trust fund doctrine in Illinois

1980Ill. 1978), 448 F. Supp. 769, 771 .) The trust fund doctrine was promulgated by the equity courts to protect creditors when dissolution occurs.

1980Snyder v. Nathan (7th Cir. 1965), 353 F.2d 3 , to support her contention that the relief afforded by the trust fund doctrine may be used to satisfy claims against a dissolved corporation.

1947Dee Memorial Hospital Ass’n, 94 Utah 460 , 78 Pac. (2d) 645 (from concurring opinion of Justice Wolfe.) One of the early refinements of the trust fund theory was to refuse exemption from liability unless the charitable institution had shown due care in the selection of its servants and agents (Old Folks’ & Orphan Children’s Home v. Roberts (1930), 91 Ind. App. 533 , 171 N. E. 10 ) but, as pointed out in Andrews v. Y.M.C.A., supra, "Such an exception is wholly inconsistent with, and a repudiation of the trust fund doctrine, since an enforcement of the exception would, itself, effect a depletion

1947Dee Memorial Hospital Ass’n, 94 Utah 460 , 78 Pac. (2d) 645 (from concurring opinion of Justice Wolfe.) One of the early refinements of the trust fund theory was to refuse exemption from liability unless the charitable institution had shown due care in the selection of its servants and agents (Old Folks’ & Orphan Children’s Home v. Roberts (1930), 91 Ind. App. 533 , 171 N. E. 10 ) but, as pointed out in Andrews v. Y.M.C.A., supra, "Such an exception is wholly inconsistent with, and a repudiation of the trust fund doctrine, since an enforcement of the exception would, itself, effect a depletion

1947In Hearns v. Waterbury Hospital, 66 Conn. 98 , 33 Atl. 595 , the court speaks of the respondeat superior rule as at times a hard rule, but resting on public policy, and there held that it should not be extended to charitable institutions, but Justice Bliss, in Andrews v. Y.M.C.A., pertinently calls attention to the fact that “This ancient maxim of the common law and its twin — ‘ Qui facit per alium faeit per se ’ — He who acts through another acts by or for himself — form the basis of the law of agency, and of other principles in the law of master and servant.

1947In Hearns v. Waterbury Hospital, 66 Conn. 98 , 33 Atl. 595 , the court speaks of the respondeat superior rule as at times a hard rule, but resting on public policy, and there held that it should not be extended to charitable institutions, but Justice Bliss, in Andrews v. Y.M.C.A., pertinently calls attention to the fact that “This ancient maxim of the common law and its twin — ‘ Qui facit per alium faeit per se ’ — He who acts through another acts by or for himself — form the basis of the law of agency, and of other principles in the law of master and servant.

1947Dee Memorial Hospital Ass’n, 94 Utah 460 , 78 Pac. (2d) 645 (from concurring opinion of Justice Wolfe.) One of the early refinements of the trust fund theory was to refuse exemption from liability unless the charitable institution had shown due care in the selection of its servants and agents (Old Folks’ & Orphan Children’s Home v. Roberts (1930), 91 Ind. App. 533 , 171 N. E. 10 ) but, as pointed out in Andrews v. Y.M.C.A., supra, "Such an exception is wholly inconsistent with, and a repudiation of the trust fund doctrine, since an enforcement of the exception would, itself, effect a depletion

1947Dee Memorial Hospital Ass’n, 94 Utah 460 , 78 Pac. (2d) 645 (from concurring opinion of Justice Wolfe.) One of the early refinements of the trust fund theory was to refuse exemption from liability unless the charitable institution had shown due care in the selection of its servants and agents (Old Folks’ & Orphan Children’s Home v. Roberts (1930), 91 Ind. App. 533 , 171 N. E. 10 ) but, as pointed out in Andrews v. Y.M.C.A., supra, "Such an exception is wholly inconsistent with, and a repudiation of the trust fund doctrine, since an enforcement of the exception would, itself, effect a depletion

1945Mary’s Academy v. Solomon, 77 Colo. 463 ; Fordyce v. Woman’s Christian Nat.

1945In the Williams’ case ( 223 Ky. 355 ) the court answered the argument of plaintiff that procurement of indemnity insurance by a charitable institution is sufficient of itself to make the institution liable, on the ground that no diversion of trust funds would result, by quoting from Levy v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. App. 171 , 239 Pac. 1100 , as follows: “If a liability may be created or an exemption waived by the acts of the trustee of a charity in- procuring and accepting the promise of a third person to make good the losses following such liability or waiver, and the trustee thus allowed to a

1945No authorities holding in accordance with the argument of counsel in this behalf have been called to our attention; and it is our opinion that the theory that a charity, not otherwise subject to liability, may become liable by reason of the procurement by those administering it of indemnity insurance cannot be supported in principle.” In the latest case brought to our attention, Stedem v. Jewish Memorial Hospital Ass’n of Kansas City, supra, the court had under consideration a policy similar to the one before us.

1945Ency. of Law,-2d ed.-923.) These reasons for exemption apply as well to private as to public charitable corporations.” In a few states recognizing the trust-fund doctrine charitable institutions have been held liable for negligence, but satisfaction of a judgment against it has been limited to property, if any, not directly connected with the charitable purposes of the organization or a part of the trust fund, Gamble v. Vanderbilt University, 138 Tenn. 616 ; St.

1945As said in Parks v. Northwestern University, 218 Ill. 381, 384 , “. . . the exemption accorded to char! table institutions does not rest alone on the doctrine that the State or the sovereign is not liable for the acts of its servants.

1945In the Williams’ case ( 223 Ky. 355 ) the court answered the argument of plaintiff that procurement of indemnity insurance by a charitable institution is sufficient of itself to make the institution liable, on the ground that no diversion of trust funds would result, by quoting from Levy v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. App. 171 , 239 Pac. 1100 , as follows: “If a liability may be created or an exemption waived by the acts of the trustee of a charity in- procuring and accepting the promise of a third person to make good the losses following such liability or waiver, and the trustee thus allowed to a

1945In the Williams’ case ( 223 Ky. 355 ) the court answered the argument of plaintiff that procurement of indemnity insurance by a charitable institution is sufficient of itself to make the institution liable, on the ground that no diversion of trust funds would result, by quoting from Levy v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. App. 171 , 239 Pac. 1100 , as follows: “If a liability may be created or an exemption waived by the acts of the trustee of a charity in- procuring and accepting the promise of a third person to make good the losses following such liability or waiver, and the trustee thus allowed to a

1933The doctrine does not prevent a corporation from disposing of the whole or any part of its assets for value and in good faith, and where it does so, the purchaser takes the assets discharged from any trust in favor of the creditors of the selling corporation.” The cases are collected in a note to Skirvin Operating Co. v. Southwestern Electric Co., 71 Okla. 25 , 174 Pac. 1069 , 15 A. L.

1933The doctrine does not prevent a corporation from disposing of the whole or any part of its assets for value and in good faith, and where it does so, the purchaser takes the assets discharged from any trust in favor of the creditors of the selling corporation.” The cases are collected in a note to Skirvin Operating Co. v. Southwestern Electric Co., 71 Okla. 25 , 174 Pac. 1069 , 15 A. L.