fourth point error in Texas

1983I concur in overruling the fourth point of error on the merits because of the holding in A.D.P. v. State, 646 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1982).

1983I concur in overruling the fourth point of error on the merits because of the holding in A.D.P. v. State, 646 S.W.2d 568 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1982).

2015Argument and Authorities Pursuant to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 44.01(c), the State hereby appeals the ruling of the trial court that spreadsheets created the State’s financial analyst, Robin Timmons, constituted material, exculpatory evidence that the State was obligated to produce to defense counsel pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).17 1.

2013See Clark, 365 S.W.3d at 339 ; Wilson, 71 S.W.3d at 349 ; see also Pena, 295 S.W.3d at 464.

2003The fourth point of error contends the trial court erred in overruling trial counsel's objections to Voight's testimony because she did not meet the standard for scientific testimony required by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. , 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

2003Under Daubert and Texas Rule of Evidence 702, "the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable." Id. at 589 .

2001The standard under which we review a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

2001The standard under which we review a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

2000P. 27.1(a); Aguirre, 917 S.W.2d at 465 ; McRoberts, 863 S.W.2d at 454-55 ; see also Mueller v. Saravia, 826 S.W.2d 608, 609 (Tex.1992) (attempt to perfect appeal was “bona fide” even though motion for new trial which extended time for filing appeal was filed under parent cause number). *682 Thus, we conclude Dr. Massey’s argument that we lack jurisdiction over the Espalins’ fourth point of error lacks merit. 4 STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR Summary Judgment Rule 166a(c) The standards for reviewing summary judgment under rule 166a(c) are well established.

2000P. 27.1(a); Aguirre, 917 S.W.2d at 465 ; McRoberts, 863 S.W.2d at 454-55 ; see also Mueller v. Saravia, 826 S.W.2d 608, 609 (Tex.1992) (attempt to perfect appeal was “bona fide” even though motion for new trial which extended time for filing appeal was filed under parent cause number). *682 Thus, we conclude Dr. Massey’s argument that we lack jurisdiction over the Espalins’ fourth point of error lacks merit. 4 STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR Summary Judgment Rule 166a(c) The standards for reviewing summary judgment under rule 166a(c) are well established.

1998Englander Co. v. Kennedy, supra. The fourth point of error is overruled.

1997Brooks v. State, 853 S.W.2d 603 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, pet. ref'd).

1996See Angelo Broadcasting, 836 S.W.2d at 736 ; Bruni II, 828 S.W.2d at 112 .

1996See Angelo Broadcasting, 836 S.W.2d at 736 ; Bruni II, 828 S.W.2d at 112 .

1995Federal Income Tax Expense The Commission concluded that it was not constrained by the holding in Public Utility Commission v. Houston *866 Lighting & Power Co., 748 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. 1987), to apply an "actual-taxes-paid" methodology in computing EPEC's federal income tax expenses.

1995Federal Income Tax Expense The Commission concluded that it was not constrained by the holding in Public Utility Commission v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 748 S.W.2d 489 (Tex.1987), to apply an “actual-taxes-paid” methodology in computing EPEC’s federal income tax expenses.

1994The supreme court noted that "[b]oth in the trial court and on appeal, Brazos attacked the trial court’s substituted finding and judgment n.o.v. on only one ground: that the jury's finding on post-taking value was supported by some evidence." Callejo, 755 S.W.2d at 75 n. 1 (emphasis in original).

1993Furthermore, we do not find the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule found in article 38.23(b) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and the "good faith" exception of United States v. Leon , 468 U.S. 897 (1984) to be applicable.

1993To support their position, the Wallaces rely on a statement from Forister v. Coleman, 418 S.W.2d 550, 559 (Tex.Civ.App.— Austin 1967), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 431 S.W.2d 2 (Tex.1968) to the effect that, when an easement is established by estoppel, the "easement can become legally attached to the dominant estate only if the same person has unity of title to both the easement and the dominant estate." (Emphasis added).

1993To support their position, the Wallaces rely on a statement from Forister v. Coleman, 418 S.W.2d 560, 559 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1967), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 431 S.W.2d 2 (Tex.1968) to the effect that, when an easement is established by estoppel, the “easement can become legally attached to the dominant .estate only if the same person has unity of title to both the easement and the dominant estate.” (Emphasis added).

1992The taxing authorities contend that the statute deprives them of their right to foreclose on the property, citing Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 , 80 S.Ct. 1563 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1554 (1960) in support of their argument.

1992The taxing authorities contend that the statute deprives them of their right to foreclose on the property, citing Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 , 80 S.Ct. 1563 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1554 (1960) in support of their argument.