constructive emancipation doctrine in New York

2017Nevertheless, under the doctrine of constructive emancipation, where “a minor of employable age and in full possession of [his or] her faculties, voluntarily and without cause, abandons the parent’s home, against the will of the parent and for the purpose of avoiding parental control [he or] she forfeits [his or] her right to demand support” (Matter of Roe v Doe, 29 NY2d 188, 192 [1971]; see Matter of Brinskelle v Widman, 137 AD3d 1022, 1023 [2016]; Matter of Jacobi v Lewis, 92 AD3d *586 1100 [2012]; Matter of Alice C. v Bernard G.C., 193 AD2d 97, 105 [1993]).

2012“Nevertheless, under the doctrine of constructive emancipation, ‘a child of employable age who actively abandons the noncustodial parent by refusing all contact and visitation’ may forfeit any entitlement to support” (Matter of Turnow v Stabile, 84 AD3d 1385, 1386 [2011], quoting Matter of Alice C. v Bernard G.C., 193 AD2d 97, 109 [1993]; see Matter of Burr v Fellner, 73 AD3d 1041, 1041 [2010]).

2026"It is fundamental public policy in New York that parents are responsible for their children's support until age 21" ( Matter of Langenhahn v Langenhahn , 241 AD3d 551, 552 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Gold v Fisher , 59 AD3d 443, 444). "'However, under the doctrine of constructive emancipation, a child of employable age who actively abandons the noncustodial parent by refusing all contact and visitation may forfeit any entitlement to support.

2026"It is fundamental public policy in New York that parents are responsible for their children's support until age 21" ( Matter of Langenhahn v Langenhahn , 241 AD3d 551, 552 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Gold v Fisher , 59 AD3d 443, 444). "'However, under the doctrine of constructive emancipation, a child of employable age who actively abandons the noncustodial parent by refusing all contact and visitation may forfeit any entitlement to support.

2020The father now appeals from an amended order that, inter alia, denied his motion and granted that part of the mother's motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the petition. "[U]nder the doctrine of constructive emancipation, a child of employable age who actively abandons the noncustodial parent by refusing all contact and visitation may forfeit any entitlement to support" ( Matter of Oneida County Dept. of Social Servs. v Christman , 125 AD3d 1409 , 1410 [4th Dept 2015] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Saunders v Aiello , [*2] 59 AD3d 1090, 1091 [4th Dept 2009]; see genera

2017However, under the doctrine of constructive emancipation, “a child of employable age who actively abandons the noncustodial parent by refusing all contact and visitation” may forfeit any entitlement to support (see Matter of Roe v Doe, 29 NY2d 188, 192-193 [1971]).

2019We reject that contention. "[U]nder the doctrine of constructive emancipation, a child of employable age who actively abandons the noncustodial parent by refusing all contact and visitation may forfeit any entitlement to support" ( Matter of Oneida County Dept. of Social Servs. v Christman , 125 AD3d 1409 , 1410 [4th Dept 2015] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Burr v Fellner , 73 AD3d 1041, 1041 [2d Dept 2010]).

2015It is well established that “ ‘[a] parent is obligated to support his or her child until the age of 21 (see Family Ct Act § 413) unless the child becomes emancipated’ ” (Matter of Cedeno v Knowlton, 98 AD3d 1257, 1257 [2012]), and that “[t]he Legislature has imposed a statutory duty upon parents to support their children who are welfare recipients in order to save the general public the cost of supporting them” (Matter of Henry v Boyd, 99 AD2d 382, 387 [1984], affd 65 NY2d 645 [1985]; see Family Ct Act § 415). “[U]nder the doctrine of constructive emancipation, ‘a child of employable age who a

