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6 Missouri opinions name it 1 courts 1896–1979 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Maryland Indemnity Insurance v. Kornkegreen2 sentences1979While some courts apparently would limit this qualification of the general rule to situations where the named insured has not specifically forbidden driving by a third person, it is more generally held that operation by a third person under such circumstances falls within the protection of the omnibus clause even where such operation is specifically forbidden by the named insured. 319 A.2d at 611-12 (emphasis in original). 1979While some courts apparently would limit this qualification of the general rule to situations where the named insured has not specifically forbidden driving by a third person, it is more generally held that operation by a third person under such circumstances falls within the protection of the omnibus clause even where such operation is specifically for bidden by the named insured. 319 A.2d at 611-12 (emphasis in original). | 1 | 1 |
Longan v. Weltmergreen2 sentences1941In the Cazzell case (where an osteopath testified in a case against an M.D.), we reaffirmed the ruling of the Still case (where M.D.s were allowed to testify against an osteopath) that such a witness "was competent to express his opinion as to matters of diagnosis and to testify to any scientific fact that ought to be known to every physician and surgeon of every school or system." [See Cook v. Moats (Neb.), 238 N.W. 529 , 78 A.L.R. 694 , citing and following the Still case; see also Longan v. Weltmer, 180 Mo. 322 , 79 S.W. 655 , where an M.D. was held competent to testify in a case against ma 1941In the Cazzell case (where an osteopath testified in a case against an M.D.), we reaffirmed the ruling of the Still case (where M.D.s were allowed to testify against an osteopath) that such a witness "was competent to express his opinion as to matters of diagnosis and to testify to any scientific fact that ought to be known to every physician and surgeon of every school or system." [See Cook v. Moats (Neb.), 238 N.W. 529 , 78 A.L.R. 694 , citing and following the Still case; see also Longan v. Weltmer, 180 Mo. 322 , 79 S.W. 655 , where an M.D. was held competent to testify in a case against ma | 1 | 1 |
Medina Garay v. Medina Garaygreen1 sentence1941In the Cazzell case (where an osteopath testified in a case against an M.D.), we reaffirmed the ruling of the Still case (where M.D.s were allowed to testify against an osteopath) that such a witness "was competent to express his opinion as to matters of diagnosis and to testify to any scientific fact that ought to be known to every physician and surgeon of every school or system." [See Cook v. Moats (Neb.), 238 N.W. 529 , 78 A.L.R. 694 , citing and following the Still case; see also Longan v. Weltmer, 180 Mo. 322 , 79 S.W. 655 , where an M.D. was held competent to testify in a case against ma | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Keegan v. Kavanaugh
neutral
2 sentences1909This qualification of the general rule is now firmly engrafted in the law of this State. [Conroy v. Vulcan Iron Works, 62 Mo. 35 ; Keegan v. Kavanaugh, 62 Mo. 230 ; Flynn v. Railroad, 78 Mo. 195 ; Stephens v. Railroad, 96 Mo. 207 .] And it is likewise the accepted rule in England. [Holmes v. Clarke, 6 Hurl. & N. 349; Clarke v. Holmes, 7 Hurl. & N. 937.]” But it is urged that the accident is not one which could have been anticipated by the defendant. 1896Conroy v. Vulcan Iron Works, 62 Mo. 35 ; Keegan v. Kavanaugh, 62 Mo. 230 ; Flynn v. Railroad, 78 Mo. 195; Stephens v. Railroad, 96 Mo. 207 . | 2 | 1896–1909 |
Conroy v. Vulcan Iron Works
green
2 sentences1909This qualification of the general rule is now firmly engrafted in the law of this State. [Conroy v. Vulcan Iron Works, 62 Mo. 35 ; Keegan v. Kavanaugh, 62 Mo. 230 ; Flynn v. Railroad, 78 Mo. 195 ; Stephens v. Railroad, 96 Mo. 207 .] And it is likewise the accepted rule in England. [Holmes v. Clarke, 6 Hurl. & N. 349; Clarke v. Holmes, 7 Hurl. & N. 937.]” But it is urged that the accident is not one which could have been anticipated by the defendant. 1896Conroy v. Vulcan Iron Works, 62 Mo. 35 ; Keegan v. Kavanaugh, 62 Mo. 230 ; Flynn v. Railroad, 78 Mo. 195; Stephens v. Railroad, 96 Mo. 207 . | 2 | 1896–1909 |
Flynn v. Kansas City
green
