Payton issue in Minnesota

2014Instead, the state argues that “these facts are not dispositive of this issue” because “[t]he officer’s belief that the subject of an arrest warrant is residing and present at a certain location may be both reasonable and incorrect at the same time.” The state, quoting Risse, argues that under the Payton standard, “the officers’ assessment need not in fact be correct; rather, they need only ‘reasonably 8 believe’ that the suspect resides at the dwelling to be searched and is currently present at the dwelling.” Id. at 216 .

2014Instead, the state argues that “these facts are not dispositive of this issue” because “[t]he officer’s belief that the subject of an arrest warrant is residing and present at a certain location may be both reasonable and incorrect at the same time.” The state, quoting Risse, argues that under the Payton standard, “the officers’ assessment need not in fact be correct; rather, they need only ‘reasonably 8 believe’ that the suspect resides at the dwelling to be searched and is currently present at the dwelling.” Id. at 216 .

1996Specifically, Roby must be able to provide the district court with some evidence that he was inside his home when arrested and that his appellate counsel was aware of that fact in order to establish that his counsel’s failure to seek a remand “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 , 104 S.Ct. at 2064 .

1996Specifically, Roby must be able to provide the district court with some evidence that he was inside his home when arrested and that his appellate counsel was aware of that fact in order to establish that his counsel’s failure to seek a remand “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 , 104 S.Ct. at 2064 .

1996At the omnibus hearing there was no claim of a warrant-less, domiciliary arrest in violation of Pay-ton.” Roby I, 463 N.W.2d at 508 .

1990Since defendant’s trial, Minn.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) has been amended, effective January 1, 1990, to follow in part Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 , 107 S.Ct. 2775 , 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987).

1990Since defendant’s trial, Minn.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) has been amended, effective January 1, 1990, to follow in part Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 , 107 S.Ct. 2775 , 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987).

1985In Miller v. State, 329 N.W.2d 54 (Minn.1983), we upheld the district court's determination on remand that the defendant’s confession was not the fruit of any Payton violation. 4 .

1985State v. Howard, 324 N.W.2d 216 (Minn.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1172 , 103 S.Ct. 818 , 74 L.Ed.2d 1016 (1983).

1985State v. Howard, 324 N.W.2d 216 (Minn.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1172 , 103 S.Ct. 818 , 74 L.Ed.2d 1016 (1983).

1985State v. Howard, 324 N.W.2d 216 (Minn.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1172 , 103 S.Ct. 818 , 74 L.Ed.2d 1016 (1983).

1985In the earlier appeal in this case, State v. Howard, 324 N.W.2d 216, 221-23 (Minn.1982), one of the issues was whether petitioner's confession was obtained in violation of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), which held that once a suspect invoices the right to counsel, the police may not initiate further conversation with the suspect in an attempt to get him to waive that right.

1985In the earlier appeal in this case, State v. Howard, 324 N.W.2d 216, 221-23 (Minn.1982), one of the issues was whether petitioner's confession was obtained in violation of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), which held that once a suspect invoices the right to counsel, the police may not initiate further conversation with the suspect in an attempt to get him to waive that right.

1982One issue not addressed in Payton — entry of a third person’s house to arrest a person not the resident of the house — was addressed recently in Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 , 101 S.Ct. 1642 , 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981), with the Court affirming a holding that, under the fourth amendment, a law enforcement officer may not legally search for the subject of an arrest warrant in the house of a third person without first obtaining a search warrant.

1982One issue not addressed in Payton — entry of a third person’s house to arrest a person not the resident of the house — was addressed recently in Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 , 101 S.Ct. 1642 , 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981), with the Court affirming a holding that, under the fourth amendment, a law enforcement officer may not legally search for the subject of an arrest warrant in the house of a third person without first obtaining a search warrant.

1980Under United States v. Crews, - U.S. -, 100 S.Ct. 1244 , 63 L.Ed.2d 537 (1980), the eyewitness identification testimony clearly was not the suppressible product of the Payton violation.

1980Under United States v. Crews, - U.S. -, 100 S.Ct. 1244 , 63 L.Ed.2d 537 (1980), the eyewitness identification testimony clearly was not the suppressible product of the Payton violation.