2017Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the Supreme Court properly determined that his child support obligation with respect to the parties’ daughter was not terminated on the ground of constructive emancipation. “ ‘It is fundamental public policy in New York that parents are responsible for their children’s support until age 21’ ” (Matter of Jurgielewicz v Johnston, 114 AD3d 945 , 945 [2014], quoting Matter of Gold v Fisher, 59 AD3d 443, 444 [2009]; see Family Ct Act § 413; Matter of Barlow v Barlow, 112 AD3d 817 [2013]; Matter of Gansky v Gansky, 103 AD3d 894 [2013]; Schulman v Schulman, 101

2017Under the doctrine of constructive emancipation, where “a minor of employable age and in full possession of [his or] her faculties, voluntarily and without cause, abandons the parent’s home, against the will of the parent and for the purpose of avoiding parental control [he or] she forfeits [his or] her right to demand support” (Matter of Roe v Doe, 29 NY2d at 192 ; see Matter of Barlow v Barlow, 112 AD3d 817, 818 [2013]). “[A] child’s unemancipated status may be revived provided there has been a sufficient change in circumstances to warrant the corresponding change in status” (Matter of Bogin

2017Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the Supreme Court properly determined that his child support obligation with respect to the parties’ daughter was not terminated on the ground of constructive emancipation. “ ‘It is fundamental public policy in New York that parents are responsible for their children’s support until age 21’ ” (Matter of Jurgielewicz v Johnston, 114 AD3d 945 , 945 [2014], quoting Matter of Gold v Fisher, 59 AD3d 443, 444 [2009]; see Family Ct Act § 413; Matter of Barlow v Barlow, 112 AD3d 817 [2013]; Matter of Gansky v Gansky, 103 AD3d 894 [2013]; Schulman v Schulman, 101

2016Nevertheless, under the doctrine of constructive emancipation, where “a minor of employable age and in full possession of [his or] her faculties, voluntarily and without cause, abandons the parent’s home, against the will of the parent and for the purpose of avoiding parental control [he or] she forfeits [his or] her right to demand support” (Matter of Roe v Doe, 29 NY2d at 192 ; see Matter of Glen L.S. v Deborah A.S., 89 AD3d 856, 857 [2011]; Matter of DeLuca v Strear-DeLuca, 84 AD3d 801 [2011]).

2025A child's mere reluctance to see a parent is not abandonment" ( Matter of Barlow v Barlow , 112 AD3d 817, 818 ; see Matter of Grucci v Villanti , 108 AD3d 626, 626-627 ). "'[W]here it is the parent who causes a breakdown in communication with his [or her] child, or has made no serious effort to contact the child and exercise his [or her parental access] rights, the child will not be deemed to have abandoned the parent'" ( Matter of Glen L.S. v Deborah A.S. , 89 AD3d 856, 857 , quoting Matter of Alice C. v Bernard G.C. , 193 AD2d 97, 109 ).

2020A child's mere reluctance to see a parent is not abandonment" ( Matter of Barlow v Barlow , 112 AD3d at 818 ; see Matter of Grucci v Villanti , 108 AD3d 626, 626-627 ; Schulman v Schulman , 101 AD3d 1098, 1099 ).

2019However, "[a] child's . . . reluctance to see a parent is not abandonment" ( Matter of Jurgielewicz v Johnston , 114 AD3d at 945 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see O'Rourke v O'Rourke , 139 AD3d 1027, 1028 ). " The burden of proof as to emancipation is on the party asserting it'" ( Matter of Jurgielewicz v Johnston , 114 AD3d at 945 , quoting Schneider v Schneider , 116 AD2d 714, 715 ; see Matter of Barlow v Barlow , 112 AD3d at 818 ).

2011“The burden of proof as to emancipation is on the party asserting it” (Schneider v Schneider, 116 AD2d 714, 715 [1986]; see Matter of Gold v Fisher, 59 AD3d at 444 ).

2012“Nevertheless, under the doctrine of constructive emancipation, ‘a child of employable age who actively abandons the noncustodial parent by refusing all contact and visitation’ may forfeit any entitlement to support” (Matter of Turnow v Stabile, 84 AD3d 1385, 1386 [2011], quoting Matter of Alice C. v Bernard G.C., 193 AD2d 97, 109 [1993]; see Matter of Burr v Fellner, 73 AD3d 1041, 1041 [2010]).

