valid constitutional claim in Maryland

2016Jones, 445 Md. at 338 , 126 A.3d 1162 .

2016Jones, 445 Md. at 338 .

2016Jones, 445 Md. at 338 , 126 A.3d 1162 .

2012Nonetheless, we agree with the postconviction court that Kulbicki’s claim fails on the merits because “there must then be a showing [of] materiality of the falsity in order to warrant relief.” In Stevenson v. State, 299 Md. 297, 305 , 473 A.2d 450 (1984), the Court of Appeals made clear that'“the proper rule, which is clearly supportable, requires that an initial inquiry be made to determine if the testimony is material to the outcome of the case; if it is not, the due process clause does not automatically require a new trial.” 19 In that case, Stevenson “was charged with the first degree murd

2012Nonetheless, we agree with the postconviction court that Kulbicki’s claim fails on the merits because “there must then be a showing [of] materiality of the falsity in order to warrant relief.” In Stevenson v. State, 299 Md. 297, 305 , 473 A.2d 450 (1984), the Court of Appeals made clear that'“the proper rule, which is clearly supportable, requires that an initial inquiry be made to determine if the testimony is material to the outcome of the case; if it is not, the due process clause does not automatically require a new trial.” 19 In that case, Stevenson “was charged with the first degree murd

2008In Elrod , *196 the Supreme Court held that the discharged employees stated a valid constitutional claim, inasmuch as patronage dismissals of that type compel political orthodoxy and restrain political association, and thus are “ ‘at war with the deeper traditions of democracy embodied in the First Amendment.’ ” 427 U.S. at 357 , 96 S.Ct. 2673 (quoting Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561 , 576 (7th Cir.1972)).

2008In Elrod , *196 the Supreme Court held that the discharged employees stated a valid constitutional claim, inasmuch as patronage dismissals of that type compel political orthodoxy and restrain political association, and thus are “ ‘at war with the deeper traditions of democracy embodied in the First Amendment.’ ” 427 U.S. at 357 , 96 S.Ct. 2673 (quoting Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561 , 576 (7th Cir.1972)).

2008The Elrod Court also said that, except for dismissals from policy-making positions, patronage discharges are forbidden inasmuch as the government “may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests, especially his interest in freedom of speech.” Id. at 359 , 96 S.Ct. 2673 (quoting Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 , 92 S.Ct. 2694 , 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972)). [T]he Elrod test does not require balancing on a case by case basis.

2008The Elrod Court also said that, except for dismissals from policy-making positions, patronage discharges are forbidden inasmuch as the government “may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests, especially his interest in freedom of speech.” Id. at 359 , 96 S.Ct. 2673 (quoting Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 , 92 S.Ct. 2694 , 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972)). [T]he Elrod test does not require balancing on a case by case basis.

2008In Elrod , *196 the Supreme Court held that the discharged employees stated a valid constitutional claim, inasmuch as patronage dismissals of that type compel political orthodoxy and restrain political association, and thus are “ ‘at war with the deeper traditions of democracy embodied in the First Amendment.’ ” 427 U.S. at 357 , 96 S.Ct. 2673 (quoting Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561 , 576 (7th Cir.1972)).

2008The Elrod Court also said that, except for dismissals from policy-making positions, patronage discharges are forbidden inasmuch as the government “may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests, especially his interest in freedom of speech.” Id. at 359 , 96 S.Ct. 2673 (quoting Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 , 92 S.Ct. 2694 , 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972)). [T]he Elrod test does not require balancing on a case by case basis.

1969App. 313 , we held that despite the fact that the evidence does not show an express waiver of the accused's right to remain silent and to consult with and/or have counsel present during the interrogation, nevertheless a valid constitutional waiver within the meaning of Johnson v. Zerbst, supra, can be found where the totality of the circumstances— the attendant facts of the case—implicitly show that the accused voluntarily and intelligently relinquished his Miranda rights and made a statement.

1969In Anderson we cited with approval State v. Kremens, 245 A. 2d 313 , where the Supreme Court of New Jersey said, at 317: “* * * Any clear manifestation of a desire to waive is sufficient.

1969Thus, in Miller v. State, 251 Md. 362 , the defendant, having been afforded his full Miranda warnings, was asked prior to interrogation whether, in view of these warnings, he wanted to make a statement and he replied in the affirmative.