Hicks brief in Alabama

2014In Vaughn v. State, supra, the Court of Criminal Appeals explained the doctrine of vagueness: “ ‘ “The doctrine of vagueness ... originates in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 , 59 S.Ct. 618 , 83 L.Ed. 888 (1939), and is the basis for striking down legislation which contains insufficient warning of what conduct is unlawful, see United States v. National Dairy Products Corporation, 372 U.S. 29 , 83 S.Ct. 594 , 9 L.Ed.2d 561 (1963). “ ‘ “Void for vagueness simply means that criminal responsibility should not attach where one could not r

2014In Vaughn v. State, supra, the Court of Criminal Appeals explained the doctrine of vagueness: “ ‘ “The doctrine of vagueness ... originates in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 , 59 S.Ct. 618 , 83 L.Ed. 888 (1939), and is the basis for striking down legislation which contains insufficient warning of what conduct is unlawful, see United States v. National Dairy Products Corporation, 372 U.S. 29 , 83 S.Ct. 594 , 9 L.Ed.2d 561 (1963). “ ‘ “Void for vagueness simply means that criminal responsibility should not attach where one could not r

2014In Vaughn v. State, supra, the Court of Criminal Appeals explained the doctrine of vagueness: “ ‘ “The doctrine of vagueness ... originates in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 , 59 S.Ct. 618 , 83 L.Ed. 888 (1939), and is the basis for striking down legislation which contains insufficient warning of what conduct is unlawful, see United States v. National Dairy Products Corporation, 372 U.S. 29 , 83 S.Ct. 594 , 9 L.Ed.2d 561 (1963). “ ‘ “Void for vagueness simply means that criminal responsibility should not attach where one could not r

2014In Vaughn v. State, supra, the Court of Criminal Appeals explained the doctrine of vagueness: “ ‘ “The doctrine of vagueness ... originates in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 , 59 S.Ct. 618 , 83 L.Ed. 888 (1939), and is the basis for striking down legislation which contains insufficient warning of what conduct is unlawful, see United States v. National Dairy Products Corporation, 372 U.S. 29 , 83 S.Ct. 594 , 9 L.Ed.2d 561 (1963). “ ‘ “Void for vagueness simply means that criminal responsibility should not attach where one could not r

2014In the alternative, Hicks argues that, if this Court does not find that the chemical-endangerment statute is impermissibly and unconstitutionally vagué, then the Court must follow the rule of lenity and construe the statute in her favor: In Ankrom , this Court applied the rules of statutory construction to interpret the chemical-endangerment statute: • “In [Ex parte ] Bertram, [ 884 So.2d 889 (Ala.2003),] this Court stated: “ ‘ “A basic rule of review in criminal cases is that criminal statutes are to be strictly construed in favor of those persons sought to be subjected to their operation, i.

2014In the alternative, Hicks argues that, if this Court does not find that the chemical-endangerment statute is impermissibly and unconstitutionally vagué, then the Court must follow the rule of lenity and construe the statute in her favor: In Ankrom , this Court applied the rules of statutory construction to interpret the chemical-endangerment statute: • “In [Ex parte ] Bertram, [ 884 So.2d 889 (Ala.2003),] this Court stated: “ ‘ “A basic rule of review in criminal cases is that criminal statutes are to be strictly construed in favor of those persons sought to be subjected to their operation, i.

2014She was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment; the sentence was suspended, and Hicks was placed on supervised probation for one year.” (References to the record omitted.) The Court of Criminal Appeals, relying on its opinion in Ankrom v. State, 152 So.3d 373 (AIa.Crim.App.2011), affirmed the trial court’s judgment, stating: “Hicks contends on appeal, as she did in the trial court, that the plain language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, and ‘the statute [ (§ 26-15-3.2(a)(l)) ] does not mention unborn children or fetuses.’ (Hicks’s brief, at p. 11.) Thus, Hicks argues, the term ‘child’

2008Hicks argues that the Commission violated his right to procedural due process when it met on April 8, 2003, received new evidence, and did not give him the opportunity to be present or to cross-examine Richard. 3 "`[P]rocedural due process, protected by the Constitutions of the United States and this State, requires notice and an opportunity to be heard when one's life, liberty, or property interests are about to be affected by governmental action.' Brown's Ferry Waste Disposal Ctr., Inc. v. Trent , 611 So.2d 226 , 228 (Ala. 1992). . . .

2001Co. v. Parham , 693 So.2d 409 *Page 955 (Ala. 1997). 1 The Pals had actual knowledge of facts which do satisfy the Hicks test for a judgment as a matter of law on the statute of limitations issue.

2001Co. v. Parham , 693 So.2d 409 *Page 955 (Ala. 1997). 1 The Pals had actual knowledge of facts which do satisfy the Hicks test for a judgment as a matter of law on the statute of limitations issue.

1992Hicks , supra. Based on the Hicks principle, Baker argues that the Bennetts' claim could have accrued at one of three different times: (1) when they received notice of the IRS audit in 1985, (2) when the IRS gave notice in 1986 that it intended to disallow the computer leasing venture as a tax shelter, or (3) when the Coleman decision, which involved similar facts and the same type of shelter, was issued in 1986.