Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
6 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1967–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kane v. Board of Appealsgreen2 sentences2014See, e.g., Kane v. Bd. of Appeals of Prince George’s Cnty., 390 Md. 145, 162 , 887 A.2d 1060, 1070 (2005) ("We commence our analysis by utilizing the generally recognized rule of statutory construction that a qualifying clause ordinarily is confined to the immediately preceding words or phrase[.]” (Citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Davis, 426 Md. at 229 n. 6, 43 A.3d at 1054 n. 6 (This Court referred to that rule as “the 'rule of the last antecedent!.]' ”)• That said, the last antecedent rule is general, not absolute. 2014See, e.g., Kane v. Bd. of Appeals of Prince George’s Cnty., 390 Md. 145, 162 , 887 A.2d 1060, 1070 (2005) ("We commence our analysis by utilizing the generally recognized rule of statutory construction that a qualifying clause ordinarily is confined to the immediately preceding words or phrase[.]” (Citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Davis, 426 Md. at 229 n. 6, 43 A.3d at 1054 n. 6 (This Court referred to that rule as “the 'rule of the last antecedent!.]' ”)• That said, the last antecedent rule is general, not absolute. | 1 | 1 |
Davis v. Stategreen2 sentences2014See, e.g., Kane v. Bd. of Appeals of Prince George’s Cnty., 390 Md. 145, 162 , 887 A.2d 1060, 1070 (2005) ("We commence our analysis by utilizing the generally recognized rule of statutory construction that a qualifying clause ordinarily is confined to the immediately preceding words or phrase[.]” (Citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Davis, 426 Md. at 229 n. 6, 43 A.3d at 1054 n. 6 (This Court referred to that rule as “the 'rule of the last antecedent!.]' ”)• That said, the last antecedent rule is general, not absolute. 2014See, e.g., Kane v. Bd. of Appeals of Prince George’s Cnty., 390 Md. 145, 162 , 887 A.2d 1060, 1070 (2005) ("We commence our analysis by utilizing the generally recognized rule of statutory construction that a qualifying clause ordinarily is confined to the immediately preceding words or phrase[.]” (Citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Davis, 426 Md. at 229 n. 6, 43 A.3d at 1054 n. 6 (This Court referred to that rule as “the 'rule of the last antecedent!.]' ”)• That said, the last antecedent rule is general, not absolute. | 1 | 1 |
Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist. 205, Will Cty.green2 sentences1992The court referred to the test laid down in Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 , 88 S.Ct. 1731, 1734-35 , 20 L.Ed.2d 811, 817 (1968), of arriving “at a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.” Judge Steinberg viewed this balancing test to be applicable, as well, to comments upon matters which were not of public concern, including comments directed solely to individuals. 1992The court referred to the test laid down in Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 , 88 S.Ct. 1731, 1734-35 , 20 L.Ed.2d 811, 817 (1968), of arriving “at a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.” Judge Steinberg viewed this balancing test to be applicable, as well, to comments upon matters which were not of public concern, including comments directed solely to individuals. | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Ohiogreen2 sentences1992In Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 420, n. 8 , 100 S.Ct. 2260, 2267, n. 8 , 65 L.Ed.2d 228 (1980), the Court referred to the exception indicated in Brown: We recognized in Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S., at 169, n. 7 [ 97 S.Ct. at 2227 n. 7] that "[a]n exception may exist where the State is unable to proceed on the more serious charge at the outset because the additional facts necessary to sustain that charge have not occurred or have not been discovered despite the exercise of due diligence." In Vitale , the Court noticed the exception but found it to be inapplicable because the additional facts n 1992In Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 420, n. 8 , 100 S.Ct. 2260, 2267, n. 8 , 65 L.Ed.2d 228 (1980), the Court referred to the exception indicated in Brown: We recognized in Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S., at 169, n. 7 [ 97 S.Ct. at 2227 n. 7] that "[a]n exception may exist where the State is unable to proceed on the more serious charge at the outset because the additional facts necessary to sustain that charge have not occurred or have not been discovered despite the exercise of due diligence." In Vitale , the Court noticed the exception but found it to be inapplicable because the additional facts n | 1 | 1 |