2012“Nevertheless, under the doctrine of constructive emancipation, ‘a child of employable age who actively abandons the noncustodial parent by refusing all contact and visitation’ may forfeit any entitlement to support” (Matter of Turnow v Stabile, 84 AD3d 1385, 1386 [2011], quoting Matter of Alice C. v Bernard G.C., 193 AD2d 97, 109 [1993]; see Matter of Burr v Fellner, 73 AD3d 1041, 1041 [2010]).

2017Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the Supreme Court properly determined that his child support obligation with respect to the parties’ daughter was not terminated on the ground of constructive emancipation. “ ‘It is fundamental public policy in New York that parents are responsible for their children’s support until age 21’ ” (Matter of Jurgielewicz v Johnston, 114 AD3d 945 , 945 [2014], quoting Matter of Gold v Fisher, 59 AD3d 443, 444 [2009]; see Family Ct Act § 413; Matter of Barlow v Barlow, 112 AD3d 817 [2013]; Matter of Gansky v Gansky, 103 AD3d 894 [2013]; Schulman v Schulman, 101

2015(Matter of Jurgielewicz v Johnston, 114 AD3d 945 [2d Dept 2014].) While fundamental public policy in New York dictates that parents are responsible for their children’s support until age 21, under the doctrine of constructive emancipation, a child of employable age who actively abandons the noncustodial parent by refusing all contact and visitation may forfeit any entitlement to support.

2017Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the Supreme Court properly determined that his child support obligation with respect to the parties’ daughter was not terminated on the ground of constructive emancipation. “ ‘It is fundamental public policy in New York that parents are responsible for their children’s support until age 21’ ” (Matter of Jurgielewicz v Johnston, 114 AD3d 945 , 945 [2014], quoting Matter of Gold v Fisher, 59 AD3d 443, 444 [2009]; see Family Ct Act § 413; Matter of Barlow v Barlow, 112 AD3d 817 [2013]; Matter of Gansky v Gansky, 103 AD3d 894 [2013]; Schulman v Schulman, 101

2015“However, under the doctrine of constructive emancipation, a child of employable age who actively abandons the noncustodial parent *972 by refusing all contact and visitation may forfeit any entitlement to support” (Matter of Jurgielewicz v Johnston, 114 AD3d 945, 945 [2014] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Gansky v Gansky, 103 AD3d at 895 ).

2017While the court did not make an express finding of constructive emancipation—an issue raised by the wife—the record is sufficient to permit this Court to make this finding (see Wallace v Wallace, 154 AD3d 1078, 1079 [2017]; Murray v Murray, 101 AD3d at 1325). 4 To that end, “a parent’s obligation to support a child until he or she reaches age 21 may be suspended where the child, although not financially self sufficient, abandons that parent’s home without sufficient cause and withdraws from the parent’s control, refusing to comply with reasonable parental demands, under the doctrine of constru

2012The father appeals. “[A] parent’s obligation to support a child until he or she reaches age 21 may be suspended where the child, although not financially self sufficient, abandons that parent’s home without sufficient cause and withdraws from the parent’s control, refusing to comply with reasonable parental demands, under the doctrine of constructive emancipation” (Matter of Donnelly v Donnelly, 14 AD3d 811, 812 [2005] [citation omitted]; see Matter of Parker v Stage, 43 NY2d 128, 132 [1977]; Matter of Roe v Doe, 29 NY2d 188, 193 [1971]; Matter of Columbia County Dept. of Social Servs. v Richa

2016However, “[a] child’s reluctance to see a parent is not abandonment, relieving the parent of any support obligation” (Radin v Radin, 209 AD2d 396, 396 [1994]; see Kordes v Kordes, 70 AD3d 782, 783 [2010]; Matter of Dewitt v Giampietro, 66 AD3d 773, 775 [2009]).

