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6 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1997–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Blackstone v. Sharmagreen2 sentences2025Co. of Hartford, Conn., 480 Md. 200, 224-25 (2022) (indicating support from bill sponsors as integral to the legislative history analysis of the statute at issue); Blackstone v. Sharma, 461 Md. 87, 122 (2018) (relying on submitted testimony from the bill sponsor to bolster a plain meaning interpretation and to further develop the legislative history); Davis v. State, 426 Md. 211, 222 , 231 n.7 (2012) (“We rely on the testimony of the bill sponsor in determining the legislative intent; especially where there were minimal amendments to the bill introduced after that testimony.”); State v. Johnso 2021See also Blackstone v. Sharma, 461 Md. 87, 122 , 191 A.3d 1188, 1208 (2018) (citing the Fiscal and Policy Note for the Senate Bill as part of the legislative history analysis). | 2 | 2 |
Macedo v. Automobile Insurance Co.green1 sentence2025Co. of Hartford, Conn., 480 Md. 200, 224-25 (2022) (indicating support from bill sponsors as integral to the legislative history analysis of the statute at issue); Blackstone v. Sharma, 461 Md. 87, 122 (2018) (relying on submitted testimony from the bill sponsor to bolster a plain meaning interpretation and to further develop the legislative history); Davis v. State, 426 Md. 211, 222 , 231 n.7 (2012) (“We rely on the testimony of the bill sponsor in determining the legislative intent; especially where there were minimal amendments to the bill introduced after that testimony.”); State v. Johnso | 1 | 1 |
Davis v. Stategreen1 sentence2025Co. of Hartford, Conn., 480 Md. 200, 224-25 (2022) (indicating support from bill sponsors as integral to the legislative history analysis of the statute at issue); Blackstone v. Sharma, 461 Md. 87, 122 (2018) (relying on submitted testimony from the bill sponsor to bolster a plain meaning interpretation and to further develop the legislative history); Davis v. State, 426 Md. 211, 222 , 231 n.7 (2012) (“We rely on the testimony of the bill sponsor in determining the legislative intent; especially where there were minimal amendments to the bill introduced after that testimony.”); State v. Johnso | 1 | 1 |
State v. Johnsongreen1 sentence2025Co. of Hartford, Conn., 480 Md. 200, 224-25 (2022) (indicating support from bill sponsors as integral to the legislative history analysis of the statute at issue); Blackstone v. Sharma, 461 Md. 87, 122 (2018) (relying on submitted testimony from the bill sponsor to bolster a plain meaning interpretation and to further develop the legislative history); Davis v. State, 426 Md. 211, 222 , 231 n.7 (2012) (“We rely on the testimony of the bill sponsor in determining the legislative intent; especially where there were minimal amendments to the bill introduced after that testimony.”); State v. Johnso | 1 | 1 |
McAlear v. McAleargreen2 sentences2021Even according to the dissent, at the very least, this should not be considered one of the situations in which the legislative purpose is “overwhelmingly” clear, see McAlear v. McAlear, 298 Md. 320, 344 , 469 A.2d 1256, 1268 (1984), and we would construe the ambiguity in favor of Travelocity as the taxpayer. 2021Even according to the dissent, at the very least, this should not be considered one of the situations in which the legislative purpose is “overwhelmingly” clear, see McAlear v. McAlear, 298 Md. 320, 344 , 469 A.2d 1256, 1268 (1984), and we would construe the ambiguity in favor of Travelocity as the taxpayer. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. American Cyanamid Co.green2 sentences1997Some of the cases recognizing that the residual exceptions can only be used in exceptional circumstances are: United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C.Cir.1979) (“The legislative history of this exception makes it very clear that this was intended to be a narrow exception to the hearsay rule, applying only in exceptional cases.”); United States v. Heyward, 729 F.2d 297, 299-300 (4th Cir.1984) (“The legislative history of the rules puts it more strongly: Tt is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.’ Fed.R.Evid. 803 Sena 1997Some of the cases recognizing that the residual exceptions can only be used in exceptional circumstances are: United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C.Cir.1979) ("The legislative history of this exception makes it very clear that this was intended to be a narrow exception to the hearsay rule, applying only in exceptional cases."); United States v. Heyward, 729 F.2d 297, 299-300 (4th Cir.1984) ("The legislative history of the rules puts it more strongly: `It is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.' Fed.R.Evid. 803 Sen | 1 | 1 |
