Payton violation in Illinois

2011In support, defendant cites the following statement in Rosemond : "[B]efore a trial court allows the State to introduce polygraph evidence at trial under the Jefferson exception, the trial court should apply enhanced scrutiny to ensure that any references to a polygraph are necessary and of minimal prejudicial impact and that no other appropriate alternative impeachment evidence is available to the State. " (Emphasis added.) Rosemond, 339 Ill.App.3d at 61 , 274 Ill.Dec. 40 , 790 N.E.2d 416 . ¶ 48 Self-serving testimony from the assistant State's Attorney and police officers denying that any co

2011In support, defendant cites the following statement in Rosemond : "[B]efore a trial court allows the State to introduce polygraph evidence at trial under the Jefferson exception, the trial court should apply enhanced scrutiny to ensure that any references to a polygraph are necessary and of minimal prejudicial impact and that no other appropriate alternative impeachment evidence is available to the State. " (Emphasis added.) Rosemond, 339 Ill.App.3d at 61 , 274 Ill.Dec. 40 , 790 N.E.2d 416 . ¶ 48 Self-serving testimony from the assistant State's Attorney and police officers denying that any co

1991App. 3d 839 , 566 N.E.2d 449 (suppression of defendant’s statements made outside the home after Payton violation not required where police had probable cause to arrest).) Therefore, the Payton violation by itself would not provide sufficient basis to suppress Shelby’s statements made after he was removed from the premises.

1991App. 3d 839 , 566 N.E.2d 449 (suppression of defendant’s statements made outside the home after Payton violation not required where police had probable cause to arrest).) Therefore, the Payton violation by itself would not provide sufficient basis to suppress Shelby’s statements made after he was removed from the premises.

1991Ed. 2d 13 , 110 S. Ct. 1640 , the statements made by Shelby after he was removed from his mother’s house need not be suppressed even if the statements were made after a Payton violation, if probable cause existed for the arrest thereby making his detention lawful.

1991Ed. 2d 13 , 110 S. Ct. 1640 , the statements made by Shelby after he was removed from his mother’s house need not be suppressed even if the statements were made after a Payton violation, if probable cause existed for the arrest thereby making his detention lawful.

1989Citing Chief Justice Clark’s concurring opinion in People v. Cabrera (1987), 116 Ill. 2d 474 , 508 N.E.2d 708 , defendant maintains that, where a suspect merely opens his door after the police have knocked and identified themselves, a Payton violation nonetheless occurs if the suspect is arrested in his home without a warrant and there are no other indications that the suspect consented to the police entry.

1989Citing Chief Justice Clark’s concurring opinion in People v. Cabrera (1987), 116 Ill. 2d 474 , 508 N.E.2d 708 , defendant maintains that, where a suspect merely opens his door after the police have knocked and identified themselves, a Payton violation nonetheless occurs if the suspect is arrested in his home without a warrant and there are no other indications that the suspect consented to the police entry.

1983Ed. 2d 576, 582 , 88 S. Ct. 507, 511 .) In this instance, there was no entry into defendant’s home for the purpose of effecting his arrest, therefore there was no violation of the Payton rule.

1983Ed. 2d 576, 582 , 88 S. Ct. 507, 511 .) In this instance, there was no entry into defendant’s home for the purpose of effecting his arrest, therefore there was no violation of the Payton rule.

1982Officers Patros and Murphy of the Chicago Police Department had been advised through regular police channels (see People v. Kahl (1978), 63 Ill.

1982Officers Patros and Murphy of the Chicago Police Department had been advised through regular police channels (see People v. Kahl (1978), 63 Ill.

1982Ed. 2d 824 , 99 S. Ct. 2248 .) We conclude that defendant’s arrest, based upon probable cause and with consent for the officers to enter the home, met the Payton standard.

1982Ed. 2d 824 , 99 S. Ct. 2248 .) We conclude that defendant’s arrest, based upon probable cause and with consent for the officers to enter the home, met the Payton standard.

1980App. 3d 637 , 408 N.E.2d 988 .) We see no -distinction between a nonexigent entry and a nonexigent remaining on the premises and conclude that the Payton rule should apply here.

1980App. 3d 637 , 408 N.E.2d 988 .) We see no -distinction between a nonexigent entry and a nonexigent remaining on the premises and conclude that the Payton rule should apply here.