2 sentences1909This qualification of the general rule is now firmly engrafted in the law of this State. [Conroy v. Vulcan Iron Works, 62 Mo. 35 ; Keegan v. Kavanaugh, 62 Mo. 230 ; Flynn v. Railroad, 78 Mo. 195 ; Stephens v. Railroad, 96 Mo. 207 .] And it is likewise the accepted rule in England. [Holmes v. Clarke, 6 Hurl. & N. 349; Clarke v. Holmes, 7 Hurl. & N. 937.]” But it is urged that the accident is not one which could have been anticipated by the defendant. 1896Conroy v. Vulcan Iron Works, 62 Mo. 35 ; Keegan v. Kavanaugh, 62 Mo. 230 ; Flynn v. Railroad, 78 Mo. 195; Stephens v. Railroad, 96 Mo. 207 . | 2 | 1896–1909 |
Stephens v. Hannibal & St. Joseph Railroad
neutral
2 sentences1909This qualification of the general rule is now firmly engrafted in the law of this State. [Conroy v. Vulcan Iron Works, 62 Mo. 35 ; Keegan v. Kavanaugh, 62 Mo. 230 ; Flynn v. Railroad, 78 Mo. 195 ; Stephens v. Railroad, 96 Mo. 207 .] And it is likewise the accepted rule in England. [Holmes v. Clarke, 6 Hurl. & N. 349; Clarke v. Holmes, 7 Hurl. & N. 937.]” But it is urged that the accident is not one which could have been anticipated by the defendant. 1896Conroy v. Vulcan Iron Works, 62 Mo. 35 ; Keegan v. Kavanaugh, 62 Mo. 230 ; Flynn v. Railroad, 78 Mo. 195; Stephens v. Railroad, 96 Mo. 207 . | 2 | 1896–1909 |
Wellinger v. Terminal Railroad Assn. of St. Louis
green
2 sentences1948Louis, 353 Mo. 670 , 183 S.W.2d 908 , 910, stating a qualification of the general rule concerning the master's duty to provide the servant with reasonably safe appliances, towit, when the appliances are not used in the ordinary manner and for the purposes intended. 1948Louis, 353 Mo. 670 , 183 S.W.2d 908 , 910, stating a qualification of the general rule concerning the master's duty to provide the servant with reasonably safe appliances, towit, when the appliances are not used in the ordinary manner and for the purposes intended. | 1 | 1948–1948 |
Cook v. Moats
neutral
2 sentences1941In the Cazzell case (where an osteopath testified in a case against an M.D.), we reaffirmed the ruling of the Still case (where M.D.s were allowed to testify against an osteopath) that such a witness "was competent to express his opinion as to matters of diagnosis and to testify to any scientific fact that ought to be known to every physician and surgeon of every school or system." [See Cook v. Moats (Neb.), 238 N.W. 529 , 78 A.L.R. 694 , citing and following the Still case; see also Longan v. Weltmer, 180 Mo. 322 , 79 S.W. 655 , where an M.D. was held competent to testify in a case against ma 1941In the Cazzell case (where an osteopath testified in a case against an M.D.), we reaffirmed the ruling of the Still case (where M.D.s were allowed to testify against an osteopath) that such a witness "was competent to express his opinion as to matters of diagnosis and to testify to any scientific fact that ought to be known to every physician and surgeon of every school or system." [See Cook v. Moats (Neb.), 238 N.W. 529 , 78 A.L.R. 694 , citing and following the Still case; see also Longan v. Weltmer, 180 Mo. 322 , 79 S.W. 655 , where an M.D. was held competent to testify in a case against ma | 1 | 1941–1941 |
Kelley v. Hannibal & St. Joseph Railroad
green
1 sentence1900This qualification of the general rule was in substance asserted in Scoville v. Railroad, 81 Mo. 483 ; Frick v. Railroad, 75 Mo. 595 ; Kelly v. Railroad, 75 Mo. 138 .....Thus it will be seen that eases may and do arise where, though the company is entitled to a clear track, it can not fairly be presumed that the track is clear. | 1 | 1900–1900 |
Frick v. St. Louis, Kansas City & Northern Railway Co.
neutral
1 sentence1900This qualification of the general rule was in substance asserted in Scoville v. Railroad, 81 Mo. 483 ; Frick v. Railroad, 75 Mo. 595 ; Kelly v. Railroad, 75 Mo. 138 .....Thus it will be seen that eases may and do arise where, though the company is entitled to a clear track, it can not fairly be presumed that the track is clear. | 1 | 1900–1900 |
Cooper v. Johnson
green
1 sentence1900This qualification of the general rule was in substance asserted in Scoville v. Railroad, 81 Mo. 483 ; Frick v. Railroad, 75 Mo. 595 ; Kelly v. Railroad, 75 Mo. 138 .....Thus it will be seen that eases may and do arise where, though the company is entitled to a clear track, it can not fairly be presumed that the track is clear. | 1 | 1900–1900 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.