double-enhancement rule in Illinois

2026“Although the trial court has broad discretion in imposing a sentence [citation], the determination of whether the trial court made a double enhancement error is a question of law reviewed de novo.” People v. Shanklin, 2014 IL App (1st) 120084, ¶ 91 ; People v. Bowen, 2015 IL App (1st) 132046, ¶ 49 (same). ¶ 65 “[A] single factor cannot be used both as an element of an offense and as a basis for imposing a harsher sentence than might otherwise have been imposed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Phelps, 211 Ill. 2d 1, 11-12 (2004).

2024However, our supreme court in Phelps stated: “The double-enhancement rule is one of statutory construction [citation] and the standard of review therefore is de novo [citation].” Phelps, 211 Ill. 2d at 12 .

2026“This double-enhancement rule is premised on the assumption that the legislature considered the factors inherent in the offense in determining the appropriate range of penalties for that offense.” People v. Rissley, 165 Ill. 2d 364, 390 (1995). ¶ 34 Defendant concedes he did not raise this issue in a postsentencing motion and has forfeited this claim.

2025The reasoning for the double enhancement rule is “premised on the assumption that 17 the legislature considered the factors inherent in the offense in determining the appropriate range of penalties for that offense.” People v. Rissley, 165 Ill. 2d 364, 390 (1995).

2025See Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d at 545 . ¶ 35 B.

2020People v. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d 539, 545 , 931 N.E.2d 1184, 1187 (2010).

2004The double-enhancement rule is one of statutory construction ( Rissley , 165 Ill. 2d at 390 ), and the standard of review therefore is de novo ( People v. Robinson , 172 Ill. 2d 452, 457 (1996)).

2004The double-enhancement rule is one of statutory construction (Rissley, 165 Ill. 2d at 390 ), and the standard of review therefore is de novo (People v. Robinson, 172 Ill. 2d 452, 457 (1996)).

2019See Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d at 545 ; see also People v. Owens, 377 Ill.

2018See Hillier , 237 Ill. 2d at 545 , 342 Ill.Dec. 1 , 931 N.E.2d 1184 ; see also People v. Owens , 377 Ill.

2014Although the trial court has broad discretion in imposing a sentence (id.), the determination of whether the trial court made a double enhancement error is a question of law reviewed de novo (People v. Chaney, 379 Ill.

2014Although the trial court has broad discretion in imposing a sentence (id.), the determination of whether the trial court made a double enhancement error is a question of law reviewed de novo (People v. Chaney, 379 Ill.

2004See People v. Sawczenko-Dub , 345 Ill.

2004See People v. Sawczenko-Dub, 345 Ill.

2004A textbook example of double enhancement is found in People v. White, 114 Ill. 2d 61 (1986).

2004White, 114 Ill. 2d at 66 .

2004Gonzalez, 151 Ill. 2d at 83-84 ; Ferguson, 132 Ill. 2d at 96 .

1995(People v. Ferguson (1989), 132 Ill. 2d 86, 97 .) This double-enhancement rule is premised on the assumption that the legislature considered the factors inherent in the offense in determining the appropriate range of penalties for that offense.

2018“However, there is a strong presumption that the trial court based its sentencing determination on proper legal reasoning ***.” People v Dowding, 388 Ill.

2018"However, there is a strong presumption that the trial court based its sentencing determination on proper legal reasoning * * *." People v Dowding , 388 Ill.

2026See People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988).

2026“Although the trial court has broad discretion in imposing a sentence [citation], the determination of whether the trial court made a double enhancement error is a question of law reviewed de novo.” People v. Shanklin, 2014 IL App (1st) 120084, ¶ 91 ; People v. Bowen, 2015 IL App (1st) 132046, ¶ 49 (same). ¶ 65 “[A] single factor cannot be used both as an element of an offense and as a basis for imposing a harsher sentence than might otherwise have been imposed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Phelps, 211 Ill. 2d 1, 11-12 (2004).

2023Where, as here, a death due to the criminal conduct is an element of the offense, the double-enhancement rule prohibits the court from imposing a more severe sentence on the ground that the victim’s death was the “ ‘end result of the defendant’s conduct.’ ” People v. Smith, 195 Ill.

2023App. 3d 878, 885 (1990) (vacating sentence for voluntary manslaughter where it was clear that the sentencing court was improperly concerned with the fact that the end result of the defendant’s conduct was the victim’s death) (quoting People v. Saldivar, 113 Ill. 2d 256, 271-72 (1986)). ¶ 32 However, “the fact that [the defendant’s] conduct “threatened or caused serious harm *** is a proper aggravating factor to be considered during sentencing even in cases where serious bodily harm is implicit in the offense.” People v. Brewer, 2013 IL App (1st) 072821, ¶ 56 (affirming 50-year sentence for fir

2023App. 3d 878, 885 (1990) (vacating sentence for voluntary manslaughter where it was clear that the sentencing court was improperly concerned with the fact that the end result of the defendant’s conduct was the victim’s death) (quoting People v. Saldivar, 113 Ill. 2d 256, 271-72 (1986)). ¶ 32 However, “the fact that [the defendant’s] conduct “threatened or caused serious harm *** is a proper aggravating factor to be considered during sentencing even in cases where serious bodily harm is implicit in the offense.” People v. Brewer, 2013 IL App (1st) 072821, ¶ 56 (affirming 50-year sentence for fir

2021People v. Thomas, 171 Ill. 2d 207, 224-25 (1996). ¶ 94 In Thomas, the supreme court rejected a double-enhancement challenge in the context of mandatory Class X sentencing, pursuant to the general-recidivism provisions of the Code of Corrections.

2021People v. Banks, 212 Ill.

2020See People v. Fouts, 319 Ill.

2009This court has explained: “A double enhancement occurs when either (1) a single factor is used both as an element of an offense and as a basis for imposing a harsher sentence than might otherwise have been imposed, or (2) the same factor is used twice to elevate the severity of the offense itself.” People v. Guevara, 216 Ill. 2d 533, 545 (2005), citing Phelps, 211 Ill. 2d at 11-13 .