Stokes v. City Of Omahagreen2 sentences1997Some of the cases recognizing that the residual exceptions can only be used in exceptional circumstances are: United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C.Cir.1979) (“The legislative history of this exception makes it very clear that this was intended to be a narrow exception to the hearsay rule, applying only in exceptional cases.”); United States v. Heyward, 729 F.2d 297, 299-300 (4th Cir.1984) (“The legislative history of the rules puts it more strongly: Tt is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.’ Fed.R.Evid. 803 Sena 1997Some of the cases recognizing that the residual exceptions can only be used in exceptional circumstances are: United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C.Cir.1979) (“The legislative history of this exception makes it very clear that this was intended to be a narrow exception to the hearsay rule, applying only in exceptional cases.”); United States v. Heyward, 729 F.2d 297, 299-300 (4th Cir.1984) (“The legislative history of the rules puts it more strongly: Tt is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.’ Fed.R.Evid. 803 Sena | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Lionel Vincent Collinsgreen2 sentences1997Some of the cases recognizing that the residual exceptions can only be used in exceptional circumstances are: United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C.Cir.1979) (“The legislative history of this exception makes it very clear that this was intended to be a narrow exception to the hearsay rule, applying only in exceptional cases.”); United States v. Heyward, 729 F.2d 297, 299-300 (4th Cir.1984) (“The legislative history of the rules puts it more strongly: Tt is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.’ Fed.R.Evid. 803 Sena 1997Some of the cases recognizing that the residual exceptions can only be used in exceptional circumstances are: United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C.Cir.1979) ("The legislative history of this exception makes it very clear that this was intended to be a narrow exception to the hearsay rule, applying only in exceptional cases."); United States v. Heyward, 729 F.2d 297, 299-300 (4th Cir.1984) ("The legislative history of the rules puts it more strongly: `It is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.' Fed.R.Evid. 803 Sen | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Michael G. Thevis, Alton Bart Hood, Global Industries, Inc., Anna Jeanette Evansgreen2 sentences1997Some of the cases recognizing that the residual exceptions can only be used in exceptional circumstances are: United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C.Cir.1979) (“The legislative history of this exception makes it very clear that this was intended to be a narrow exception to the hearsay rule, applying only in exceptional cases.”); United States v. Heyward, 729 F.2d 297, 299-300 (4th Cir.1984) (“The legislative history of the rules puts it more strongly: Tt is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.’ Fed.R.Evid. 803 Sena 1997Some of the cases recognizing that the residual exceptions can only be used in exceptional circumstances are: United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C.Cir.1979) (“The legislative history of this exception makes it very clear that this was intended to be a narrow exception to the hearsay rule, applying only in exceptional cases.”); United States v. Heyward, 729 F.2d 297, 299-300 (4th Cir.1984) (“The legislative history of the rules puts it more strongly: Tt is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.’ Fed.R.Evid. 803 Sena | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Thomas G. Heywardgreen | 1 | 1 |
cluster 449034green2 sentences1997Some of the cases recognizing that the residual exceptions can only be used in exceptional circumstances are: United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C.Cir.1979) (“The legislative history of this exception makes it very clear that this was intended to be a narrow exception to the hearsay rule, applying only in exceptional cases.”); United States v. Heyward, 729 F.2d 297, 299-300 (4th Cir.1984) (“The legislative history of the rules puts it more strongly: Tt is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.’ Fed.R.Evid. 803 Sena 1997Some of the cases recognizing that the residual exceptions can only be used in exceptional circumstances are: United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C.Cir.1979) ("The legislative history of this exception makes it very clear that this was intended to be a narrow exception to the hearsay rule, applying only in exceptional cases."); United States v. Heyward, 729 F.2d 297, 299-300 (4th Cir.1984) ("The legislative history of the rules puts it more strongly: `It is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.' Fed.R.Evid. 803 Sen | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Williamsgreen2 sentences1997Some of the cases recognizing that the residual exceptions can only be used in exceptional circumstances are: United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C.Cir.1979) (“The legislative history of this exception makes it very clear that this was intended to be a narrow exception to the hearsay rule, applying only in exceptional cases.”); United States v. Heyward, 729 F.2d 297, 299-300 (4th Cir.1984) (“The legislative history of the rules puts it more strongly: Tt is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.’ Fed.R.Evid. 803 Sena 1997Some of the cases recognizing that the residual exceptions can only be used in exceptional circumstances are: United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C.Cir.1979) ("The legislative history of this exception makes it very clear that this was intended to be a narrow exception to the hearsay rule, applying only in exceptional cases."); United States v. Heyward, 729 F.2d 297, 299-300 (4th Cir.1984) ("The legislative history of the rules puts it more strongly: `It is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.' Fed.R.Evid. 803 Sen | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Antonio Fernandez, Jorge Recarey, Mariano Villa Del Raygreen2 sentences1997Some of the cases recognizing that the residual exceptions can only be used in exceptional circumstances are: United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C.Cir.1979) (“The legislative history of this exception makes it very clear that this was intended to be a narrow exception to the hearsay rule, applying only in exceptional cases.”); United States v. Heyward, 729 F.2d 297, 299-300 (4th Cir.1984) (“The legislative history of the rules puts it more strongly: Tt is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.’ Fed.R.Evid. 803 Sena 1997Some of the cases recognizing that the residual exceptions can only be used in exceptional circumstances are: United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C.Cir.1979) ("The legislative history of this exception makes it very clear that this was intended to be a narrow exception to the hearsay rule, applying only in exceptional cases."); United States v. Heyward, 729 F.2d 297, 299-300 (4th Cir.1984) ("The legislative history of the rules puts it more strongly: `It is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.' Fed.R.Evid. 803 Sen | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Jack Lovegreen2 sentences1997Some of the cases recognizing that the residual exceptions can only be used in exceptional circumstances are: United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C.Cir.1979) (“The legislative history of this exception makes it very clear that this was intended to be a narrow exception to the hearsay rule, applying only in exceptional cases.”); United States v. Heyward, 729 F.2d 297, 299-300 (4th Cir.1984) (“The legislative history of the rules puts it more strongly: Tt is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.’ Fed.R.Evid. 803 Sena 1997Some of the cases recognizing that the residual exceptions can only be used in exceptional circumstances are: United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C.Cir.1979) ("The legislative history of this exception makes it very clear that this was intended to be a narrow exception to the hearsay rule, applying only in exceptional cases."); United States v. Heyward, 729 F.2d 297, 299-300 (4th Cir.1984) ("The legislative history of the rules puts it more strongly: `It is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.' Fed.R.Evid. 803 Sen | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Hancho C. Kimgreen2 sentences1997Some of the cases recognizing that the residual exceptions can only be used in exceptional circumstances are: United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C.Cir.1979) (“The legislative history of this exception makes it very clear that this was intended to be a narrow exception to the hearsay rule, applying only in exceptional cases.”); United States v. Heyward, 729 F.2d 297, 299-300 (4th Cir.1984) (“The legislative history of the rules puts it more strongly: Tt is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.’ Fed.R.Evid. 803 Sena 1997Some of the cases recognizing that the residual exceptions can only be used in exceptional circumstances are: United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C.Cir.1979) (“The legislative history of this exception makes it very clear that this was intended to be a narrow exception to the hearsay rule, applying only in exceptional cases.”); United States v. Heyward, 729 F.2d 297, 299-300 (4th Cir.1984) (“The legislative history of the rules puts it more strongly: Tt is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.’ Fed.R.Evid. 803 Sena | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Criminal Investigation No. 437
green
2 sentences2013The legislative history of our rule was discussed by the Court of Appeals in No. 437, 316 Md. at 81 , 557 A.2d 235 (emphasis added): We are informed by the Minutes of the Court of Appeals Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of 15-16 October 1982 at p. 15 that Rule 4—642[ (d) ] “to a large extent follows the language of [what is now FRCRP 6(e)(3)(E) ] regarding non-disclosure and exceptions to non-disclosure” and it is indeed manifest that the lineaments of the two rules are fundamentally the same. 2013The legislative history of our rule was discussed by the Court of Appeals in No. 437, 316 Md. at 81 , 557 A.2d 235 (emphasis added): We are informed by the Minutes of the Court of Appeals Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of 15-16 October 1982 at p. 15 that Rule 4—642[ (d) ] “to a large extent follows the language of [what is now FRCRP 6(e)(3)(E) ] regarding non-disclosure and exceptions to non-disclosure” and it is indeed manifest that the lineaments of the two rules are fundamentally the same. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Swartzbaugh v. Encompass Insurance Co. of America
green
2 sentences2012Legislative History The legislative history of the waiver provisions for PIP and enhanced UM coverage was thoroughly reviewed by the Court of Special Appeals in its opinion in this case, 201 Md.App. at 143-49 , 28 A.3d 785 , and we need only briefly summarize it here. 2012Legislative History The legislative history of the waiver provisions for PIP and enhanced UM coverage was thoroughly reviewed by the Court of Special Appeals in its opinion in this case, 201 Md.App. at 143-49 , 28 A.3d 785 , and we need only briefly summarize it here. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Secretary, Department of Public Safety & Correctional Services v. Henderson
green
