DUI defendant in California

2022More than 30 years ago, in Weatherill, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d 1569 , the majority concluded the diversion scheme for misdemeanor defendants with developmental disabilities under section 1001.20 et seq. did not apply to DUI defendants.

2022More than 30 years ago, in Weatherill, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d 1569 , the majority concluded the diversion scheme for misdemeanor defendants with developmental disabilities under section 1001.20 et seq. did not apply to DUI defendants.

2022In People v. VanVleck (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 355 , review granted Nov. 16, 2016, S237219, the court relied on Weatherill, the presumption that the Legislature was aware of the existence of Vehicle Code section 23640, and the canon that specific statutes prevail over general statutes to conclude that DUI defendants were not eligible for military diversion.

2021Code, § 1001.80, added by Stats. 2014, ch. 658.) In People v. VanVleck (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 355 , the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division One held that the general prohibition on diversion for DUI defendants, now found in section 23640 (see id. at p. 361, fn. 2), applied to bar such defendants from military diversion.

2022(VanVleck, at pp. 363–367.) The court in Hopkins v. Superior Court (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1275 , 1278–1279, review granted Nov. 16, 2016, S237734, disagreed, noting the canon of construction that specific statutes prevail over general statutes could be applied either way, and that the canon that later enacted statutes prevail over earlier ones and the legislative history pointed to allowing diversion for military DUI defendants.

2021But what is interesting is that most of the courts, with the exception of Hopkins v. Superior Court (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1275 , discussed below, have concluded that unless the Legislature expressly states so, section 23640 prohibits diversion for DUI offenses. 5 Starting in People v. Weatherill (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1569 , notwithstanding Justice Johnson’s eloquent dissent, the majority court concluded that section 23202, the forerunner to section 23640, prohibited a DUI defendant from being granted diversion for defendants with developmental disabilities under Penal Code section 1001.20 et se

2024(See People v. Sudduth (1966) 65 Cal.2d 543 , 546–547 (Sudduth); South Dakota v. Neville (1983) 459 U.S. 553, 554, 564 (Neville).) Although we have no Fifth Amendment challenge in this case, we take these high court precedents as highly instructive in piecing together the applicable Fourth Amendment principles at issue here based on McNeely and Birchfield. 15 supra, 579 U.S. at pp. 443–444.) While the “typical penalty for noncompliance” “[i]n the past” was “suspension or revocation of the motorist’s license,” the North Dakota and Minnesota laws at issue in Birchfield went “beyond that and [mad

2024(See People v. Sudduth (1966) 65 Cal.2d 543 , 546–547 (Sudduth); South Dakota v. Neville (1983) 459 U.S. 553, 554, 564 (Neville).) Although we have no Fifth Amendment challenge in this case, we take these high court precedents as highly instructive in piecing together the applicable Fourth Amendment principles at issue here based on McNeely and Birchfield. 15 supra, 579 U.S. at pp. 443–444.) While the “typical penalty for noncompliance” “[i]n the past” was “suspension or revocation of the motorist’s license,” the North Dakota and Minnesota laws at issue in Birchfield went “beyond that and [mad

2023(People v. Kopp (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 47 , review granted Nov. 13, 2019, S257844.) 13 After taking the DUI plea, the trial court proceeded to sentencing on that case.

2022The defendant is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt as to the true interpretation of words or the construction of a statute.” (People v. Overstreet (1986) 42 Cal.3d 891, 896 .) Thus, “when ‘two reasonable interpretations of the same provision stand in relative equipoise, i.e., . . . resolution of the statute’s ambiguities in a convincing manner is impracticable,’ we construe the provision most favorably to the defendant.” (People v. Hernandez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 835, 869 , overruled in part on other ground.) Further, [“t]he rule of lenity does not apply every time there are two or

2022The defendant is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt as to the true interpretation of words or the construction of a statute.” (People v. Overstreet (1986) 42 Cal.3d 891, 896 .) Thus, “when ‘two reasonable interpretations of the same provision stand in relative equipoise, i.e., . . . resolution of the statute’s ambiguities in a convincing manner is impracticable,’ we construe the provision most favorably to the defendant.” (People v. Hernandez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 835, 869 , overruled in part on other ground.) Further, [“t]he rule of lenity does not apply every time there are two or

2022The defendant is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt as to the true interpretation of words or the construction of a statute.” (People v. Overstreet (1986) 42 Cal.3d 891, 896 .) Thus, “when ‘two reasonable interpretations of the same provision stand in relative equipoise, i.e., . . . resolution of the statute’s ambiguities in a convincing manner is impracticable,’ we construe the provision most favorably to the defendant.” (People v. Hernandez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 835, 869 , overruled in part on other ground.) Further, [“t]he rule of lenity does not apply every time there are two or

2022Citing People v. Fry (1969) 271 Cal.App.2d 350, 358 , Noujaim argues that “[w]here a defendant appeals from a judgment of a plea of guilty following a denial of a motion to suppress evidence material to the charge against him, and the appellate court determines denial of his motion was error, the judgment will be reversed with instructions to set aside the plea upon which it was entered.” Defendant makes no effort to explain how his motion to suppress the evidence from the September 10, 2019, warrantless blood draw might possibly be material to the April 7, 2020, misdemeanor DUI charge.

