statute made exception in Kansas

2007App. 2d 633 , 155 P.3d 739 (2007), this court refused to apply the federal standard to the Kansas statute, finding that the clear language of the statute made such an analysis unnecessary.

2003Allstate argues Howard v. Edwards, 9 Kan.

1997The New York court held that Carolla’s acquittal under Section 692f-1.0 (subd. f, par. a), requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt, did not bar a civil action under Section 692f-1.0 (subd. f, par. b), requiring only a fair preponderance of the evidence. 48 Misc. 2d at 142 .

1992The Kansas Supreme Court cited Bank v. Jesch, 99 Kan. 797 , 163 Pac. 150 (1917), and said: “The decision is a clear statement of the rule that even if a tenant is under the duty, by the terms of his lease, to sow a crop which does not mature until after his lease expires, he is not by that fact alone entitled to harvest the crop.” 166 Kan. at 540 .

1992The Kansas Supreme Court cited Bank v. Jesch, 99 Kan. 797 , 163 Pac. 150 (1917), and said: “The decision is a clear statement of the rule that even if a tenant is under the duty, by the terms of his lease, to sow a crop which does not mature until after his lease expires, he is not by that fact alone entitled to harvest the crop.” 166 Kan. at 540 .

1992The Kansas Supreme Court cited Bank v. Jesch, 99 Kan. 797 , 163 Pac. 150 (1917), and said: “The decision is a clear statement of the rule that even if a tenant is under the duty, by the terms of his lease, to sow a crop which does not mature until after his lease expires, he is not by that fact alone entitled to harvest the crop.” 166 Kan. at 540 .

1974One of the earliest, State, ex rel., v. City of Kingman, 123 Kan. 207 , 254 Pac. 397 , dealt with a statute which made any ordinance subject to protest and referendum except those containing a statement of “emergency.” While the statute made no exception for administrative ordinances the court nevertheless had no doubt that “the ordinances to which the referendum statute is intended to apply are those which are legislative in their character” (p. 209).

1974One of the earliest, State, ex rel., v. City of Kingman, 123 Kan. 207 , 254 Pac. 397 , dealt with a statute which made any ordinance subject to protest and referendum except those containing a statement of “emergency.” While the statute made no exception for administrative ordinances the court nevertheless had no doubt that “the ordinances to which the referendum statute is intended to apply are those which are legislative in their character” (p. 209).

1942In support of his contention he cites the case of Patterson v. Mitchell, 135 Kan. 585 , 11 P. 2d 1022 , in which it was held the statute made no exception in the case of an action brought by a receiver who had been appointed by the district court of a county other than that in which the land was situated and that the receiver was obliged to bring the action in the county where the land was situated.

1942In support of his contention he cites the case of Patterson v. Mitchell, 135 Kan. 585 , 11 P. 2d 1022 , in which it was held the statute made no exception in the case of an action brought by a receiver who had been appointed by the district court of a county other than that in which the land was situated and that the receiver was obliged to bring the action in the county where the land was situated.