2 sentences2010With the benefit of hindsight, we should have relied, as we had in Fields , upon the legislative history and the rule of lenity, as these “would have dictated the same result in Wickes ... [and] Fields and also confined the [disaggregation approach] to those situations in which strict application of the ... definition of ‘term of confinement’ would preclude inmates *176 from receiving the benefit of the 1992 [amendment]____” Henderson, 351 Md. at 445 , 718 A.2d at 1154 . 2010With the benefit of hindsight, we should have relied, as we had in Fields , upon the legislative history and the rule of lenity, as these “would have dictated the same result in Wickes ... [and] Fields and also confined the [disaggregation approach] to those situations in which strict application of the ... definition of ‘term of confinement’ would preclude inmates *176 from receiving the benefit of the 1992 [amendment]____” Henderson, 351 Md. at 445 , 718 A.2d at 1154 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
cluster 586957
green
2 sentences1997Some of the cases recognizing that the residual exceptions can only be used in exceptional circumstances are: United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C.Cir.1979) (“The legislative history of this exception makes it very clear that this was intended to be a narrow exception to the hearsay rule, applying only in exceptional cases.”); United States v. Heyward, 729 F.2d 297, 299-300 (4th Cir.1984) (“The legislative history of the rules puts it more strongly: Tt is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.’ Fed.R.Evid. 803 Sena 1997Some of the cases recognizing that the residual exceptions can only be used in exceptional circumstances are: United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C.Cir.1979) ("The legislative history of this exception makes it very clear that this was intended to be a narrow exception to the hearsay rule, applying only in exceptional cases."); United States v. Heyward, 729 F.2d 297, 299-300 (4th Cir.1984) ("The legislative history of the rules puts it more strongly: `It is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.' Fed.R.Evid. 803 Sen | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Thevis v. United States
green
2 sentences1997Some of the cases recognizing that the residual exceptions can only be used in exceptional circumstances are: United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C.Cir.1979) (“The legislative history of this exception makes it very clear that this was intended to be a narrow exception to the hearsay rule, applying only in exceptional cases.”); United States v. Heyward, 729 F.2d 297, 299-300 (4th Cir.1984) (“The legislative history of the rules puts it more strongly: Tt is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.’ Fed.R.Evid. 803 Sena 1997Some of the cases recognizing that the residual exceptions can only be used in exceptional circumstances are: United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C.Cir.1979) (“The legislative history of this exception makes it very clear that this was intended to be a narrow exception to the hearsay rule, applying only in exceptional cases.”); United States v. Heyward, 729 F.2d 297, 299-300 (4th Cir.1984) (“The legislative history of the rules puts it more strongly: Tt is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.’ Fed.R.Evid. 803 Sena | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Rubush v. Bemis Co.
green
2 sentences1997Some of the cases recognizing that the residual exceptions can only be used in exceptional circumstances are: United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C.Cir.1979) (“The legislative history of this exception makes it very clear that this was intended to be a narrow exception to the hearsay rule, applying only in exceptional cases.”); United States v. Heyward, 729 F.2d 297, 299-300 (4th Cir.1984) (“The legislative history of the rules puts it more strongly: Tt is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.’ Fed.R.Evid. 803 Sena 1997Some of the cases recognizing that the residual exceptions can only be used in exceptional circumstances are: United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C.Cir.1979) (“The legislative history of this exception makes it very clear that this was intended to be a narrow exception to the hearsay rule, applying only in exceptional cases.”); United States v. Heyward, 729 F.2d 297, 299-300 (4th Cir.1984) (“The legislative history of the rules puts it more strongly: Tt is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.’ Fed.R.Evid. 803 Sena | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Associated Grocers v. National Labor Relations Board
green
2 sentences1997Some of the cases recognizing that the residual exceptions can only be used in exceptional circumstances are: United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C.Cir.1979) (“The legislative history of this exception makes it very clear that this was intended to be a narrow exception to the hearsay rule, applying only in exceptional cases.”); United States v. Heyward, 729 F.2d 297, 299-300 (4th Cir.1984) (“The legislative history of the rules puts it more strongly: Tt is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.’ Fed.R.Evid. 803 Sena 1997Some of the cases recognizing that the residual exceptions can only be used in exceptional circumstances are: United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C.Cir.1979) (“The legislative history of this exception makes it very clear that this was intended to be a narrow exception to the hearsay rule, applying only in exceptional cases.”); United States v. Heyward, 729 F.2d 297, 299-300 (4th Cir.1984) (“The legislative history of the rules puts it more strongly: Tt is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.’ Fed.R.Evid. 803 Sena | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Etlin v. Etlin
