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6 Missouri opinions name it 2 courts 2014–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
McNeal v. Stategreen2 sentences2017McNeal v. State, 412 S.W.3d 886, 889 (Mo. banc 2013) (hereinafter, “McNeal I”). 2014Cf. McNeal, 412 S.W.3d at 889-90 (where movant claimed counsel’s failure to request instruction was not justified by any “strategy or reason, other than inadvertence,” and allegation was not refuted by record, movant was entitled to evidentiary hearing). | 2 | 2 |
State of Missouri v. Justin Floyd Eugene Jonesgreen2 sentences2016The Missouri Supreme Court explained recently in State v, Jones, 479 S.W.3d 100, 106 (Mo.banc 2016), that the definition of armed criminal action under section 671.015.1 “was intended to reach as broadly as possible.” The Court concluded that the plain meaning of the words in the statute “ma[d]e it clear that the legislature intended section 571.015.1 to reach as far as possible and to discourage defendants from arming themselves during the commission of felonies by imposing a separate punishment when the defendant’s criminal purpose is assisted or aided by ready access to a dangerous weapon.” 2016The Missouri Supreme Court explained recently in State v, Jones, 479 S.W.3d 100, 106 (Mo.banc 2016), that the definition of armed criminal action under section 671.015.1 “was intended to reach as broadly as possible.” The Court concluded that the plain meaning of the words in the statute “ma[d]e it clear that the legislature intended section 571.015.1 to reach as far as possible and to discourage defendants from arming themselves during the commission of felonies by imposing a separate punishment when the defendant’s criminal purpose is assisted or aided by ready access to a dangerous weapon.” | 1 | 1 |
State of Missouri v. Bruce Piercegreen1 sentence2014Jackson, 433 S.W.3d at 404 (emphasis in original). 6 Prine sought a second-degree robbery instruction, but his sole basis was a claim that he was intoxicated at the time of the offense. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Strickland v. Washington
green
1 sentence2024“In making the determination whether the specified errors resulted in the required prejudice, a court should presume . . . that the judge or jury acted according to law.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Watson v. State
green
1 sentence2024“In this context, ‘prejudice’ means a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different if the second-degree robbery instruction had been given.” Watson, 520 S.W.3d at 437 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Demarco McCrady, Movant/Appellant v. State of Missouri
green
1 sentence2017McCrady, 461 S.W.3d at 448 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Busey
green
1 sentence2016The l\/lissonri Supreme Court explained recently in S:‘cu‘e v. Jones, 479 S,W.3d 100, 106 (Mo.banc 2016), that the definition of armed criminal action under section 571.015.1 "Was intended to reach as broadly as possible." The Cou1't concluded that the plain meaning of the words in the statute "ma[d]e it clear that the legislature intended section 571.()15.1 to reach as far as possible and to discourage defendants from arming themselves during the commission of felonies by imposing a separate punishment when the defendant’s criminal purpose is assisted or aided by ready access to a dangerous W | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.