Illinois v. Vitalegreen2 sentences1992In Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 420, n. 8 , 100 S.Ct. 2260, 2267, n. 8 , 65 L.Ed.2d 228 (1980), the Court referred to the exception indicated in Brown: We recognized in Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S., at 169, n. 7 [ 97 S.Ct. at 2227 n. 7] that "[a]n exception may exist where the State is unable to proceed on the more serious charge at the outset because the additional facts necessary to sustain that charge have not occurred or have not been discovered despite the exercise of due diligence." In Vitale , the Court noticed the exception but found it to be inapplicable because the additional facts n 1992In Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 420, n. 8 , 100 S.Ct. 2260, 2267, n. 8 , 65 L.Ed.2d 228 (1980), the Court referred to the exception indicated in Brown: We recognized in Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S., at 169, n. 7 [ 97 S.Ct. at 2227 n. 7] that "[a]n exception may exist where the State is unable to proceed on the more serious charge at the outset because the additional facts necessary to sustain that charge have not occurred or have not been discovered despite the exercise of due diligence." In Vitale , the Court noticed the exception but found it to be inapplicable because the additional facts n | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Five Platters, Inc. v. Purdie
green
1 sentence2005In Five Platters, Inc. v. Purdie, 419 F.Supp. 372 (D.Md.1976), a suit alleging violations of common law trademark rights, unfair competition, and trademark infringement, a jury awarded the plaintiff $1.00 in compensatory damages and $3,000 in punitive damages. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Shell Oil Co. v. Parker
green
2 sentences2005In stating its holding, the Court referred to this exception a second time, commenting, “[w]e do not reach in this case the issue appearing in some cases that general compensatory damages might be presumed from the tortious act itself.” Id. at 644 , 291 A.2d 64 . 2005In stating its holding, the Court referred to this exception a second time, commenting, “[w]e do not reach in this case the issue appearing in some cases that general compensatory damages might be presumed from the tortious act itself.” Id. at 644 , 291 A.2d 64 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Grady v. Corbin
red
2 sentences1992In Corbin, 110 S.Ct. at 2090 n. 7, the Court once more recognized the exception, quoting Brown and again citing to Diaz and the concurring opinion of Brennan, J., in Ashe : [WJhen application of our traditional double jeopardy analysis would bar a subsequent prosecution, “[a]n exception may exist where the State is unable to proceed on the more serious charge at the outset because the additional facts necessary to sustain that charge have not occurred or have not been discovered despite the exercise of due diligence.” Again the exception was deemed inapplicable because the additional facts nec 1992In Corbin, 110 S.Ct. at 2090 n. 7, the Court once more recognized the exception, quoting Brown and again citing to Diaz and the concurring opinion of Brennan, J., in Ashe : [W]hen application of our traditional double jeopardy analysis would bar a subsequent prosecution, "[a]n exception may exist where the State is unable to proceed on the more serious charge at the outset because the additional facts necessary to sustain that charge have not occurred or have not been discovered despite the exercise of due diligence." Again the exception was deemed inapplicable because the additional facts nec | 1 | 1992–1992 |
American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Pearce
green
1 sentence1979The Court referred to the doctrine “recognizjing] the right of the land-owner to compensation for every additional burden cast upon the land outside the scope of the original easement, and that whether a given structure creates an additional servitude is a question of fact, depending on the circumstances of each case, to be determined by the tribunal having jurisdiction to try the same, and before which it is tried.” Id. 71 Md. at 543 . | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Mundell v. State
green
1 sentence1967In Mundell v. State, 244 Md. 91 (1966) there was evidence the defendant appeared to be semi-conscious at the time of his arrest, that he was crying when he was about to be released from the hospital, that he was depressed and had been drinking. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.