green
2 sentences1997Some of the cases recognizing that the residual exceptions can only be used in exceptional circumstances are: United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C.Cir.1979) (“The legislative history of this exception makes it very clear that this was intended to be a narrow exception to the hearsay rule, applying only in exceptional cases.”); United States v. Heyward, 729 F.2d 297, 299-300 (4th Cir.1984) (“The legislative history of the rules puts it more strongly: Tt is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.’ Fed.R.Evid. 803 Sena 1997Some of the cases recognizing that the residual exceptions can only be used in exceptional circumstances are: United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C.Cir.1979) (“The legislative history of this exception makes it very clear that this was intended to be a narrow exception to the hearsay rule, applying only in exceptional cases.”); United States v. Heyward, 729 F.2d 297, 299-300 (4th Cir.1984) (“The legislative history of the rules puts it more strongly: Tt is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.’ Fed.R.Evid. 803 Sena | 1 | 1997–1997 |
United States v. National Bank of Commerce
green
2 sentences1997Some of the cases recognizing that the residual exceptions can only be used in exceptional circumstances are: United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C.Cir.1979) (“The legislative history of this exception makes it very clear that this was intended to be a narrow exception to the hearsay rule, applying only in exceptional cases.”); United States v. Heyward, 729 F.2d 297, 299-300 (4th Cir.1984) (“The legislative history of the rules puts it more strongly: Tt is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.’ Fed.R.Evid. 803 Sena 1997Some of the cases recognizing that the residual exceptions can only be used in exceptional circumstances are: United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C.Cir.1979) ("The legislative history of this exception makes it very clear that this was intended to be a narrow exception to the hearsay rule, applying only in exceptional cases."); United States v. Heyward, 729 F.2d 297, 299-300 (4th Cir.1984) ("The legislative history of the rules puts it more strongly: `It is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.' Fed.R.Evid. 803 Sen | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Lewis v. Myshak
green
2 sentences1997Some of the cases recognizing that the residual exceptions can only be used in exceptional circumstances are: United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C.Cir.1979) (“The legislative history of this exception makes it very clear that this was intended to be a narrow exception to the hearsay rule, applying only in exceptional cases.”); United States v. Heyward, 729 F.2d 297, 299-300 (4th Cir.1984) (“The legislative history of the rules puts it more strongly: Tt is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.’ Fed.R.Evid. 803 Sena 1997Some of the cases recognizing that the residual exceptions can only be used in exceptional circumstances are: United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C.Cir.1979) ("The legislative history of this exception makes it very clear that this was intended to be a narrow exception to the hearsay rule, applying only in exceptional cases."); United States v. Heyward, 729 F.2d 297, 299-300 (4th Cir.1984) ("The legislative history of the rules puts it more strongly: `It is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.' Fed.R.Evid. 803 Sen | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Lewis v. Myshak
green
2 sentences1997Some of the cases recognizing that the residual exceptions can only be used in exceptional circumstances are: United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C.Cir.1979) (“The legislative history of this exception makes it very clear that this was intended to be a narrow exception to the hearsay rule, applying only in exceptional cases.”); United States v. Heyward, 729 F.2d 297, 299-300 (4th Cir.1984) (“The legislative history of the rules puts it more strongly: Tt is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.’ Fed.R.Evid. 803 Sena 1997Some of the cases recognizing that the residual exceptions can only be used in exceptional circumstances are: United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C.Cir.1979) ("The legislative history of this exception makes it very clear that this was intended to be a narrow exception to the hearsay rule, applying only in exceptional cases."); United States v. Heyward, 729 F.2d 297, 299-300 (4th Cir.1984) ("The legislative history of the rules puts it more strongly: `It is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.' Fed.R.Evid. 803 Sen | 1 | 1997–1997 |
McElvey v. Department of Transportation
green