2014A child’s mere reluctance to see a parent is not abandonment” (Matter of Barlow v Barlow, 112 AD3d at 818 ; see Matter of Grucci v Villanti, 108 AD3d 626, 626-627 [2013]; Schulman v Schulman, 101 AD3d at 1099 ; Matter of Glen L.S. v Deborah A.S., 89 AD3d at 857 ; Matter of Turnow v Stabile, 84 AD3d 1385, 1386 [2011]). “ ‘[W]here it is the parent who causes a breakdown in communication with his [or her] child, or has made no serious effort to contact the child and exercise his [or her] visitation rights, the child will not be deemed to have abandoned the parent’ ” (Matter of Glen L.S. v Deborah

2015It is well established that “ ‘[a] parent is obligated to support his or her child until the age of 21 (see Family Ct Act § 413) unless the child becomes emancipated’ ” (Matter of Cedeno v Knowlton, 98 AD3d 1257, 1257 [2012]), and that “[t]he Legislature has imposed a statutory duty upon parents to support their children who are welfare recipients in order to save the general public the cost of supporting them” (Matter of Henry v Boyd, 99 AD2d 382, 387 [1984], affd 65 NY2d 645 [1985]; see Family Ct Act § 415). “[U]nder the doctrine of constructive emancipation, ‘a child of employable age who a

2015It is well established that “ ‘[a] parent is obligated to support his or her child until the age of 21 (see Family Ct Act § 413) unless the child becomes emancipated’ ” (Matter of Cedeno v Knowlton, 98 AD3d 1257, 1257 [2012]), and that “[t]he Legislature has imposed a statutory duty upon parents to support their children who are welfare recipients in order to save the general public the cost of supporting them” (Matter of Henry v Boyd, 99 AD2d 382, 387 [1984], affd 65 NY2d 645 [1985]; see Family Ct Act § 415). “[U]nder the doctrine of constructive emancipation, ‘a child of employable age who a

2015The burden of proving emancipation is on the party asserting it (see Matter of Gold v Fisher, 59 AD3d 443, 444 [2009]; see also Schmitt v Schmitt, 107 AD3d 1529, 1530 [2013]).

2015The burden of proving emancipation is on the party asserting it (see Matter of Gold v Fisher, 59 AD3d 443, 444 [2009]; see also Schmitt v Schmitt, 107 AD3d 1529, 1530 [2013]).

2017Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the Supreme Court properly determined that his child support obligation with respect to the parties’ daughter was not terminated on the ground of constructive emancipation. “ ‘It is fundamental public policy in New York that parents are responsible for their children’s support until age 21’ ” (Matter of Jurgielewicz v Johnston, 114 AD3d 945 , 945 [2014], quoting Matter of Gold v Fisher, 59 AD3d 443, 444 [2009]; see Family Ct Act § 413; Matter of Barlow v Barlow, 112 AD3d 817 [2013]; Matter of Gansky v Gansky, 103 AD3d 894 [2013]; Schulman v Schulman, 101

2013Under the doctrine of constructive emancipation, a child of employable age who actively abandons the noncustodial parent by refusing all contact and visitation may forfeit any entitlement to support (see Schulman v Schulman, 101 AD3d 1098 [2012]; Matter of Gold v Fisher, 59 AD3d 443 [2009]).

2016However, “[a] child’s reluctance to see a parent is not abandonment, relieving the parent of any support obligation” (Radin v Radin, 209 AD2d 396, 396 [1994]; see Kordes v Kordes, 70 AD3d 782, 783 [2010]; Matter of Dewitt v Giampietro, 66 AD3d 773, 775 [2009]).

2013However, a child’s reluctance to see a parent is not abandonment (see Schulman v Schulman, 101 AD3d at 1098 ; Matter of Glen L.S. v Deborah A.S., 89 AD3d 856 [2011]; Matter of Turnow v Stabile, 84 AD3d 1385 [2011]; Kordes v Kordes, 70 AD3d 782 [2010]).