2021With regard to the threshold question of eligibility, the prosecutor had argued that DUI defendants are categorically ineligible for 1 While it appears that the People have a remedy by way of appeal (People v. Tapia (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1 , 3 & fn. 1), “writ review of an appealable order is appropriate where it is necessary to resolve an issue of first impression promptly and to set guidelines for bench and bar” (Rodrigues v. Superior Court (Joaquim) (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1032 ).

2021The Legislative Counsel’s Digest “is not a part of the law.” (California Teachers’ Assn. v. Governing Board (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 606, 614 .) Again for the first time in the reply, Grassi asserts section 1001.95 differs in a key respect from other diversion statutes that expressly exclude DUI defendants.

2021With regard to the threshold question of eligibility, the prosecutor had argued that DUI defendants are categorically ineligible for 1 While it appears that the People have a remedy by way of appeal (People v. Tapia (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1 , 3 & fn. 1), “writ review of an appealable order is appropriate where it is necessary to resolve an issue of first impression promptly and to set guidelines for bench and bar” (Rodrigues v. Superior Court (Joaquim) (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1032 ).

2021(Tellez, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 444; Lewis v. Ryan (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 330, 333-334 .) 19 Assemblyman Jim Cooper stated section 1001.95 allowed DUI defendants to obtain diversion.

2021We are not persuaded. “‘In construing a statute we do not consider the motives or understandings of individual legislators who cast their votes in favor of it. [Citations.] Nor do we carve an exception to this principle simply because the legislator whose motives are proffered actually authored the bill in controversy [citation]; no guarantee can issue that those who supported his proposal shared his view of its compass.’ [Citation.] A legislator’s statement is entitled to consideration, however, when it is a reiteration of legislative discussion and events leading to adoption of proposed amen

2020(Davis v. Municipal Court (1988) 46 Cal.3d 64, 73-74 .) Many of these local diversion programs included “driving- under-the-influence diversion programs.” (Weatherill, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at p. 1576 .) The proliferation of local DUI diversion programs in California ultimately led to the 1981 enactment of Vehicle Code former sections 23202 and 23206, the predecessors to Vehicle Code sections 23640 and 23600.

2020Bill No. 215 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 6, 2018, § 1.) 18 include the prohibition just as if it had not been eliminated by the Legislature.” (People v Bruno (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 1102, 1107 .) More generally, he claims, “ ‘[t]he rejection by the Legislature of a specific provision contained in an act as originally introduced is most persuasive to the conclusion that the act should not be construed to include the omitted provision.’ ” (Madrid v. Justice Court (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 819, 825 (Madrid).) But whatever reasons the sponsors of Senate Bill 215 may have had for removing any express excl

2020Code, § 23600, subd. (c).) Courts have consistently observed that the Legislature’s “ ‘unambiguous intent’ ” in enacting Vehicle Code sections 23640 and 23600, and their predecessor statutes, was “ ‘to prohibit pre- or postconviction stays or suspensions of proceedings to allow [DUI defendants] to be diverted into a treatment program and avoid spending the statutorily mandated minimum time in confinement or paying the statutorily imposed minimum fine.’ ” (VanVleck, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 361 , quoting People v. Darnell (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 806, 810 ; see People v Duncan, supra, 216 Cal.Ap

2020Code, § 23600, subd. (c).) Courts have consistently observed that the Legislature’s “ ‘unambiguous intent’ ” in enacting Vehicle Code sections 23640 and 23600, and their predecessor statutes, was “ ‘to prohibit pre- or postconviction stays or suspensions of proceedings to allow [DUI defendants] to be diverted into a treatment program and avoid spending the statutorily mandated minimum time in confinement or paying the statutorily imposed minimum fine.’ ” (VanVleck, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 361 , quoting People v. Darnell (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 806, 810 ; see People v Duncan, supra, 216 Cal.Ap

2020Both because the issue is novel and no appeal lies from an order denying pretrial diversion in a criminal proceeding (Morse v. Municipal Court (1974) 13 Cal.3d 149, 155 ), the question of whether DUI defendants are categorically ineligible for pretrial mental health diversion is likely to recur, both by petitions for extraordinary writ and on appeal from judgments of conviction in DUI cases.

2020We disagree. “ ‘Under the maxim of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, if exemptions are specified in a statute, we may not imply additional exemptions unless there is a clear legislative intent to the contrary.’ (Sierra Club v. State Bd. of Forestry (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1215, 1230-1231 [court did not interpret intent of Legislature to exempt timber harvesting from environmental legislation where it had exempted other types of forest practices].) ‘The proper rule of statutory construction is that the statement of limited exceptions excludes others, and therefore the judi

2020We disagree. “ ‘Under the maxim of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, if exemptions are specified in a statute, we may not imply additional exemptions unless there is a clear legislative intent to the contrary.’ (Sierra Club v. State Bd. of Forestry (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1215, 1230-1231 [court did not interpret intent of Legislature to exempt timber harvesting from environmental legislation where it had exempted other types of forest practices].) ‘The proper rule of statutory construction is that the statement of limited exceptions excludes others, and therefore the judi

2020(See Wade v. Superior Court (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 694, 706-707 .) 10 736, 741 [“Questions of statutory interpretation are, of course, pure matters of law upon which we may exercise our independent judgment.”].) “Our primary objective in interpreting a statute is to determine and give effect to the underlying legislative intent. [Citation.] Intent is determined foremost by the plain meaning of the statutory language.