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6 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1972–2002 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Bentongreen2 sentences2002As a “general rule, . . . trial judges must consider reasonable alternatives before declaring a mistrial.” People v Hicks, 447 Mich 819, 841 ; 528 NW2d 136 (1994) (opinion of Griffin, J.). [I]n the absence of a motion by a defendant for a mistrial, “ ‘the Perez doctrine of manifest necessity stands as a command to trial judges not to foreclose the defendant’s option until a scrupulous exercise of judicial discretion leads to the conclusion that the ends of public justice would not be served by a continuation of the proceedings. ...’ ” [People v Benton, 402 Mich 47, 57 ; 260 NW2d 77, 81 (1977), 2002As a “general rule, . . . trial judges must consider reasonable alternatives before declaring a mistrial.” People v Hicks, 447 Mich 819, 841 ; 528 NW2d 136 (1994) (opinion of Griffin, J.). [I]n the absence of a motion by a defendant for a mistrial, “ ‘the Perez doctrine of manifest necessity stands as a command to trial judges not to foreclose the defendant’s option until a scrupulous exercise of judicial discretion leads to the conclusion that the ends of public justice would not be served by a continuation of the proceedings. ...’ ” [People v Benton, 402 Mich 47, 57 ; 260 NW2d 77, 81 (1977), | 4 | 4 |
Illinois v. Somervillegreen2 sentences1978"In Illinois v Somerville, 410 US 458, 464, 471 ; 93 S Ct 1066 ; 35 L Ed 2d 425 (1973), the Court ruled that there was manifest necessity where under local law a defect in the indictment was not curative by amendment and could not be waived by the defendant’s failure to object: 'A trial judge properly exercises his discretion to declare a mistrial if an impartial verdict cannot be reached, or if a verdict of conviction * * * would have to be reversed on appeal due to an obvious procedural error in the trial.’ "The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reconciled Somerville and 1978"In Illinois v Somerville, 410 US 458, 464, 471 ; 93 S Ct 1066 ; 35 L Ed 2d 425 (1973), the Court ruled that there was manifest necessity where under local law a defect in the indictment was not curative by amendment and could not be waived by the defendant’s failure to object: 'A trial judge properly exercises his discretion to declare a mistrial if an impartial verdict cannot be reached, or if a verdict of conviction * * * would have to be reversed on appeal due to an obvious procedural error in the trial.’ "The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reconciled Somerville and | 2 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Dinitz
green
2 sentences2002As a “general rule, . . . trial judges must consider reasonable alternatives before declaring a mistrial.” People v Hicks, 447 Mich 819, 841 ; 528 NW2d 136 (1994) (opinion of Griffin, J.). [I]n the absence of a motion by a defendant for a mistrial, “ ‘the Perez doctrine of manifest necessity stands as a command to trial judges not to foreclose the defendant’s option until a scrupulous exercise of judicial discretion leads to the conclusion that the ends of public justice would not be served by a continuation of the proceedings. ...’ ” [People v Benton, 402 Mich 47, 57 ; 260 NW2d 77, 81 (1977), 2002As a “general rule, . . . trial judges must consider reasonable alternatives before declaring a mistrial.” People v Hicks, 447 Mich 819, 841 ; 528 NW2d 136 (1994) (opinion of Griffin, J.). [I]n the absence of a motion by a defendant for a mistrial, “ ‘the Perez doctrine of manifest necessity stands as a command to trial judges not to foreclose the defendant’s option until a scrupulous exercise of judicial discretion leads to the conclusion that the ends of public justice would not be served by a continuation of the proceedings. ...’ ” [People v Benton, 402 Mich 47, 57 ; 260 NW2d 77, 81 (1977), | 3 | 1977–2002 |
United States v. Jorn
green
2 sentences1994In United States v Jorn, 400 US 470, 485 ; 91 S Ct 547 ; 27 L Ed 2d 543 (1971) (plurality), Justice Harlan stated that if the defendant does not consent to the motion for mistrial, "the Perez doctrine of manifest necessity stands as a command to trial judges not to foreclose the defendant’s option until a scrupulous exercise of judicial discretion leads to the conclusion that the ends of public justice would not be served by a continuation of the proceedings.” (Citation omitted.) Justice Harlan emphasized the defendant’s interest: Yet, in the final analysis, the judge must always temper the de 1994In United States v Jorn, 400 US 470, 485 ; 91 S Ct 547 ; 27 L Ed 2d 543 (1971) (plurality), Justice Harlan stated that if the defendant does not consent to the motion for mistrial, "the Perez doctrine of manifest necessity stands as a command to trial judges not to foreclose the defendant’s option until a scrupulous exercise of judicial discretion leads to the conclusion that the ends of public justice would not be served by a continuation of the proceedings.” (Citation omitted.) Justice Harlan emphasized the defendant’s interest: Yet, in the final analysis, the judge must always temper the de | 3 | 1972–1994 |
Arizona v. Washington
green
2 sentences2002The trial judge, therefore, “must always temper the decision whether or not to abort the trial by considering the importance to the defendant of being able, once and for all, to conclude his confrontation with society through the verdict of a tribunal he might believe to be favorably disposed to his fate.” In order to ensure that this interest is adequately protected, reviewing courts have an obligation to satisfy themselves that, in the words of Mr. Justice Story, the trial judge exercised “sound discretion” in declaring a mistrial. [Arizona v Washington, 434 US 497, 514 ; 98 S Ct 824 ; 54 L 2002The trial judge, therefore, “must always temper the decision whether or not to abort the trial by considering the importance to the defendant of being able, once and for all, to conclude his confrontation with society through the verdict of a tribunal he might believe to be favorably disposed to his fate.” In order to ensure that this interest is adequately protected, reviewing courts have an obligation to satisfy themselves that, in the words of Mr. Justice Story, the trial judge exercised “sound discretion” in declaring a mistrial. [Arizona v Washington, 434 US 497, 514 ; 98 S Ct 824 ; 54 L | 2 | 2002–2002 |
People v. Hicks
green
2 sentences2002As a “general rule, . . . trial judges must consider reasonable alternatives before declaring a mistrial.” People v Hicks, 447 Mich 819, 841 ; 528 NW2d 136 (1994) (opinion of Griffin, J.). [I]n the absence of a motion by a defendant for a mistrial, “ ‘the Perez doctrine of manifest necessity stands as a command to trial judges not to foreclose the defendant’s option until a scrupulous exercise of judicial discretion leads to the conclusion that the ends of public justice would not be served by a continuation of the proceedings. ...’ ” [People v Benton, 402 Mich 47, 57 ; 260 NW2d 77, 81 (1977), 2002As a “general rule, . . . trial judges must consider reasonable alternatives before declaring a mistrial.” People v Hicks, 447 Mich 819, 841 ; 528 NW2d 136 (1994) (opinion of Griffin, J.). [I]n the absence of a motion by a defendant for a mistrial, “ ‘the Perez doctrine of manifest necessity stands as a command to trial judges not to foreclose the defendant’s option until a scrupulous exercise of judicial discretion leads to the conclusion that the ends of public justice would not be served by a continuation of the proceedings. ...’ ” [People v Benton, 402 Mich 47, 57 ; 260 NW2d 77, 81 (1977), | 2 | 2002–2002 |
People v. Johnson
green
2 sentences1977People v Alvin Johnson, 396 Mich 424, 437 ; 240 NW2d 729 (1976). 1977People v Alvin Johnson, 396 Mich 424, 437 ; 240 NW2d 729 (1976). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.