reversion clause (Kansas) · Go Syfert
← Kansas issues

reversion clause in Kansas

6 Kansas opinions name it 2 courts 1935–2017 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Kansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (0)

CaseFollowedCited
No positive-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kansas.

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kansas. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (7)

CaseCitedYears
Schoenberger v. Missouri Pacific Railroad green
kanctapp · 2000
2 sentences

2017It noted one deed did "not contain a reversion clause." 29 Kan.

2004Despite the small size of the land conveyed in the deeds, the lack of any express or implied use restriction required the panel to conclude that both deeds conveyed fee title. 29 Kan.

22004–2017
Nott v. Beightel green
kan · 1942
1 sentence

2000In Nott , the warranty deed did not mention a limited use and did not contain a reversion clause. 155 Kan. at 95 .

12000–2000
Rose v. Board of Directors of School District No. 94 green
kan · 1947
2 sentences

1982Thompson v. Godfrey, 191 Kan. 102 , 379 P.2d 269 (1963); Rose v. School District No. 94, 162 Kan. 720 , 179 P.2d 181 (1947).

1982Thompson v. Godfrey, 191 Kan. 102 , 379 P.2d 269 (1963); Rose v. School District No. 94, 162 Kan. 720 , 179 P.2d 181 (1947).

11982–1982
Thompson v. Godfrey green
kan · 1963
2 sentences

1982Thompson v. Godfrey, 191 Kan. 102 , 379 P.2d 269 (1963); Rose v. School District No. 94, 162 Kan. 720 , 179 P.2d 181 (1947).

1982Thompson v. Godfrey, 191 Kan. 102 , 379 P.2d 269 (1963); Rose v. School District No. 94, 162 Kan. 720 , 179 P.2d 181 (1947).

11982–1982
Federal Farm Mortgage Corp. v. Smith green
kan · 1939
2 sentences

1963Although factually dissimilar, we think the general principles announced in Federal Farm Mortgage Corp. v. Smith, 149 Kan. 789 , 89 P. 2d 838 , are controlling on the underlying basic question in this case relating to the right of plaintiffs, as successors in interest, to ownership of the portion of the school tract in question upon its *108 abandonment for school purposes — by virtue of the reversion clause in the 1885 Cherry deed.

1963Although factually dissimilar, we think the general principles announced in Federal Farm Mortgage Corp. v. Smith, 149 Kan. 789 , 89 P. 2d 838 , are controlling on the underlying basic question in this case relating to the right of plaintiffs, as successors in interest, to ownership of the portion of the school tract in question upon its *108 abandonment for school purposes — by virtue of the reversion clause in the 1885 Cherry deed.

11963–1963
Harvest Queen Mill & Elevator Co. v. Sanders green
kan · 1962
2 sentences

1963(And see also Harvest Queen Mill & Elevator Co. v. Sanders, 189 Kan. 536 , 370 P. 2d 419 .) In both' its general and special verdicts the jury found that plaintiffs were the owners of the tract in controversy, and those findings —despite defendant’s contention to the contrary — are supported by the evidence.

1963(And see also Harvest Queen Mill & Elevator Co. v. Sanders, 189 Kan. 536 , 370 P. 2d 419 .) In both' its general and special verdicts the jury found that plaintiffs were the owners of the tract in controversy, and those findings —despite defendant’s contention to the contrary — are supported by the evidence.

11963–1963
Barker v. Lashbrook green
kan · 1929
2 sentences

1935It was there held, by virtue of a warranty deed without a reversion clause, and the description of the land being as a strip lying within fifty feet of the center line of the main track of the railroad, which road was never built nor graded, that' — • “An instrument which is in form a general warranty deed, conveying a strip of land to a railroad company for a right of way, will not vest an absolute title in the railroad company, but the interest conveyed is limited by the use for which the land is acquired, and when that use is abandoned the property will revert to the adjoining owner.” (Syl.

1935It was there held, by virtue of a warranty deed without a reversion clause, and the description of the land being as a strip lying within fifty feet of the center line of the main track of the railroad, which road was never built nor graded, that' — • “An instrument which is in form a general warranty deed, conveying a strip of land to a railroad company for a right of way, will not vest an absolute title in the railroad company, but the interest conveyed is limited by the use for which the land is acquired, and when that use is abandoned the property will revert to the adjoining owner.” (Syl.

11935–1935

Where else courts name it

KS 6 (1935–2017) IL 3 (1939–1986) TX 3 (1984–2009) NM 3 (1960–2010) CA 2 (1962–1991) TN 2 (2002–2002) FL 2 (1953–1993)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

← Caselaw search · G Cite Topics · Brief Check