2016However, “[a] child’s reluctance to see a parent is not abandonment, relieving the parent of any support obligation” (Radin v Radin, 209 AD2d 396, 396 [1994]; see Kordes v Kordes, 70 AD3d 782, 783 [2010]; Matter of Dewitt v Giampietro, 66 AD3d 773, 775 [2009]).

2011However, “[a] child’s reluctance to see a parent is not abandonment, relieving the parent of any support obligation” (Radin v Radin, 209 AD2d 396, 396 [1994]; see Kordes v Kordes, 70 AD3d 782, 783 [2010]).

2015It is well established that “ ‘[a] parent is obligated to support his or her child until the age of 21 (see Family Ct Act § 413) unless the child becomes emancipated’ ” (Matter of Cedeno v Knowlton, 98 AD3d 1257, 1257 [2012]), and that “[t]he Legislature has imposed a statutory duty upon parents to support their children who are welfare recipients in order to save the general public the cost of supporting them” (Matter of Henry v Boyd, 99 AD2d 382, 387 [1984], affd 65 NY2d 645 [1985]; see Family Ct Act § 415). “[U]nder the doctrine of constructive emancipation, ‘a child of employable age who a

2015It is well established that “ ‘[a] parent is obligated to support his or her child until the age of 21 (see Family Ct Act § 413) unless the child becomes emancipated’ ” (Matter of Cedeno v Knowlton, 98 AD3d 1257, 1257 [2012]), and that “[t]he Legislature has imposed a statutory duty upon parents to support their children who are welfare recipients in order to save the general public the cost of supporting them” (Matter of Henry v Boyd, 99 AD2d 382, 387 [1984], affd 65 NY2d 645 [1985]; see Family Ct Act § 415). “[U]nder the doctrine of constructive emancipation, ‘a child of employable age who a

2015It is well established that “ ‘[a] parent is obligated to support his or her child until the age of 21 (see Family Ct Act § 413) unless the child becomes emancipated’ ” (Matter of Cedeno v Knowlton, 98 AD3d 1257, 1257 [2012]), and that “[t]he Legislature has imposed a statutory duty upon parents to support their children who are welfare recipients in order to save the general public the cost of supporting them” (Matter of Henry v Boyd, 99 AD2d 382, 387 [1984], affd 65 NY2d 645 [1985]; see Family Ct Act § 415). “[U]nder the doctrine of constructive emancipation, ‘a child of employable age who a

2015It is well established that “ ‘[a] parent is obligated to support his or her child until the age of 21 (see Family Ct Act § 413) unless the child becomes emancipated’ ” (Matter of Cedeno v Knowlton, 98 AD3d 1257, 1257 [2012]), and that “[t]he Legislature has imposed a statutory duty upon parents to support their children who are welfare recipients in order to save the general public the cost of supporting them” (Matter of Henry v Boyd, 99 AD2d 382, 387 [1984], affd 65 NY2d 645 [1985]; see Family Ct Act § 415). “[U]nder the doctrine of constructive emancipation, ‘a child of employable age who a

2015Although the court did not address that issue in its decision, defendant properly raises it on appeal as an alternative ground for affirmance (see Parochial Bus Sys. v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 60 NY2d 539, 545-546 [1983]). “[U]nder the doctrine of constructive emancipation, a child of employable age who actively abandons the noncustodial parent by refusing all contact and visitation may forfeit any entitlement to support” (Barlow, 112 AD3d at 818 ; see Burr, 73 AD3d at 1041 ).

2015Although the court did not address that issue in its decision, defendant properly raises it on appeal as an alternative ground for affirmance (see Parochial Bus Sys. v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 60 NY2d 539, 545-546 [1983]). “[U]nder the doctrine of constructive emancipation, a child of employable age who actively abandons the noncustodial parent by refusing all contact and visitation may forfeit any entitlement to support” (Barlow, 112 AD3d at 818 ; see Burr, 73 AD3d at 1041 ).

