6 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1988–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rendine v. Pantzergreen2 sentences2020There is considerable overlap between calculating the lodestar and the factors laid out in Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5(a), but the New Jersey Supreme Court is adamant that the factors "must inform the calculation of the reasonableness of a fee award in . . . every case." Ibid. 2018Under counsel's strict and literal interpretation of the contingent fee rule exclusions, an attorney applying for an excessive contingent fee percentage seemingly protected by the [ Rule] 1:21-7(c) exclusion language is in a position to receive a significantly larger fee without having to demonstrate the Lodestar analysis 1 as required under [ Rendine v. Pantzer , 141 N.J. 292 , 661 A.2d 1202 (1995) ] and without having to apply for and justify an enhanced fee under [ Rule ] 1:21-7(f). | 1 | 3 |
Packard-Bamberger & Co., Inc. v. Colliergreen1 sentence2021Instead, after identifying the Rendine factors, it found only that the case "was a basic contract recovery case," which "did not require any special knowledge or [involve] novel questions." Noting "there were only five motions filed by the plaintiff," 3 the majority of which "were non-dispositive discovery motions," the court emphasized that "[t]he amount involved was only $30,500." Although allowing that "[p]laintiff's counsel returned a satisfactory result for the client," the court declared it "unreasonable to spend triple the amount on litigation costs than it is possible to obtain from th | 1 | 1 |
City of Burlington v. Daguegreen2 sentences2012In Dague , the Court referred to the lodestar analysis as “the guiding light of our fee-shifting jurisprudence ... [and to the] strong presumption that the lodestar represents the reasonable fee[J” Id. at 562 , 112 S.Ct. at 2641 , 120 L.Ed.2d at 456 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 2012In Dague , the Court referred to the lodestar analysis as “the guiding light of our fee-shifting jurisprudence ... [and to the] strong presumption that the lodestar represents the reasonable fee[J” Id. at 562 , 112 S.Ct. at 2641 , 120 L.Ed.2d at 456 (internal citations and quotations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
cluster 315529
green
2 sentences2012Johnson, supra, 488 F.2d at 717-19 . 2012Johnson, supra, 488 F.2d at 717-19 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Blum v. Stenson
green
2 sentences2012Commenting that there is a burden on one who seeks an enhancement to demonstrate that it is “necessary,” ibid, (quoting Blum, supra, 465 U.S. at 898 , 104 S.Ct. at 1541 , 79 L.Ed.2d at 891 ), the Court held that enhancing the lodestar because a case was taken on a contingent fee basis was inappropriate. 2012Commenting that there is a burden on one who seeks an enhancement to demonstrate that it is “necessary,” ibid, (quoting Blum, supra, 465 U.S. at 898 , 104 S.Ct. at 1541 , 79 L.Ed.2d at 891 ), the Court held that enhancing the lodestar because a case was taken on a contingent fee basis was inappropriate. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Furman v. Georgia
green
2 sentences1988The lodestar principle identified by modern federal death penalty jurisprudence beginning with Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 , 92 S.Ct. 2726 , 33 L.Ed. 2d 346 (1972), has been the prevention of the standardless imposition of the death penalty. 1988The lodestar principle identified by modern federal death penalty jurisprudence beginning with Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 , 92 S.Ct. 2726 , 33 L.Ed. 2d 346 (1972), has been the prevention of the standardless imposition of the death penalty. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.