pre-sentencing hearing in Illinois

1985Both parties cite and rely on several Third District cases (People v. Osborn (1983), 111 Ill.

1984(People v. House (1981), 98 Ill.

1983(People v. Johnson (1982), 106 Ill.

1983Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 1005-5-6), provides: "If restitution is part of the disposition, the defendant shall make restitution to the victim in accordance with the following: (a) A pre-sentencing hearing shall be held to assess the financial capacity of the defendant to make restitution as well as to determine the amount and conditions of payment at the court's discretion." The decision to hold a separate and distinct sentencing hearing on the issue of restitution is discretionary. ( People v. Johnson (1982), 106 Ill.

1981Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 1005 — 5—6) provides that if restitution is part of the disposition: “(a) A pre-sentencing hearing shall be held to assess the financial capacity of the defendant to make restitution as well as to determine the amount and conditions of payment at the court’s discretion.” In People v. Abraham (1980), 89 Ill.

1981App. 3d 786 , 412 N.E.2d 45 , it was held that it was a matter of the trial court’s discretion to hold a hearing upon the issue.

1973(People v. Fuca (1969), 43 Ill.2d 182 , 251 N.E.2d 239 .) During the hearing in aggravation and mitigation, the trial court referred to the fact that Tolefree was on bond at the time of his offense, but in the sentencing decision he said, “I do have to take into consideration your age * * *, and the fact that you havn’t been convicted of anything other than the $100.00 fine.” Even if we were to ignore the context of the correction of the defense misstatement and were to view the information that defendant was on bond at the time of the commission of the instant crime as having been improperly

1973(People v. Fuca (1969), 43 Ill.2d 182 , 251 N.E.2d 239 .) During the hearing in aggravation and mitigation, the trial court referred to the fact that Tolefree was on bond at the time of his offense, but in the sentencing decision he said, “I do have to take into consideration your age * * *, and the fact that you havn’t been convicted of anything other than the $100.00 fine.” Even if we were to ignore the context of the correction of the defense misstatement and were to view the information that defendant was on bond at the time of the commission of the instant crime as having been improperly

1968We agree with the State that defendant may not ask the court to proceed in a given manner and “then assign as error in a court of review the ruling or action which he procured.” (People v. Ficarrotta, 385 Ill 108, 110, 52 NE2d 165 (1943).) Also, we find no prejudicial error in the manner the prior conviction was handled during the pre-sentencing hearing.

1968In People v. Deweese, 27 Ill2d 332, 336, 189 NE2d 250 (1963), it is said that at a hearing in aggravation and mitigation, the “informal presentation of a defendant’s former record is not erroneous,” because the trial court is not “bound at such hearing by the usual rules of evidence.” See, also, People v. Bradford, 23 Ill2d 30, 34, 177 NE 2d 139 (1961).

1968In People v. Deweese, 27 Ill2d 332, 336, 189 NE2d 250 (1963), it is said that at a hearing in aggravation and mitigation, the “informal presentation of a defendant’s former record is not erroneous,” because the trial court is not “bound at such hearing by the usual rules of evidence.” See, also, People v. Bradford, 23 Ill2d 30, 34, 177 NE 2d 139 (1961).