2023A child's mere reluctance to see a parent is not abandonment" ( Matter of Shisgal v Abels , 179 AD3d at 1072 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Roe v Doe , 29 NY2d 188, 192-193 ; Mitarotonda v Mitarotonda , 171 AD3d 1040 , 1040). "[W]here it is the parent who causes a breakdown in communication with his or her child, or has made no serious effort to contact the child and exercise his or her parental access rights, the child will not be deemed to have abandoned the parent" ( Matter of Kenneth H. v Dawn P. , 214 AD3d at 732 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Barlow

2023"However, under the doctrine of constructive emancipation, a child of employable age who actively abandons the noncustodial parent by refusing all contact and [parental access] may forfeit any entitlement to support" ( Matter of Shisgal v Abels , 179 AD3d at 1072 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Mitarotonda v Mitarotonda , 171 AD3d at 1040).

2012The father appeals. “[A] parent’s obligation to support a child until he or she reaches age 21 may be suspended where the child, although not financially self sufficient, abandons that parent’s home without sufficient cause and withdraws from the parent’s control, refusing to comply with reasonable parental demands, under the doctrine of constructive emancipation” (Matter of Donnelly v Donnelly, 14 AD3d 811, 812 [2005] [citation omitted]; see Matter of Parker v Stage, 43 NY2d 128, 132 [1977]; Matter of Roe v Doe, 29 NY2d 188, 193 [1971]; Matter of Columbia County Dept. of Social Servs. v Richa

2009In my view, the majority’s conclusion is belied by well-settled case law establishing that “a parent’s obligation to support a child until he or she reaches age 21 . . . may be suspended where the child, although not financially self sufficient, abandons the parent’s home without sufficient cause and withdraws from the parent’s control, refus ing to comply with reasonable parental demands, under the doctrine of constructive emancipation” (Matter of Donnelly v Donnelly, 14 AD3d 811, 812 [2005]; see Matter of Roe v Doe, 29 NY2d 188, 193 [1971]; Matter of Ontario County Dept. of Social Servs. v G

2012The father appeals. “[A] parent’s obligation to support a child until he or she reaches age 21 may be suspended where the child, although not financially self sufficient, abandons that parent’s home without sufficient cause and withdraws from the parent’s control, refusing to comply with reasonable parental demands, under the doctrine of constructive emancipation” (Matter of Donnelly v Donnelly, 14 AD3d 811, 812 [2005] [citation omitted]; see Matter of Parker v Stage, 43 NY2d 128, 132 [1977]; Matter of Roe v Doe, 29 NY2d 188, 193 [1971]; Matter of Columbia County Dept. of Social Servs. v Richa

2012In other words, “a child who is not financially self-sufficient may nevertheless be deemed emancipated if he or she abandons the parental home without sufficient cause and refuses to comply with reasonable parental demands” (Matter of Alice C. v Bernard G.C., 193 AD2d 97, 106 [1993]; see Matter of Chambers v Chambers, 295 AD2d 654, 654-655 [2002]; Matter of Columbia County Dept. of Social Servs. v Richard O., 262 AD2d at 915 ).

2012In other words, “a child who is not financially self-sufficient may nevertheless be deemed emancipated if he or she abandons the parental home without sufficient cause and refuses to comply with reasonable parental demands” (Matter of Alice C. v Bernard G.C., 193 AD2d 97, 106 [1993]; see Matter of Chambers v Chambers, 295 AD2d 654, 654-655 [2002]; Matter of Columbia County Dept. of Social Servs. v Richard O., 262 AD2d at 915 ).

