendants greater than that required by Schmerber and recognized that, absent a statutory provision to the contrary, police may constitutionally seize bodily substances from a defendant without his consent when probable cause is present and the evidence may quickly dissipate: "Since Schmerber v. California (1966), 384 U.S. 757 , 16 L. 2008The court noted, however, that the statute afforded protection to DUI defendants greater than that required by Schmerber and recognized that, absent a statutory provision to the contrary, police may constitutionally seize bodily substances from a defendant without his consent when probable cause is present and the evidence may quickly dissipate: "Since Schmerber v. California (1966), 384 U.S. 757 , 16 L. | 2 | 2008–2008 |
People v. Todd
green
2 sentences2005The court noted, however, that the statute gave protection to DUI defendants greater than that required by Schmerber , stating Schmerber made it "clear that a compulsory blood test does not violate any constitutional rights of an individual merely because he objected to such tests." Todd, 59 Ill.2d at 544 , 322 N.E.2d 447 . 2005The court noted, however, that the statute gave protection to DUI defendants greater than that required by Schmerber, stating Schmerber made it “clear that a compulsory blood test does not violate any constitutional rights of an individual merely because he objected to such tests.” Todd, 59 Ill. 2d at 544 . | 2 | 2005–2005 |
People v. Coleman
green
2 sentences1995This court found, however, that the "[u]se of a prior disposition of supervision as an aggravating factor in sentencing is not a 'disqualification or disability imposed by law.’ ” (Coleman, 111 Ill. 2d at 97 .) Here, we similarly conclude that the use of a prior DUI violation resulting in supervision as an enhancing offense in subsequent felony DUI proceedings is not a "disqualification or disability imposed by law” and thus does not offend that portion of the supervision statute. 1995This court found, however, that the "[u]se of a prior disposition of supervision as an aggravating factor in sentencing is not a 'disqualification or disability imposed by law.’ ” (Coleman, 111 Ill. 2d at 97 .) Here, we similarly conclude that the use of a prior DUI violation resulting in supervision as an enhancing offense in subsequent felony DUI proceedings is not a "disqualification or disability imposed by law” and thus does not offend that portion of the supervision statute. | 2 | 1986–1995 |
People v. Meyer
green
2 sentences1991(See People v. Meyer (1988), 166 Ill. 1991(See People v. Meyer (1988), 166 Ill. | 2 | 1991–1991 |
Almendarez-Torres v. United States
red
2 sentences2023As the Court in Almendarez- Torres further explained, that level of “unfairness” is not warranted with respect to “facts that are almost never contested.” Id. 2023As the Court in Almendarez- Torres further explained, that level of “unfairness” is not warranted with respect to “facts that are almost never contested.” Id. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Apprendi v. New Jersey
green
2 sentences2022Defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence, which the trial court denied. ¶ 12 On appeal, defendant contends that his DWLR conviction violates Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), because the facts that elevated the offense from a Class A misdemeanor to a Class 4 felony—namely, that his license had been revoked due to a DUI violation and that he previously violated the DWLR statute due to a DUI conviction—were not submitted to the jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. ¶ 13 The State replies that it was not required to prove the basis for defendant’s driver’s license revocatio 2022Defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence, which the trial court denied. ¶ 12 On appeal, defendant contends that his DWLR conviction violates Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), because the facts that elevated the offense from a Class A misdemeanor to a Class 4 felony—namely, that his license had been revoked due to a DUI violation and that he previously violated the DWLR statute due to a DUI conviction—were not submitted to the jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. ¶ 13 The State replies that it was not required to prove the basis for defendant’s driver’s license revocatio | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Jackson
green
2 sentences2021The State disagrees, contending it was not required to present any such evidence at trial to prove defendant guilty of counts I and II. ¶ 28 When presented with a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, our inquiry is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v. Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 64 , 162 N.E.3d 223 . 2021The State disagrees, contending it was not required to present any such evidence at trial to prove defendant guilty of counts I and II. ¶ 28 When presented with a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, our inquiry is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v. Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 64 , 162 N.E.3d 223 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Weiser
green
