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6 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1987–1996 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Watt v. Alaskagreen2 sentences1995This is because the plain-meaning rule is 'rather an axiom of experience than a rule of law, and does not preclude consideration of persuasive evidence if it exists.’ The circumstances of the enactment of particular legislation may persuade a court that '[the Legislature] did not intend words of common meaning to have their literal effect.’ ” (Quoting Kaczorowski, 309 Md. 505, 514 , 525 A.2d 628, 632 (1987) and Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 265-66 , 101 S.Ct. 1673, 1677-78 , 68 L.Ed.2d 80, 88 (1981)) (citations and footnotes omitted, emphasis added). 1995This is because the plain-meaning rule is 'rather an axiom of experience than a rule of law, and does not preclude consideration of persuasive evidence if it exists.’ The circumstances of the enactment of particular legislation may persuade a court that '[the Legislature] did not intend words of common meaning to have their literal effect.’ ” (Quoting Kaczorowski, 309 Md. 505, 514 , 525 A.2d 628, 632 (1987) and Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 265-66 , 101 S.Ct. 1673, 1677-78 , 68 L.Ed.2d 80, 88 (1981)) (citations and footnotes omitted, emphasis added). | 5 | 5 |
Kaczorowski v. Mayor of Baltimoregreen2 sentences1995This is because the plain-meaning rule is 'rather an axiom of experience than a rule of law, and does not preclude consideration of persuasive evidence if it exists.’ The circumstances of the enactment of particular legislation may persuade a court that '[the Legislature] did not intend words of common meaning to have their literal effect.’ ” (Quoting Kaczorowski, 309 Md. 505, 514 , 525 A.2d 628, 632 (1987) and Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 265-66 , 101 S.Ct. 1673, 1677-78 , 68 L.Ed.2d 80, 88 (1981)) (citations and footnotes omitted, emphasis added). 1995This is because the plain-meaning rule is 'rather an axiom of experience than a rule of law, and does not preclude consideration of persuasive evidence if it exists.’ The circumstances of the enactment of particular legislation may persuade a court that '[the Legislature] did not intend words of common meaning to have their literal effect.’ ” (Quoting Kaczorowski, 309 Md. 505, 514 , 525 A.2d 628, 632 (1987) and Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 265-66 , 101 S.Ct. 1673, 1677-78 , 68 L.Ed.2d 80, 88 (1981)) (citations and footnotes omitted, emphasis added). | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ridge Sheet Metal Co. v. Morrell
green
2 sentences1990This is because the plain-meaning rule is “rather an axiom of experience than a rule of law, and does not preclude consideration of persuasive evidence if it exists.” The circumstances of the enactment of particular legislation may persuade a court that Congress did not intend words of common meaning to have this literal effect.’ Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 265-266 , 101 S.Ct. 1673, 1677-78 , 68 L.Ed.2d 80, 88 (1981) [citations and footnote omitted].” (Some citations omitted.) (Brackets in original.) In Ridge Sheet Metal Co. v. Morrell, 69 Md.App. 364 , 517 A.2d 1133 (1986), we had occasion 1990This is because the plain-meaning rule is “rather an axiom of experience than a rule of law, and does not preclude consideration of persuasive evidence if it exists.” The circumstances of the enactment of particular legislation may persuade a court that Congress did not intend words of common meaning to have this literal effect.’ Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 265-266 , 101 S.Ct. 1673, 1677-78 , 68 L.Ed.2d 80, 88 (1981) [citations and footnote omitted].” (Some citations omitted.) (Brackets in original.) In Ridge Sheet Metal Co. v. Morrell, 69 Md.App. 364 , 517 A.2d 1133 (1986), we had occasion | 2 | 1990–1996 |