fact-sensitive nature inquiry in New Jersey

2017Based on the testimonial evidence presented at this N.J.R.E. 104 hearing and the contents of the letter itself, the judge applied the two-tier approach in Robertson and found defendant had not met his burden of demonstrating "that this statement was made in the course of plea negotiation." However, in an implicit request for guidance from this court, the trial judge alternatively found "that the State had met its burden of proving that . . . [defense counsel's] letter was not sent out in the course of plea negotiation." Thus, by providing an alternative burden-of-proof analysis, the judge wise

2016As the Court noted in Moriarty, supra, the “structure [of N.J.S.A. 9:2 — Y.l] underscores the fact-sensitive nature of the inquiry by detailing seven particularized considerations for the court and instructing the court to consider as well, ‘any other factor’ relevant to the child’s best interests.” 177 N.J. at 100 , 827 A.2d 203 .

2016As the Court noted in Moriarty, supra, the “structure [of N.J.S.A. 9:2 — Y.l] underscores the fact-sensitive nature of the inquiry by detailing seven particularized considerations for the court and instructing the court to consider as well, ‘any other factor’ relevant to the child’s best interests.” 177 N.J. at 100 , 827 A.2d 203 .

2003The Grandparent Visitation Statute, like all others, is presumed to be constitutional—“a presumption that may be rebutted only on a showing that a provision of the Constitution is clearly violated by the statute.” In re Adoption of a Child by W.P., supra, 163 N.J. at 192 , 748 A.2d 515 (Poritz, C.J., dissenting) (citing Board of Educ. v. Caffiero, 86 N.J. 308, 318 , 431 A.2d 799 , appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 1025 , 102 S.Ct. 560 , 70 L.Ed.2d 470 (1981)).

2003The Grandparent Visitation Statute, like all others, is presumed to be constitutional—“a presumption that may be rebutted only on a showing that a provision of the Constitution is clearly violated by the statute.” In re Adoption of a Child by W.P., supra, 163 N.J. at 192 , 748 A.2d 515 (Poritz, C.J., dissenting) (citing Board of Educ. v. Caffiero, 86 N.J. 308, 318 , 431 A.2d 799 , appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 1025 , 102 S.Ct. 560 , 70 L.Ed.2d 470 (1981)).

2003The Grandparent Visitation Statute, like all others, is presumed to be constitutional—“a presumption that may be rebutted only on a showing that a provision of the Constitution is clearly violated by the statute.” In re Adoption of a Child by W.P., supra, 163 N.J. at 192 , 748 A.2d 515 (Poritz, C.J., dissenting) (citing Board of Educ. v. Caffiero, 86 N.J. 308, 318 , 431 A.2d 799 , appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 1025 , 102 S.Ct. 560 , 70 L.Ed.2d 470 (1981)).

2003The Grandparent Visitation Statute, like all others, is presumed to be constitutional—“a presumption that may be rebutted only on a showing that a provision of the Constitution is clearly violated by the statute.” In re Adoption of a Child by W.P., supra, 163 N.J. at 192 , 748 A.2d 515 (Poritz, C.J., dissenting) (citing Board of Educ. v. Caffiero, 86 N.J. 308, 318 , 431 A.2d 799 , appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 1025 , 102 S.Ct. 560 , 70 L.Ed.2d 470 (1981)).

2003The Grandparent Visitation Statute, like all others, is presumed to be constitutional—“a presumption that may be rebutted only on a showing that a provision of the Constitution is clearly violated by the statute.” In re Adoption of a Child by W.P., supra, 163 N.J. at 192 , 748 A.2d 515 (Poritz, C.J., dissenting) (citing Board of Educ. v. Caffiero, 86 N.J. 308, 318 , 431 A.2d 799 , appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 1025 , 102 S.Ct. 560 , 70 L.Ed.2d 470 (1981)).

2003The Grandparent Visitation Statute, like all others, is presumed to be constitutional—"a presumption that may be rebutted only on a showing that a provision of the Constitution is clearly violated by the statute." In re Adoption of a Child by W.P., supra, 163 N.J. at 192 , 748 A. 2d 515 (Poritz, C.J., dissenting) (citing Board of Educ. v. Caffiero, 86 N.J. 308, 318 , 431 A. 2d 799 , appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 1025 , 102 S.Ct. 560 , 70 L.Ed. 2d 470 (1981)).

