morning hearing in Mississippi

2014See State v. Crank, 666 S.W.2d 91 (Tex.1984) (holding administrative board’s denial of a petitioner's continuance request was not an abuse of discretion when the petitioner already had received two continuances, had been notified of the hearing a month in advance, and had waited to fire his attorney until the morning of the hearing), and Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 588-91 , 84 S.Ct. 841 , 11 L.Ed.2d 921 (1964) (holding the denial of a petitioner’s continuance request did not deny the petitioner due process when the petitioner was given five days’ notice of the hearing, the issues were lim

2012Additionally, in King, the petitioner’s reasons for her request were 29 See State v. Crank, 666 S.W.2d 91 (Tex. 1984) (holding administrative board’s denial of a petitioner’s continuance request was not an abuse of discretion when the petitioner already had received two continuances, had been notified of the hearing a month in advance, and had waited to fire his attorney until the morning of the hearing), and Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 588-91 , 84 S. Ct. 841 , 11 L.

2014See State v. Crank, 666 S.W.2d 91 (Tex.1984) (holding administrative board’s denial of a petitioner's continuance request was not an abuse of discretion when the petitioner already had received two continuances, had been notified of the hearing a month in advance, and had waited to fire his attorney until the morning of the hearing), and Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 588-91 , 84 S.Ct. 841 , 11 L.Ed.2d 921 (1964) (holding the denial of a petitioner’s continuance request did not deny the petitioner due process when the petitioner was given five days’ notice of the hearing, the issues were lim

2014See State v. Crank, 666 S.W.2d 91 (Tex.1984) (holding administrative board’s denial of a petitioner's continuance request was not an abuse of discretion when the petitioner already had received two continuances, had been notified of the hearing a month in advance, and had waited to fire his attorney until the morning of the hearing), and Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 588-91 , 84 S.Ct. 841 , 11 L.Ed.2d 921 (1964) (holding the denial of a petitioner’s continuance request did not deny the petitioner due process when the petitioner was given five days’ notice of the hearing, the issues were lim

2004We review the chancellor's decision under an abuse of discretion standard: The granting of a continuance is largely a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court and unless manifest injustice appears to have resulted from a denial, this Court should not reverse." Thomas v. Hilburn, 654 So.2d 898 , 904 (Miss. 1995) (quoting Hatcher v. Fleeman, 617 So.2d 634 , 639 (Miss. 1993)).

2002We review the chancellor’s decision under an abuse of discretion standard: The granting of a continuance is largely a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court and unless manifest injustice appears to have resulted from a denial, this Court should not reverse." Thomas v. Hilburn, 654 So.2d 898, 904 (Miss. 1995) (quoting Hatcher v. Fleeman, 617 So.2d 634, 639 (Miss. 1993)).

2004We review the chancellor's decision under an abuse of discretion standard: The granting of a continuance is largely a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court and unless manifest injustice appears to have resulted from a denial, this Court should not reverse." Thomas v. Hilburn, 654 So.2d 898 , 904 (Miss. 1995) (quoting Hatcher v. Fleeman, 617 So.2d 634 , 639 (Miss. 1993)).

2002We review the chancellor’s decision under an abuse of discretion standard: The granting of a continuance is largely a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court and unless manifest injustice appears to have resulted from a denial, this Court should not reverse." Thomas v. Hilburn, 654 So.2d 898, 904 (Miss. 1995) (quoting Hatcher v. Fleeman, 617 So.2d 634, 639 (Miss. 1993)).

2022The Court found that the attorney’s behavior constituted direct contempt because he had notified the court the morning of the hearing, meaning “[his] actions and reasons for his actions were known to the court.” Id. at 361.

2022As such, he “was not entitled to formal notice or a separate evidentiary hearing.” Id. 18 ¶30.

2019In Peden v. City of Gautier, 870 So. 2d 1185, 1188 (¶10) (Miss. 2004), Peden moved for continuance on the morning of the hearing, citing poor health and that he was no longer represented by counsel.