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6 Minnesota opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Minnesota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Tate v. Commissioner of Public Safetygreen1 sentence2012Safety, 356 N.W.2d 766, 767-68 (Minn.App.1984) (concluding that the district court properly admitted breathalyzer-test-result evidence even though the officer administering the test admitted that his observation of the appellant was interrupted); Bielejeski v. Comm’r of Pub. | 1 | 1 |
Bielejeski v. Commissioner of Public Safetygreen1 sentence2012Safety, 351 N.W.2d 664, 666 (Minn.App.1984) (concluding that appellant’s "grounds for appeal, that he might have burped, that he might have had a fever, that the simulator solution might have been low, that the machine might not have been warmed up, are merely an invitation to speculation and contrary to the evidence”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Minnesota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Brooks v. Commissioner of Public Safety
green
2 sentences2016In Brooks, the drivers argued that their due-process rights were violated because the method of testing allowed suspected intoxicated drivers to be treated differently from each other—an officer administering the test might stop some subjects at the moment an adequate breath sample was obtained while requiring other subjects to continue blowing past that point. 584 N.W.2d at 19-20 . 1999In Brooks , the drivers argued that their state and federal procedural due process rights were violated because the method allowed suspected intoxicated drivers to be treated differently from each other — an officer administering the test might stop some subjects at the moment an adequate breath sample was obtained while requiring'other subjects to continue blowing past that point. 584 N.W.2d at 19-20 . | 2 | 1999–2016 |
Gunderson v. Commissioner of Public Safety
green
1 sentence2010Id. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State, Department of Highways v. Halvorson
green
2 sentences1985This matter can also be distinguished from State, Department of Public Highways v. Halvorson, 288 Minn. 424 , 181 N.W.2d 473 (1970), relied upon by the dissent, in which the Commissioner had not established that the officer administering the test was qualified to do so. 1985This matter can also be distinguished from State, Department of Public Highways v. Halvorson, 288 Minn. 424 , 181 N.W.2d 473 (1970), relied upon by the dissent, in which the Commissioner had not established that the officer administering the test was qualified to do so. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
State v. Abe
green
1 sentence1984Minn.Stat. § 169.123, subd. 2(b) (1982); State v. Abe, 289 N.W.2d 158 (Minn.1980) (the only advisory that police are required to give a person under the implied consent law is that mandated by statute). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.