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6 Missouri opinions name it 1 courts 1994–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Riverside-Quindaro Bend Levee District v. Intercontinental Engineering Manufacturing Corp.green2 sentences2015This is because, Property Owners assert, without citation to any relevant legal authority, “[t]he price for allowing permissive interlocutory appeals [i]s giving up an appeal as a matter of right at the conclusion of the case.” Property Owners misconstrue the scope of Rule 84.035. “‘The right to appeal is purely statutory and, where a statute does not give a right to appeal, no right exists.’” Coca-Cola Co., 249 S.W.3d at 859 (quoting Riverside–Quindaro Bend Levee Dist. v. Intercont'l Eng'g Mfg., 121 S.W.3d 531, 532 (Mo. banc 2003), and citing Rule 81.01). 2015This is because, Property Owners assert, without citation to any relevant legal authority, “[t]he price for allowing permissive interlocutory appeals [i]s giving up an appeal as a matter of right at the conclusion of the case.” Property Owners misconstrue the scope of Rule 84.035. “ ‘The right to appeal is purely statutory and, where a statute does not give a right to appeal, no right exists.’ ” Coca-Cola Co., 249 S.W.3d at 859 (quoting Riverside —Quindaro Bend Levee Dist. v. Intercont’l Eng’g Mfg., 121 S.W.3d 531, 532 (Mo. banc 2003), and citing Rule 81.01). | 2 | 2 |
Murphy v. Carrongreen1 sentence2024Standard of Review We review the decision in this court-tried case under the standard set forth in Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976). | 1 | 1 |
Ackman v. Union Pac. R.R. Co.green1 sentence2019Co., 556 S.W.3d 80, 87 (Mo. App. E.D. 2018), transfer denied (Sept. 25, 2018) (In reviewing the grant of summary judgment to employer on employee’s claim of work-related injury, the appellate court refused to consider portions of employee’s medical records attached to a motion for summary judgment where the employee/non-movant had not relied on those portions of the medical records in opposing the grant of summary judgment and had admitted in his summary judgment response that the medical records did not link his injury to his work.).16 Consequently, Street does not aid Tenants’ claim. | 1 | 1 |
Hiers v. Lemleygreen1 sentence2000Hiers v. Lemley, 834 S.W.2d 729, 731-2 (Mo. banc 1992); Blue Cross, supra, 800 S.W.2d at 75 ; Williams, supra, 565 S.W.2d at 662 . | 1 | 1 |
Dixon v. Bi-State Development Agencygreen1 sentence2000Bearing on the decision of the effect of the August order granting the new trial in favor of the Tenants are the following factors: (1) Tenants’ motion for new trial, and particularly the ground that the judgment was contrary to the law is “worthless and state[s] no legal basis for a new trial.” Dixon v. Bi-State Development Agency, 636 S.W.2d 696, 697-8 (Mo.App.1982) (citing McCarthy v. Halloran 435 S.W.2d 339, 340 (Mo.1968)); (2) Under Rule 78.03, the August order granting a new trial, which did not specify of record the grounds on which it was being granted, created a presumption under Rule | 1 | 1 |
McCarthy v. Hallorangreen2 sentences2000Bearing on the decision of the effect of the August order granting the new trial in favor of the Tenants are the following factors: (1) Tenants’ motion for new trial, and particularly the ground that the judgment was contrary to the law is “worthless and state[s] no legal basis for a new trial.” Dixon v. Bi-State Development Agency, 636 S.W.2d 696, 697-8 (Mo.App.1982) (citing McCarthy v. Halloran 435 S.W.2d 339, 340 (Mo.1968)); (2) Under Rule 78.03, the August order granting a new trial, which did not specify of record the grounds on which it was being granted, created a presumption under Rule 2000McCarthy, 435 S.W.2d at 340 . | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Midwest Petroleum Co.green1 sentence1994Landlord acknowledges that waste is defined as “the failure of a tenant to exercise ordinary care in the use of the leased premises or property that causes material and permanent injury thereto over and above ordinary wear and tear.” Brown v. Midwest Petroleum Co., 828 S.W.2d 686, 687 (Mo.App.1992). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State Ex Rel. Coca-Cola Co. v. Nixon
green
2 sentences2015This is because, Property Owners assert, without citation to any relevant legal authority, “[t]he price for allowing permissive interlocutory appeals [i]s giving up an appeal as a matter of right at the conclusion of the case.” Property Owners misconstrue the scope of Rule 84.035. “‘The right to appeal is purely statutory and, where a statute does not give a right to appeal, no right exists.’” Coca-Cola Co., 249 S.W.3d at 859 (quoting Riverside–Quindaro Bend Levee Dist. v. Intercont'l Eng'g Mfg., 121 S.W.3d 531, 532 (Mo. banc 2003), and citing Rule 81.01). 2015This is because, Property Owners assert, without citation to any relevant legal authority, “[t]he price for allowing permissive interlocutory appeals [i]s giving up an appeal as a matter of right at the conclusion of the case.” Property Owners misconstrue the scope of Rule 84.035. “ ‘The right to appeal is purely statutory and, where a statute does not give a right to appeal, no right exists.’ ” Coca-Cola Co., 249 S.W.3d at 859 (quoting Riverside —Quindaro Bend Levee Dist. v. Intercont’l Eng’g Mfg., 121 S.W.3d 531, 532 (Mo. banc 2003), and citing Rule 81.01). | 2 | 2015–2015 |
GREAT SOUTHERN BANK, Plaintiff-Respondent v. BLUE CHALK CONSTRUCTION, LLC, a Missouri Limited Liability Company, HAILEY REAL ESTATE & DEVELOPMENT, LLC, a Missouri Limited Liability Company, and MICHAEL L. HAILEY and NANCY A. HAILEY, husband and wife
green
1 sentence2019“Arguments, such as this, that are completely disconnected from the numbered paragraph material facts in the summary judgment record, as required by Rule 74.04, are analytically useless in an appellate review that requires this court to properly apply Rule 74.04.” Great S. Bank, 497 S.W.3d at 835 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Blue Cross Health Services, Inc. v. Sauer
green
1 sentence2000Hiers v. Lemley, 834 S.W.2d 729, 731-2 (Mo. banc 1992); Blue Cross, supra, 800 S.W.2d at 75 ; Williams, supra, 565 S.W.2d at 662 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Williams v. Williams
green
2 sentences2000Hiers v. Lemley, 834 S.W.2d 729, 731-2 (Mo. banc 1992); Blue Cross, supra, 800 S.W.2d at 75 ; Williams, supra, 565 S.W.2d at 662 . 2000Hiers v. Lemley, 834 S.W.2d 729, 731-2 (Mo. banc 1992); Blue Cross, supra, 800 S.W.2d at 75 ; Williams, supra, 565 S.W.2d at 662 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.