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11 Minnesota opinions name it 2 courts 1998–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Minnesota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Stonegreen2 sentences2024However, in Jones, this court concluded that the registration statute was punitive for the purpose of the Cabazon/Stone test (see California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 209 (1987); State v. Stone, 572 N.W.2d 725, 729 (Minn. 1997)), which distinguished from the analysis in Boutin (see Jones, 729 N.W.2d at 9-11 ; see also State v. LaFountain, 901 N.W.2d 441, 449 (Minn. App. 2017) (distinguishing this court’s conclusion in Jones from Boutin)). 12 of registration may have been amended, Jefferson has not demonstrated how the more stringent requirements make Manning inapplicabl 2017The Cabazon/Stone test requires evaluating whether a law’s intent is " ‘generally to prohibit certain conduct,’ ’’ in which case it is criminal/prohibitory, or whether the law " ‘generally permits the conduct at issue,’ subject to regulation,’ ” in which case it is “ 'civil/regulatory.’” State v. Stone, 572 N.W.2d 725, 729 (Minn. 1997) (quoting California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 209 , 107 S.Ct. 1083, 1088 , 94 L.Ed.2d 244 (1987)). . | 2 | 5 |
State v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2024However, in Jones, this court concluded that the registration statute was punitive for the purpose of the Cabazon/Stone test (see California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 209 (1987); State v. Stone, 572 N.W.2d 725, 729 (Minn. 1997)), which distinguished from the analysis in Boutin (see Jones, 729 N.W.2d at 9-11 ; see also State v. LaFountain, 901 N.W.2d 441, 449 (Minn. App. 2017) (distinguishing this court’s conclusion in Jones from Boutin)). 12 of registration may have been amended, Jefferson has not demonstrated how the more stringent requirements make Manning inapplicabl 2017The court specifically stated that “ ‘criminal/prohibitory’ for the purposes of the Cabazon/Stone test is substantively different from ‘punitive’ for the purposes of the issues raised by Boutin and Kaiser—respectively, the constitutional guarantee of due process and the right to withdrawn guilty plea.” Id. 4 The court continued, We acknowledge that our use in Bout-in and Kaiser of the terms “punitive”— which we used interchangeably with “criminal”—and “civil, regulatory” could cause confusion in our analysis under the Cabazon/Stone test, which distinguishes conduct that is “criminal/prohibitor | 1 | 4 |
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indiansred2 sentences2024However, in Jones, this court concluded that the registration statute was punitive for the purpose of the Cabazon/Stone test (see California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 209 (1987); State v. Stone, 572 N.W.2d 725, 729 (Minn. 1997)), which distinguished from the analysis in Boutin (see Jones, 729 N.W.2d at 9-11 ; see also State v. LaFountain, 901 N.W.2d 441, 449 (Minn. App. 2017) (distinguishing this court’s conclusion in Jones from Boutin)). 12 of registration may have been amended, Jefferson has not demonstrated how the more stringent requirements make Manning inapplicabl 2017The Cabazon/Stone test requires evaluating whether a law’s intent is " ‘generally to prohibit certain conduct,’ ’’ in which case it is criminal/prohibitory, or whether the law " ‘generally permits the conduct at issue,’ subject to regulation,’ ” in which case it is “ 'civil/regulatory.’” State v. Stone, 572 N.W.2d 725, 729 (Minn. 1997) (quoting California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 209 , 107 S.Ct. 1083, 1088 , 94 L.Ed.2d 244 (1987)). . | 1 | 3 |
State v. LaFountaingreen1 sentence2024However, in Jones, this court concluded that the registration statute was punitive for the purpose of the Cabazon/Stone test (see California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 209 (1987); State v. Stone, 572 N.W.2d 725, 729 (Minn. 1997)), which distinguished from the analysis in Boutin (see Jones, 729 N.W.2d at 9-11 ; see also State v. LaFountain, 901 N.W.2d 441, 449 (Minn. App. 2017) (distinguishing this court’s conclusion in Jones from Boutin)). 12 of registration may have been amended, Jefferson has not demonstrated how the more stringent requirements make Manning inapplicabl | 1 | 1 |
Thiele v. Stichgreen1 sentence2024See Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 582 . 10 We affirm the decision of the court of appeals to reverse the district court because the juridical-link argument was forfeited by Stone. | 1 | 1 |
Citizens for a Balanced City v. Plymouth Congregational Churchgreen2 sentences2016However, “[t]his court is bound by decision[s] of the Minnesota Supreme Court.” Citizens for a Balanced City v. Plymouth Congregational Church, 672 N.W.2d 13, 20 (Minn. App. 2003). 2016However, “[t]his court is bound by decision[s] of the Minnesota Supreme Court.” Citizens for a Balanced City v. Plymouth Congregational Church, 672 N.W.2d 13, 20 (Minn. App. 2003). | 1 | 1 |
