6 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1992–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hicks v. Stategreen2 sentences2014Under the first prong of the Hicks test, we must consider if the evidence is relevant other than to the defendant’s propensity to commit the charged act. 690 N.E.2d at 221 . 2014Under the first prong of the Hicks test, we must consider if the evidence is relevant other than to the defendant’s propensity to commit the charged act. 690 N.E.2d at 221 . | 1 | 3 |
Cotton v. Stategreen1 sentence2010See Cotton, 658 N.E.2d at 901 (emphasizing that although a nune pro tunc entry "cannot be used to show that an event happened which did not actually occur," this language "should not be read to prevent a trial court from completing its record of what did in fact occur). 6 In light of the foregoing, we conclude the trial court did not err by using a nune pro tune order to complete the record and retroactively sign and grant Hicks's motion to correct error. | 1 | 1 |
Christenson v. Strussgreen1 sentence2010See Ind.Code § 38-28-5-9(a) (magistrate "shall report findings in an evidentiary hearing, a trial, or a jury's verdiet to the court" but "[the court shall enter the final order"); Christenson, 855 N.E.2d at 1033 (magistrate may conduct hearing on motion to correct error, but "the judge must still perform the necessary judicial act of granting or denying the motion") (quotation omitted); see also In re Hawkins, 902 N.E.2d 231, 240-41 (Ind.2009) (emphasizing that "[rle- view of final orders by the presiding judge is not a mere technicality," and finding that judge's regularly permitting master c | 1 | 1 |
In Re Hawkinsgreen1 sentence2010See Ind.Code § 38-28-5-9(a) (magistrate "shall report findings in an evidentiary hearing, a trial, or a jury's verdiet to the court" but "[the court shall enter the final order"); Christenson, 855 N.E.2d at 1033 (magistrate may conduct hearing on motion to correct error, but "the judge must still perform the necessary judicial act of granting or denying the motion") (quotation omitted); see also In re Hawkins, 902 N.E.2d 231, 240-41 (Ind.2009) (emphasizing that "[rle- view of final orders by the presiding judge is not a mere technicality," and finding that judge's regularly permitting master c | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Segura v. State
green
2 sentences2018Hicks’s claim falls under the first Segura category—“an unutilized defense or failure to mitigate a penalty.” Id. 2018In such cases, Segura requires that “the prejudice from the omitted defense, or failure to mitigate a penalty, be measured by (1) evaluating the probability of success of the omitted defense at trial or (2) determining whether the utilization of the opportunity to mitigate a penalty likely would produce a better result for the petitioner.” Id. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Gibson v. State
green
1 sentence2010The other principal case relied upon by the City, Gibson v. State, 910 N.E.2d 263 (Ind.Ct.App.2009), involved the readily distinguishable seenar-io where the defendant's undisputed testimony and the trial court's own statements and findings directly contradicted the CCS entries stating the defendant was granted continuances. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
cluster 2009061
green
2 sentences1992The jury was instructed in Hicks v. State (1989), Ind., 536 N.E.2d 496, 499 , that “in Indiana a defendant may be convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of the victim.” The Hicks defendant alleged that the instruction invaded the province of the jury in that it gave tacit approval of the victim’s testimony. 1992The court responded: “So long as the jury was instructed on the elements of the offense charged, the State’s burden of proof throughout the case, the presumption of the defendant’s innocence, the credibility of the witnesses, and the manner in which the jury was to deliberate to reach a verdict, the instruction about which appellant complains is proper.” Id. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.