2003The Grandparent Visitation Statute, like all others, is presumed to be constitutional—“a presumption that may be rebutted only on a showing that a provision of the Constitution is clearly violated by the statute.” In re Adoption of a Child by W.P., supra, 163 N.J. at 192 , 748 A.2d 515 (Poritz, C.J., dissenting) (citing Board of Educ. v. Caffiero, 86 N.J. 308, 318 , 431 A.2d 799 , appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 1025 , 102 S.Ct. 560 , 70 L.Ed.2d 470 (1981)).

2003The Grandparent Visitation Statute, like all others, is presumed to be constitutional—"a presumption that may be rebutted only on a showing that a provision of the Constitution is clearly violated by the statute." In re Adoption of a Child by W.P., supra, 163 N.J. at 192 , 748 A. 2d 515 (Poritz, C.J., dissenting) (citing Board of Educ. v. Caffiero, 86 N.J. 308, 318 , 431 A. 2d 799 , appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 1025 , 102 S.Ct. 560 , 70 L.Ed. 2d 470 (1981)).

2003The Grandparent Visitation Statute, like all others, is presumed to be constitutional—“a presumption that may be rebutted only on a showing that a provision of the Constitution is clearly violated by the statute.” In re Adoption of a Child by W.P., supra, 163 N.J. at 192 , 748 A.2d 515 (Poritz, C.J., dissenting) (citing Board of Educ. v. Caffiero, 86 N.J. 308, 318 , 431 A.2d 799 , appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 1025 , 102 S.Ct. 560 , 70 L.Ed.2d 470 (1981)).

2003The Grandparent Visitation Statute, like all others, is presumed to be constitutional—"a presumption that may be rebutted only on a showing that a provision of the Constitution is clearly violated by the statute." In re Adoption of a Child by W.P., supra, 163 N.J. at 192 , 748 A. 2d 515 (Poritz, C.J., dissenting) (citing Board of Educ. v. Caffiero, 86 N.J. 308, 318 , 431 A. 2d 799 , appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 1025 , 102 S.Ct. 560 , 70 L.Ed. 2d 470 (1981)).

1997The emphasis is upon the claimant’s attachment to the labor market, not to a particular job or a particular employer, save as a claimant’s refusal to accept an employer’s offer of suitable work may bear on the question____ The determination entails primarily a probe of the claimant’s good-faith intention to work and “it should be evident that no single approach to availability can be satisfactory in all cases.” [ Krauss, supra, 13 N.J. at 458 , 100 A.2d 277 (quoting Altman, Availability for Work 131 (Harv.Univ.

1997The emphasis is upon the claimant’s attachment to the labor market, not to a particular job or a particular employer, save as a claimant’s refusal to accept an employer’s offer of suitable work may bear on the question____ The determination entails primarily a probe of the claimant’s good-faith intention to work and “it should be evident that no single approach to availability can be satisfactory in all cases.” [ Krauss, supra, 13 N.J. at 458 , 100 A.2d 277 (quoting Altman, Availability for Work 131 (Harv.Univ.

1996Brenner, supra, 134 N.J. at 516 , 634 A.2d 1019 .

1996Brenner, supra, 134 N.J. at 516 , 634 A.2d 1019 .

1987The fact-sensitive nature of our inquiry requires a careful review of the evidence as disclosed at the so-called Lopez hearing, conducted in keeping with the procedures established in Lopez v. Swyer, supra, 62 N.J. 267 to determine if plaintiff’s cause of action accrued more than two years prior to the date on which he filed his complaint.

1987The fact-sensitive nature of our inquiry requires a careful review of the evidence as disclosed at the so-called Lopez hearing, conducted in keeping with the procedures established in Lopez v. Swyer, supra, 62 N.J. 267 to determine if plaintiff’s cause of action accrued more than two years prior to the date on which he filed his complaint.