6 Indiana opinions name it 1 courts 1983–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hilliard v. Jacobsgreen1 sentence2019See Hilliard v. Jacobs, 927 N.E.2d 393, 399 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (affirming the trial court’s denial of plaintiff’s motion to amend complaint where new claims could have been raised in original complaint and motion was filed after trial court issued summary judgment order), trans. denied; see also Serino, 735 F.3d at 595 (observing that the plaintiff would have to show that the police chief, by extreme or outrageous conduct, intentionally or recklessly caused him severe emotional distress, holding that ITCA shields a government Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CT-3151 | September 30, | 1 | 1 |
Bushong v. Williamsongreen1 sentence2019Malicious Prosecution [19] As for Stone’s claim of malicious prosecution against Wright and the City, Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3 provides in part: “A governmental entity or an employee acting within the scope of the employee’s employment is not liable if a loss results from . . . (6) The initiation of a judicial or an administrative proceeding.” The Indiana Supreme Court has held that “the fact of criminal conduct standing alone is not dispositive of whether the employee was acting outside the scope of employment.” Bushong v. Williamson, 790 N.E.2d 467, 473 (Ind. 2003). | 1 | 1 |
Serino v. Hensleygreen1 sentence2019See Hilliard v. Jacobs, 927 N.E.2d 393, 399 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (affirming the trial court’s denial of plaintiff’s motion to amend complaint where new claims could have been raised in original complaint and motion was filed after trial court issued summary judgment order), trans. denied; see also Serino, 735 F.3d at 595 (observing that the plaintiff would have to show that the police chief, by extreme or outrageous conduct, intentionally or recklessly caused him severe emotional distress, holding that ITCA shields a government Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CT-3151 | September 30, | 1 | 1 |
Richardson v. Stategreen1 sentence1983See Richardson v. State, (1982) Ind., 439 N.E.2d 610 ; Winston v. State, (1978) 267 Ind. 587 , 372 N.E.2d 183 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Stone v. State
green
1 sentence2019Id. at 540 . [35] I acknowledge that counsel called J.W. a liar in her opening statement and that comments by counsel can sometimes open a door. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Mathews v. State
green
1 sentence2018As he recognizes on appeal, Stone's claim of error is waived unless he can establish that the admission of the challenged evidence constituted fundamental error. [17] The doctrine of fundamental error is narrow and may lead to reversal only where there has been a " 'blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.' " Mamon v. State , 6 N.E.3d 488 , 490 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Mathews v. State , 849 N.E.2d 578 , 587 (Ind. 2006) ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Brown v. State
green
2 sentences2018In Brown v. State , 929 N.E.2d 204 (Ind. 2010), our supreme court noted that the admission of evidence as the result of an improper search or seizure does not automatically require reversal, and indeed, does not rise to the level of fundamental error where there is "no claim of fabrication of evidence or willful malfeasance" on the part of officers or where there is no contention that the "evidence is not what it appears to be." Id. at 207 . 2018In Brown v. State , 929 N.E.2d 204 (Ind. 2010), our supreme court noted that the admission of evidence as the result of an improper search or seizure does not automatically require reversal, and indeed, does not rise to the level of fundamental error where there is "no claim of fabrication of evidence or willful malfeasance" on the part of officers or where there is no contention that the "evidence is not what it appears to be." Id. at 207 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Kevin J. Mamon v. State of Indiana
green
1 sentence2018As he recognizes on appeal, Stone's claim of error is waived unless he can establish that the admission of the challenged evidence constituted fundamental error. [17] The doctrine of fundamental error is narrow and may lead to reversal only where there has been a " 'blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.' " Mamon v. State , 6 N.E.3d 488 , 490 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Mathews v. State , 849 N.E.2d 578 , 587 (Ind. 2006) ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
RUST v. Watson
green
2 sentences2001We note that Stone's brief contains the following assertion: "there is a presumed prejudice that probably will be created in the minds of the jurors if they realize that the defendant is insured/’ citing Rust, 215 N.E.2d at 53 . 2001What Rust actually says, however, is that "[t]he continued recognition of such presumed prejudice can be seriously questioned today." Id. 6 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
CDT v. State
green
1 sentence1996NOTES [1] Ind.Code 35-48-4-6 (1995 Supp.). [2] Ind.Code 35-48-4-11 (1995 Supp.). [3] Terry v. State, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). [4] C.D.T., 653 N.E.2d at 1045 , (citing Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 , 113 S.Ct. 2130 , 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993)). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Minnesota v. Dickerson
green
2 sentences1996NOTES [1] Ind.Code 35-48-4-6 (1995 Supp.). [2] Ind.Code 35-48-4-11 (1995 Supp.). [3] Terry v. State, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). [4] C.D.T., 653 N.E.2d at 1045 , (citing Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 , 113 S.Ct. 2130 , 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993)). 1996NOTES [1] Ind.Code 35-48-4-6 (1995 Supp.). [2] Ind.Code 35-48-4-11 (1995 Supp.). [3] Terry v. State, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). [4] C.D.T., 653 N.E.2d at 1045 , (citing Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 , 113 S.Ct. 2130 , 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993)). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Terry v. Ohio
green
2 sentences1996NOTES [1] Ind.Code 35-48-4-6 (1995 Supp.). [2] Ind.Code 35-48-4-11 (1995 Supp.). [3] Terry v. State, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). [4] C.D.T., 653 N.E.2d at 1045 , (citing Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 , 113 S.Ct. 2130 , 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993)). 1996NOTES [1] Ind.Code 35-48-4-6 (1995 Supp.). [2] Ind.Code 35-48-4-11 (1995 Supp.). [3] Terry v. State, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). [4] C.D.T., 653 N.E.2d at 1045 , (citing Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 , 113 S.Ct. 2130 , 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993)). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Winston v. State
neutral
2 sentences1983See Richardson v. State, (1982) Ind., 439 N.E.2d 610 ; Winston v. State, (1978) 267 Ind. 587 , 372 N.E.2d 183 . 1983See Richardson v. State, (1982) Ind., 439 N.E.2d 610 ; Winston v. State, (1978) 267 Ind. 587 , 372 N.E.2d 183 . | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.