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6 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Goldberg v. Ruskingreen2 sentences2014See, e.g., Goldberg, 113 Ill. 2d at 490 (finding that a child born with Tay Sachs disease could not recover general damages for the pain and suffering associated with his genetic disease, as there was “no rational way to measure non-existence or to compare non-existence with the pain and suffering of the child’s impaired existence” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Siemieniec, 117 Ill. 2d at 251 (rejecting a hemophiliac child’s wrongful life claim, in which he sought to recover extraordinary expenses, because “the public policy of this State to protect and to preserve the sanctity 2014See, e.g., Goldberg, 113 Ill. 2d at 490 (finding that a child born with Tay Sachs disease could not recover general damages for the pain and suffering associated with his genetic disease, as there was “no rational way to measure non-existence or to compare non-existence with the pain and suffering of the child’s impaired existence” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Siemieniec, 117 Ill. 2d at 251 (rejecting a hemophiliac child’s wrongful life claim, in which he sought to recover extraordinary expenses, because “the public policy of this State to protect and to preserve the sanctity | 3 | 4 |
Siemieniec v. Lutheran General Hospitalgreen2 sentences2014See, e.g., Goldberg, 113 Ill. 2d at 490 (finding that a child born with Tay Sachs disease could not recover general damages for the pain and suffering associated with his genetic disease, as there was “no rational way to measure non-existence or to compare non-existence with the pain and suffering of the child’s impaired existence” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Siemieniec, 117 Ill. 2d at 251 (rejecting a hemophiliac child’s wrongful life claim, in which he sought to recover extraordinary expenses, because “the public policy of this State to protect and to preserve the sanctity 2014See, e.g., Goldberg, 113 Ill. 2d at 490 (finding that a child born with Tay Sachs disease could not recover general damages for the pain and suffering associated with his genetic disease, as there was “no rational way to measure non-existence or to compare non-existence with the pain and suffering of the child’s impaired existence” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Siemieniec, 117 Ill. 2d at 251 (rejecting a hemophiliac child’s wrongful life claim, in which he sought to recover extraordinary expenses, because “the public policy of this State to protect and to preserve the sanctity | 2 | 4 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Williams v. University of Chicago Hospitals
green
2 sentences2014Williams, 179 Ill. 2d at 84 . 2014Williams, 179 Ill. 2d at 84 . | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Elliott v. Brown
green
2 sentences1987We decline to pronounce judgment in the imponderable area of nonexistence." ( Elliott v. Brown (Ala. 1978), 361 So.2d 546, 548 .) In Smith , the New Hampshire Supreme Court, in denying the wrongful life claim of a child born with congenital rubella syndrome, couched this dilemma in terms of public policy: "[C]ompelling policy reasons militate against recognition of wrongful life claims. 1987We decline to pronounce judgment in the imponderable area of nonexistence.” (Elliott v. Brown (Ala. 1978), 361 So. 2d 546, 548 .) In Smith, the New Hampshire Supreme Court, in denying the wrongful life claim of a child bom with congenital rubeHa syndrome, couched this dilemma in terms of public policy: “[Cjompelling policy reasons militate against recognition of wrongful life claims. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Goldberg v. Ruskin
green
1 sentence1985Goldberg v. Ruskin (1984), 128 Ill. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Becker v. Schwartz
green
2 sentences1985(Becker v. Schwratz (1978), 41 N.Y.2d 401, 407 , 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 900 , 386 N.E.2d 807, 812 .) In Goldberg, the appellate court rejected a wrongful life claim which did not seek only extraordinary medical expenses, as here. 1985(Becker v. Schwratz (1978), 41 N.Y.2d 401, 407 , 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 900 , 386 N.E.2d 807, 812 .) In Goldberg, the appellate court rejected a wrongful life claim which did not seek only extraordinary medical expenses, as here. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.