2 sentences2020See People v. Tatera, 2018 IL App (2d) 160207, ¶ 72 , 103 N.E.3d 1059 (aggravated DUI defendant with nine prior DUI convictions sentenced to eight years in prison); People v. Morrow, 2014 IL App (2d) 130718 , ¶ 20, 39 N.E.3d 44 (aggravated DUI defendant with seven prior DUI convictions sentenced to 13 years’ imprisonment); People v. Dryden, 2015 IL App (2d) 130683-U , ¶¶ 6, 10, 12 (aggravated DUI defendant with 9 to 11 prior DUI convictions sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment); People v. Vanderark, 2012 IL App (2d) 110044-U , ¶¶ 7, 11 (aggravated DUI defendant with nine prior DUI convictions s 2020See People v. Tatera, 2018 IL App (2d) 160207, ¶ 72 , 103 N.E.3d 1059 (aggravated DUI defendant with nine prior DUI convictions sentenced to eight years in prison); People v. Morrow, 2014 IL App (2d) 130718 , ¶ 20, 39 N.E.3d 44 (aggravated DUI defendant with seven prior DUI convictions sentenced to 13 years’ imprisonment); People v. Dryden, 2015 IL App (2d) 130683-U , ¶¶ 6, 10, 12 (aggravated DUI defendant with 9 to 11 prior DUI convictions sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment); People v. Vanderark, 2012 IL App (2d) 110044-U , ¶¶ 7, 11 (aggravated DUI defendant with nine prior DUI convictions s | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Brunner
green
2 sentences2020A sentence within statutory limits is excessive and an abuse of the court’s discretion only “when it is greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law, or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense.” People v. Brunner, 2012 IL App (4th) 100708, ¶ 40 , 976 N.E.2d 27 . -8- ¶ 32 Here, defendant was convicted of, and sentenced for, aggravated DUI, a Class 4 felony based on his commission of that offense during a period when his driving privileges were revoked or suspended for a previous DUI violation. 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(1), (d)(1)(G) (West 2016). 2020A sentence within statutory limits is excessive and an abuse of the court’s discretion only “when it is greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law, or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense.” People v. Brunner, 2012 IL App (4th) 100708, ¶ 40 , 976 N.E.2d 27 . -8- ¶ 32 Here, defendant was convicted of, and sentenced for, aggravated DUI, a Class 4 felony based on his commission of that offense during a period when his driving privileges were revoked or suspended for a previous DUI violation. 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(1), (d)(1)(G) (West 2016). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Daily
green
2 sentences2020See People v. Tatera, 2018 IL App (2d) 160207, ¶ 72 , 103 N.E.3d 1059 (aggravated DUI defendant with nine prior DUI convictions sentenced to eight years in prison); People v. Morrow, 2014 IL App (2d) 130718 , ¶ 20, 39 N.E.3d 44 (aggravated DUI defendant with seven prior DUI convictions sentenced to 13 years’ imprisonment); People v. Dryden, 2015 IL App (2d) 130683-U , ¶¶ 6, 10, 12 (aggravated DUI defendant with 9 to 11 prior DUI convictions sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment); People v. Vanderark, 2012 IL App (2d) 110044-U , ¶¶ 7, 11 (aggravated DUI defendant with nine prior DUI convictions s 2020See People v. Tatera, 2018 IL App (2d) 160207, ¶ 72 , 103 N.E.3d 1059 (aggravated DUI defendant with nine prior DUI convictions sentenced to eight years in prison); People v. Morrow, 2014 IL App (2d) 130718 , ¶ 20, 39 N.E.3d 44 (aggravated DUI defendant with seven prior DUI convictions sentenced to 13 years’ imprisonment); People v. Dryden, 2015 IL App (2d) 130683-U , ¶¶ 6, 10, 12 (aggravated DUI defendant with 9 to 11 prior DUI convictions sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment); People v. Vanderark, 2012 IL App (2d) 110044-U , ¶¶ 7, 11 (aggravated DUI defendant with nine prior DUI convictions s | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Morrow
green
1 sentence2020See People v. Tatera, 2018 IL App (2d) 160207, ¶ 72 , 103 N.E.3d 1059 (aggravated DUI defendant with nine prior DUI convictions sentenced to eight years in prison); People v. Morrow, 2014 IL App (2d) 130718 , ¶ 20, 39 N.E.3d 44 (aggravated DUI defendant with seven prior DUI convictions sentenced to 13 years’ imprisonment); People v. Dryden, 2015 IL App (2d) 130683-U , ¶¶ 6, 10, 12 (aggravated DUI defendant with 9 to 11 prior DUI convictions sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment); People v. Vanderark, 2012 IL App (2d) 110044-U , ¶¶ 7, 11 (aggravated DUI defendant with nine prior DUI convictions s | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. Shafer green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| People v. Merritt green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| People v. Tinkham green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| People v. Sheehan green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| People v. Johnson green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Cunningham v. Huffman green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| People Ex Rel. Edgar v. Pence green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Pennsylvania v. Muniz green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| People v. Doyle neutral | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Harris v. Oklahoma green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| People v. Murphy green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| People Ex Rel. Carey v. Chrastka green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| People v. McNeil green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| People v. Walljasper green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.