Kaiser v. Stategreen2 sentences2007Specifically, we must address Jones’s argument that our holdings in Boutin v. LaFleur, 591 N.W.2d 711, 717 (Minn.1999), and Kaiser v. State, 641 N.W.2d 900, 907 (Minn.2002), mandate a conclusion that section 243.166is civil/regulatory in nature. 2007Specifically, we must address Jones’s argument that our holdings in Boutin v. LaFleur, 591 N.W.2d 711, 717 (Minn.1999), and Kaiser v. State, 641 N.W.2d 900, 907 (Minn.2002), mandate a conclusion that section 243.166is civil/regulatory in nature. | 1 | 1 |
Boutin v. LaFleurgreen2 sentences2007Specifically, we must address Jones’s argument that our holdings in Boutin v. LaFleur, 591 N.W.2d 711, 717 (Minn.1999), and Kaiser v. State, 641 N.W.2d 900, 907 (Minn.2002), mandate a conclusion that section 243.166is civil/regulatory in nature. 2007Specifically, we must address Jones’s argument that our holdings in Boutin v. LaFleur, 591 N.W.2d 711, 717 (Minn.1999), and Kaiser v. State, 641 N.W.2d 900, 907 (Minn.2002), mandate a conclusion that section 243.166is civil/regulatory in nature. | 1 | 1 |
In Re the Civil Commitment of Martingreen1 sentence2006See Martin, 661 N.W.2d at 638 (observing that sexually motivated stalking behavior amounts to course of harmful sexual conduct). | 1 | 1 |
Bray v. Commissioner of Public Safetygreen2 sentences1998Safety, 555 N.W.2d 757, 760 (Minn.App.1996). 1998Safety, 555 N.W.2d 757, 760 (Minn.App.1996). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Minnesota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Busse
green
2 sentences2008Under the particular facts of Busse , we determined that we could consider at the first step of our Stone analysis the underlying offense that resulted in the cancellation, Busse, 644 N.W.2d at 84 , despite our explicit concern in Johnson that by doing so, "the offender could be subject to being sanctioned twice for the prior offense," Johnson, 598 N.W.2d at 684 . 2008Under the particular facts of Busse , we determined that we could consider at the first step of our Stone analysis the underlying offense that resulted in the cancellation, Busse, 644 N.W.2d at 84 , despite our explicit concern in Johnson that by doing so, “the offender could be subject to being sanctioned twice for the prior offense,” Johnson, 598 N.W.2d at 684 . | 4 | 2007–2010 |
State v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2008Under the particular facts of Busse , we determined that we could consider at the first step of our Stone analysis the underlying offense that resulted in the cancellation, Busse, 644 N.W.2d at 84 , despite our explicit concern in Johnson that by doing so, "the offender could be subject to being sanctioned twice for the prior offense," Johnson, 598 N.W.2d at 684 . 2008Under the particular facts of Busse , we determined that we could consider at the first step of our Stone analysis the underlying offense that resulted in the cancellation, Busse, 644 N.W.2d at 84 , despite our explicit concern in Johnson that by doing so, “the offender could be subject to being sanctioned twice for the prior offense,” Johnson, 598 N.W.2d at 684 . | 2 | 2000–2008 |
Hubsch v. United States
green
1 sentence2017The Cabazon/Stone test requires evaluating whether a law’s intent is " ‘generally to prohibit certain conduct,’ ’’ in which case it is criminal/prohibitory, or whether the law " ‘generally permits the conduct at issue,’ subject to regulation,’ ” in which case it is “ 'civil/regulatory.’” State v. Stone, 572 N.W.2d 725, 729 (Minn. 1997) (quoting California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 209 , 107 S.Ct. 1083, 1088 , 94 L.Ed.2d 244 (1987)). . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Jones
green
2 sentences2007In its decision, the court of appeals stated, “We are unable to find any meaningful distinction here between broad and narrow conduct” and “[t]he conduct at issue is Jones’s failure to keep the authorities apprised of his residence address.” Jones, 700 N.W.2d at 559 . 2007In its decision, the court of appeals stated, "We are unable to find any meaningful distinction here between broad and narrow conduct" and "[t]he conduct at issue is Jones's failure to keep the authorities apprised of his residence address." Jones, 700 N.W.2d at 559 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Zornes
green
2 sentences2000Applying the Stone test, this court in State v. Zornes, 584 N.W.2d 7 (Minn.App.1998), found that a charge for driving after cancellation as inimical to public safety was criminal and therefore the state had jurisdiction to enforce Minn.Stat. § 171.24, subd. 5 (Supp.1997), against a tribal mem *763 ber who violated the statute on a reservation. 2000Applying the Stone test, this court in State v. Zornes, 584 N.W.2d 7 (Minn.App.1998), found that a charge for driving after cancellation as inimical to public safety was criminal and therefore the state had jurisdiction to enforce Minn.Stat. § 171.24, subd. 5 (Supp.1997), against a tribal mem *763 ber who violated the statute on a reservation. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.