violent presumption in Missouri

1911In such circumstances, it is said by the Supreme Court that slight proof, sufficient only to raise a violent presumption, will be regarded as sufficient. [State v. Burns, 48 Mo. 438 ; State v. Schatt, 128 Mo. App. 622 , 107 S. W. 10 ; State v. Ruth, 14 Mo. App. 226 .] It thus appears that Clarendon avenue is a public traveled street of a great city, and runs north and south, and defendant’s car tracks cross it from east to west.

1908The court adjudged that these facts brought the case within the rule announced in State v. Burns, supra, by raising a violent presumption that the offense was committed as charged, and the judgment was affirmed.

1975He presumptively knew the value of them according to custom, place, and circumstance. * * * In this view of the matter, there is room for a most violent presumption that the trial court did not err in gauging the quantum of the fee.” See also Sebree v. Rosen, 393 S.W.2d 590 (Mo. 1965); Bil-linger v. Jost, 510 S.W.2d 57, 58 [1, 2] (Mo.App.1974).

1965In the absence of evidence to the contrary it is presumed that the allowance for attorney fees was for compensable services (Sutliff v. Montgomery, 115 Mo. *600 App. 592, 92 S.W. 515 [5] ); and that no allowance was made for noncompensable services (Sullivan v. Winer, Mo.App., 307 S.W.2d 704 [9]).

1965In the absence of evidence to the contrary it is presumed that the allowance for attorney fees was for compensable services (Sutliff v. Montgomery, 115 Mo. *600 App. 592, 92 S.W. 515 [5] ); and that no allowance was made for noncompensable services (Sullivan v. Winer, Mo.App., 307 S.W.2d 704 [9]).

1911In such circumstances, it is said by the Supreme Court that slight proof, sufficient only to raise a violent presumption, will be regarded as sufficient. [State v. Burns, 48 Mo. 438 ; State v. Schatt, 128 Mo. App. 622 , 107 S. W. 10 ; State v. Ruth, 14 Mo. App. 226 .] It thus appears that Clarendon avenue is a public traveled street of a great city, and runs north and south, and defendant’s car tracks cross it from east to west.

1911In such circumstances, it is said by the Supreme Court that slight proof, sufficient only to raise a violent presumption, will be regarded as sufficient. [State v. Burns, 48 Mo. 438 ; State v. Schatt, 128 Mo. App. 622 , 107 S. W. 10 ; State v. Ruth, 14 Mo. App. 226 .] It thus appears that Clarendon avenue is a public traveled street of a great city, and runs north and south, and defendant’s car tracks cross it from east to west.

1911In such circumstances, it is said by the Supreme Court that slight proof, sufficient only to raise a violent presumption, will be regarded as sufficient. [State v. Burns, 48 Mo. 438 ; State v. Schatt, 128 Mo. App. 622 , 107 S. W. 10 ; State v. Ruth, 14 Mo. App. 226 .] It thus appears that Clarendon avenue is a public traveled street of a great city, and runs north and south, and defendant’s car tracks cross it from east to west.

1908The admission of that testimony was against the letter and spirit of the statute, and was for that reason erroneous. [Gaul v. Wenger, 19 Mo. 542 ; Wetherell v. Patterson, 31 Mo. 458 .] III.

1903It was clearly announced in the cases of Kansas City v. Smart, 128 Mo. 272 , and Kansas City v. Vineyard, 128 Mo. 75 , that, “the charter of Kansas City is a public act, of which courts of this State will take judicial notice.” While it may be urged that the courts may take judicial notice of the charter, they do not take judicial notice that any particular street is located in Kansas City.

1903It was clearly announced in the cases of Kansas City v. Smart, 128 Mo. 272 , and Kansas City v. Vineyard, 128 Mo. 75 , that, “the charter of Kansas City is a public act, of which courts of this State will take judicial notice.” While it may be urged that the courts may take judicial notice of the charter, they do not take judicial notice that any particular street is located in Kansas City.