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6 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 2020–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rowland v. Washtenaw County Road Commissiongreen2 sentences2021Thirty years later, in Rowland v Washtenaw Co Rd Comm, 477 Mich 197 (2007), the Court overruled Hobbs and Brown, holding that the GTLA did not contain an actual- prejudice requirement before enforcement of the notice provision, that the earlier cases had improperly engrafted that requirement onto the statute, and that a governmental agency did not have to show actual prejudice before the 120-day notice provision could be enforced. 2021Thirty years later, in Rowland v Washtenaw Co Rd Comm, 477 Mich 197 (2007), the Court overruled Hobbs and Brown, holding that the GTLA did not contain an actual- prejudice requirement before enforcement of the notice provision, that the earlier cases had improperly engrafted that requirement onto the statute, and that a governmental agency did not have to show actual prejudice before the 120-day notice provision could be enforced. | 2 | 5 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
McCAHAN v. BRENNAN
green
2 sentences2020Similarly, in McCahan v Brennan, 492 Mich 730, 733 ; 822 NW2d 747 (2012), we held that the notice provision of the Court of Claims Act, MCL 600.6431, “must be 5 interpreted and enforced as plainly written and that no judicially created saving construction is permitted to avoid a clear statutory mandate.” More specifically, we held that “when the Legislature conditions the ability to pursue a claim against the state on a plaintiff’s having filed specific statutory notice, the courts may not engraft an ‘actual prejudice’ component onto the statute as a precondition to enforcing the legislative p 2020Similarly, in McCahan v Brennan, 492 Mich 730, 733 ; 822 NW2d 747 (2012), we held that the notice provision of the Court of Claims Act, MCL 600.6431, “must be 5 interpreted and enforced as plainly written and that no judicially created saving construction is permitted to avoid a clear statutory mandate.” More specifically, we held that “when the Legislature conditions the ability to pursue a claim against the state on a plaintiff’s having filed specific statutory notice, the courts may not engraft an ‘actual prejudice’ component onto the statute as a precondition to enforcing the legislative p | 2 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Cress
green
2 sentences2026In order for a new trial to be granted on the basis of newly discovered evidence, a defendant must show that: (1) the evidence itself, not merely its materiality, was newly discovered; (2) the newly discovered evidence was not cumulative; (3) the party could not, using reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced the evidence at trial; and (4) the new evidence makes a different result probable on retrial. [Id. at 566, citing People v Cress, 468 Mich 678, 692 ; 664 NW2d 174 (2003) (quotation marks omitted).] “As our Supreme Court has explained, Cress’s first three prongs relate to the goo 2026In order for a new trial to be granted on the basis of newly discovered evidence, a defendant must show that: (1) the evidence itself, not merely its materiality, was newly discovered; (2) the newly discovered evidence was not cumulative; (3) the party could not, using reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced the evidence at trial; and (4) the new evidence makes a different result probable on retrial. [Id. at 566, citing People v Cress, 468 Mich 678, 692 ; 664 NW2d 174 (2003) (quotation marks omitted).] “As our Supreme Court has explained, Cress’s first three prongs relate to the goo | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.