2005On the merits, under well-established law, a parent’s obligation to support a child until he or she reaches age 21 (see Family Ct Act § 413) may be suspended where the child, although not financially self sufficient, abandons that parent’s home without sufficient cause and withdraws from the parent’s control, refusing to comply with reasonable parental demands, under the doctrine of constructive emancipation (see Matter of Roe v Doe, 29 NY2d 188, 193 [1971]; Matter of Ontario County Dept. of Social Servs. [Christopher L.] v Gail K., 269 AD2d 847, 847 [2000], lv denied 95 NY2d 760 [2000]; see a

2016Nevertheless, under the doctrine of constructive emancipation, where “a minor of employable age and in full possession of [his or] her faculties, voluntarily and without cause, abandons the parent’s home, against the will of the parent and for the purpose of avoiding parental control [he or] she forfeits [his or] her right to demand support” (Matter of Roe v Doe, 29 NY2d at 192 ; see Matter of Glen L.S. v Deborah A.S., 89 AD3d 856, 857 [2011]; Matter of DeLuca v Strear-DeLuca, 84 AD3d 801 [2011]).

2013Nevertheless, under the doctrine of constructive emancipation, where “a minor of employable age and in full possession of [his or] her faculties, voluntarily and without cause, abandons the parent’s home, against the will of the parent and for the purpose of avoiding parental control [he or] she forfeits [his or] her right to demand support” (Matter of Roe v Doe, 29 NY2d at 192 ; see Matter of Glen L.S. v Deborah A.S., 89 AD3d 856, 857 [2011]; Matter of DeLuca v Strear-DeLuca, 84 AD3d 801 [2011]).

2020The father now appeals from an amended order that, inter alia, denied his motion and granted that part of the mother's motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the petition. "[U]nder the doctrine of constructive emancipation, a child of employable age who actively abandons the noncustodial parent by refusing all contact and visitation may forfeit any entitlement to support" ( Matter of Oneida County Dept. of Social Servs. v Christman , 125 AD3d 1409 , 1410 [4th Dept 2015] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Saunders v Aiello , [*2] 59 AD3d 1090, 1091 [4th Dept 2009]; see genera

2019We reject that contention. "[U]nder the doctrine of constructive emancipation, a child of employable age who actively abandons the noncustodial parent by refusing all contact and visitation may forfeit any entitlement to support" ( Matter of Oneida County Dept. of Social Servs. v Christman , 125 AD3d 1409 , 1410 [4th Dept 2015] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Burr v Fellner , 73 AD3d 1041, 1041 [2d Dept 2010]).

2009In my view, the majority’s conclusion is belied by well-settled case law establishing that “a parent’s obligation to support a child until he or she reaches age 21 . . . may be suspended where the child, although not financially self sufficient, abandons the parent’s home without sufficient cause and withdraws from the parent’s control, refus ing to comply with reasonable parental demands, under the doctrine of constructive emancipation” (Matter of Donnelly v Donnelly, 14 AD3d 811, 812 [2005]; see Matter of Roe v Doe, 29 NY2d 188, 193 [1971]; Matter of Ontario County Dept. of Social Servs. v G

2005On the merits, under well-established law, a parent’s obligation to support a child until he or she reaches age 21 (see Family Ct Act § 413) may be suspended where the child, although not financially self sufficient, abandons that parent’s home without sufficient cause and withdraws from the parent’s control, refusing to comply with reasonable parental demands, under the doctrine of constructive emancipation (see Matter of Roe v Doe, 29 NY2d 188, 193 [1971]; Matter of Ontario County Dept. of Social Servs. [Christopher L.] v Gail K., 269 AD2d 847, 847 [2000], lv denied 95 NY2d 760 [2000]; see a

2020Even assuming, arguendo, that the subject children were both of employable age ( see Matter of Jones v Jones , 160 AD3d 1428 , 1429 [4th Dept 2018]; Matter of Jurgielewicz v Johnston , 114 AD3d 945, 946 [2d Dept 2014]; see generally Merril Sobie, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 29A, Family Ct Act § 413 at 87 [2008 ed]), we conclude that the father did not meet his initial burden on his motion of establishing that their refusal to visit with him was unjustified ( see Matter of Wiegert v Wiegert , 267 AD2d 620, 621 [3d Dept 1999]; see also Christman , 125 AD3d at 1410).