6 Massachusetts opinions name it 2 courts 1989–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Smithgreen2 sentences2012In these circumstances, a reasonable person in Norris’s position could believe that his intervention was called for to protect Facey and also that Facey would have been warranted in using deadly force. 8 Given the sufficiency of the evidence, in order to determine whether the failure to request an instruction on defense of another was error, we must consider whether counsel’s apparent decision not to request the instruction was “so manifestly unreasonable as to be unprotected by the labels of ‘trial strategy’ or ‘trial tactics.’ ” Commonwealth v. Smith, 459 Mass. 538, 554 (2011), quoting Commo 2012We give trial counsel’s strategic and tactical decisions due deference, recognizing that “[m]any decisions of defense counsel that are characterized in hindsight as errors may have been reasonable tactical or strategic decisions when made.” Commonwealth v. Mosher, supra. See Commonwealth v. Norris, supra at 141-142, quoting Commonwealth v. Smith, 459 Mass. 538, 554 (2011) (“to determine whether the failure to request an instruction on defense of another was error, we must consider whether counsel’s apparent decision not to request the instruction was ‘so manifestly unreasonable as to be unprot | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Bollinggreen2 sentences2023Nor can we now contemplate a case where the failure to object to jury instructions relieving the Commonwealth of its burden to prove a necessary element beyond a reasonable doubt would be the result of a reasonable tactical decision.10 See Bolling, 462 Mass. at 452 ("it seems unlikely that the failure to request the instruction was a reasonable 10We note that the circumstances here are distinguishable from those where a defendant strategically declines to request an instruction on the elements of a lesser included offense. 2022Rather, before concluding that there was a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice, the court went on to consider the seriousness of "the nature of the error," whether "the error was significant in the context of the evidence presented at trial," and whether "the failure to request the instruction was a tactical decision." Id. | 1 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Glovergreen1 sentence2023See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Glover, 459 Mass. 836, 844 (2011) (reasonable strategic decision not to request instruction on voluntary manslaughter so as to proceed solely on theory of self-defense). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Adamsgreen1 sentence2012In these circumstances, a reasonable person in Norris’s position could believe that his intervention was called for to protect Facey and also that Facey would have been warranted in using deadly force. 8 Given the sufficiency of the evidence, in order to determine whether the failure to request an instruction on defense of another was error, we must consider whether counsel’s apparent decision not to request the instruction was “so manifestly unreasonable as to be unprotected by the labels of ‘trial strategy’ or ‘trial tactics.’ ” Commonwealth v. Smith, 459 Mass. 538, 554 (2011), quoting Commo | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Saferian
green
1 sentence2018We see no reason to conclude that the failure to request the instruction on involuntary manslaughter as a battery satisfied the first prong of Commonwealth v. Saferian , 366 Mass. 89 , 96-97 (1974). 4. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Commonwealth v. Boateng
green
1 sentence2012We give trial counsel’s strategic and tactical decisions due deference, recognizing that “[m]any decisions of defense counsel that are characterized in hindsight as errors may have been reasonable tactical or strategic decisions when made.” Commonwealth v. Mosher, supra. See Commonwealth v. Norris, supra at 141-142, quoting Commonwealth v. Smith, 459 Mass. 538, 554 (2011) (“to determine whether the failure to request an instruction on defense of another was error, we must consider whether counsel’s apparent decision not to request the instruction was ‘so manifestly unreasonable as to be unprot | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Commonwealth v. Mosher
green
1 sentence2012We give trial counsel’s strategic and tactical decisions due deference, recognizing that “[m]any decisions of defense counsel that are characterized in hindsight as errors may have been reasonable tactical or strategic decisions when made.” Commonwealth v. Mosher, supra. See Commonwealth v. Norris, supra at 141-142, quoting Commonwealth v. Smith, 459 Mass. 538, 554 (2011) (“to determine whether the failure to request an instruction on defense of another was error, we must consider whether counsel’s apparent decision not to request the instruction was ‘so manifestly unreasonable as to be unprot | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Commonwealth v. Keevan
green
1 sentence1989Cf. Commonwealth v. Keevan, 400 Mass. at 567 , holding that the omission of a specific unanimity instruction did not create in that case any substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.