DUI exception in South Dakota

2020Goin relies on State v. Mundy-Geidd, claiming it is instructive on situations where the repeal of one statute does not result in a statute that referenced the repealed statute being unenforceable. 2014 S.D. 96 , 857 N.W.2d 880 . [¶15.] In Mundy-Geidd, the appellant argued that a DUI statute could not be enforced at the time of her DUI (2013) because the DUI exception to SDCL 34-20A- 93 (repealed 2014), which prohibited enforcement of laws that include “drinking, drunkenness, or being found in an intoxicated condition as one of the elements of -6- #28971, #28986 the offense,” had been repealed

2020Goin relies on State v. Mundy-Geidd, claiming it is instructive on situations where the repeal of one statute does not result in a statute that referenced the repealed statute being unenforceable. 2014 S.D. 96 , 857 N.W.2d 880 . [¶15.] In Mundy-Geidd, the appellant argued that a DUI statute could not be enforced at the time of her DUI (2013) because the DUI exception to SDCL 34-20A- 93 (repealed 2014), which prohibited enforcement of laws that include “drinking, drunkenness, or being found in an intoxicated condition as one of the elements of -6- #28971, #28986 the offense,” had been repealed

2012Id. at 439 .

1999“Instructions are adequate, when considered as a whole, if they correctly state the law and properly inform the jury.” State v. Hart, 1996 SD 17, ¶ 13 , 544 N.W.2d 206 (citation omitted). [¶ 20.] Still, the estate argues that a limiting instruction should have been given so the jury would not have been misled into applying the DUI presumption to Wangsness by concluding that because the decedent’s blood alcohol level was above the legal limit, that he was presumptively under the influence and thus contributorily negligent.

1999“Instructions are adequate, when considered as a whole, if they correctly state the law and properly inform the jury.” State v. Hart, 1996 SD 17, ¶ 13 , 544 N.W.2d 206 (citation omitted). [¶ 20.] Still, the estate argues that a limiting instruction should have been given so the jury would not have been misled into applying the DUI presumption to Wangsness by concluding that because the decedent’s blood alcohol level was above the legal limit, that he was presumptively under the influence and thus contributorily negligent.

1999Nonetheless, we continued to bar “strong association between the blood alcohol content of the injured [pedestrian] and the ramifications of our driving while intoxicated laws and the statutory presumptions flowing from certain blood alcohol content levels.” Id. [¶ 18.] The defense sought and received part of a pattern DUI instruction explaining to the jury when the presumption of being under the influence of alcohol applies under South Dakota law.

1999Cf. Blaine, supra where the prosecutor made arguments to the jury that were not based on the evidence and that asked the jury to consider what might have happened if a small child had crossed the DUI defendant's path.

1997Id. [7] The right to refuse is reserved for misdemeanor offenses.

1990Likewise, in City of Kettering v. Hollen, 64 Ohio St.2d 232 , 416 N.E.2d 598 (1980), the Ohio Supreme Court, in a rather shallow opinion, determined that the exclusionary rule was not applicable to a DUI defendant arrested by a Kettering police officer in adjoining Dayton.

1990Likewise, in City of Kettering v. Hollen, 64 Ohio St.2d 232 , 416 N.E.2d 598 (1980), the Ohio Supreme Court, in a rather shallow opinion, determined that the exclusionary rule was not applicable to a DUI defendant arrested by a Kettering police officer in adjoining Dayton.