2 sentences1997Some of the cases recognizing that the residual exceptions can only be used in exceptional circumstances are: United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C.Cir.1979) (“The legislative history of this exception makes it very clear that this was intended to be a narrow exception to the hearsay rule, applying only in exceptional cases.”); United States v. Heyward, 729 F.2d 297, 299-300 (4th Cir.1984) (“The legislative history of the rules puts it more strongly: Tt is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.’ Fed.R.Evid. 803 Sena 1997Some of the cases recognizing that the residual exceptions can only be used in exceptional circumstances are: United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C.Cir.1979) ("The legislative history of this exception makes it very clear that this was intended to be a narrow exception to the hearsay rule, applying only in exceptional cases."); United States v. Heyward, 729 F.2d 297, 299-300 (4th Cir.1984) ("The legislative history of the rules puts it more strongly: `It is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.' Fed.R.Evid. 803 Sen | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Dutton v. Johnson
green
2 sentences1997Some of the cases recognizing that the residual exceptions can only be used in exceptional circumstances are: United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C.Cir.1979) (“The legislative history of this exception makes it very clear that this was intended to be a narrow exception to the hearsay rule, applying only in exceptional cases.”); United States v. Heyward, 729 F.2d 297, 299-300 (4th Cir.1984) (“The legislative history of the rules puts it more strongly: Tt is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.’ Fed.R.Evid. 803 Sena 1997Some of the cases recognizing that the residual exceptions can only be used in exceptional circumstances are: United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C.Cir.1979) (“The legislative history of this exception makes it very clear that this was intended to be a narrow exception to the hearsay rule, applying only in exceptional cases.”); United States v. Heyward, 729 F.2d 297, 299-300 (4th Cir.1984) (“The legislative history of the rules puts it more strongly: Tt is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.’ Fed.R.Evid. 803 Sena | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Madrid-Palacios v. United States
green
2 sentences1997Some of the cases recognizing that the residual exceptions can only be used in exceptional circumstances are: United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C.Cir.1979) (“The legislative history of this exception makes it very clear that this was intended to be a narrow exception to the hearsay rule, applying only in exceptional cases.”); United States v. Heyward, 729 F.2d 297, 299-300 (4th Cir.1984) (“The legislative history of the rules puts it more strongly: Tt is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.’ Fed.R.Evid. 803 Sena 1997Some of the cases recognizing that the residual exceptions can only be used in exceptional circumstances are: United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C.Cir.1979) ("The legislative history of this exception makes it very clear that this was intended to be a narrow exception to the hearsay rule, applying only in exceptional cases."); United States v. Heyward, 729 F.2d 297, 299-300 (4th Cir.1984) ("The legislative history of the rules puts it more strongly: `It is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.' Fed.R.Evid. 803 Sen | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Orellana v. United States
green
2 sentences1997Some of the cases recognizing that the residual exceptions can only be used in exceptional circumstances are: United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C.Cir.1979) (“The legislative history of this exception makes it very clear that this was intended to be a narrow exception to the hearsay rule, applying only in exceptional cases.”); United States v. Heyward, 729 F.2d 297, 299-300 (4th Cir.1984) (“The legislative history of the rules puts it more strongly: Tt is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.’ Fed.R.Evid. 803 Sena 1997Some of the cases recognizing that the residual exceptions can only be used in exceptional circumstances are: United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C.Cir.1979) ("The legislative history of this exception makes it very clear that this was intended to be a narrow exception to the hearsay rule, applying only in exceptional cases."); United States v. Heyward, 729 F.2d 297, 299-300 (4th Cir.1984) ("The legislative history of the rules puts it more strongly: `It is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.' Fed.R.Evid. 803 Sen | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Jackson v. United States
green
2 sentences1997Some of the cases recognizing that the residual exceptions can only be used in exceptional circumstances are: United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C.Cir.1979) (“The legislative history of this exception makes it very clear that this was intended to be a narrow exception to the hearsay rule, applying only in exceptional cases.”); United States v. Heyward, 729 F.2d 297, 299-300 (4th Cir.1984) (“The legislative history of the rules puts it more strongly: Tt is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.’ Fed.R.Evid. 803 Sena 1997Some of the cases recognizing that the residual exceptions can only be used in exceptional circumstances are: United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C.Cir.1979) ("The legislative history of this exception makes it very clear that this was intended to be a narrow exception to the hearsay rule, applying only in exceptional cases."); United States v. Heyward, 729 F.2d 297, 299-300 (4th Cir.1984) ("The legislative history of the rules puts it more strongly: `It is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.' Fed.R.Evid. 803 Sen | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.