43 Texas opinions name it 6 courts 2011–2026 26 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rohrmoos Venture, Eric Langford, Dan Basso, and Tobin Grove v. Utsw DVA Healthcare, Llpgreen2 sentences2026“The Texas Supreme Court has explained that it intends ‘the lodestar analysis to apply to any situation in which an objective calculation of reasonable hours worked times a reasonable rate can be employed.’” In re H.T.S., No. 06-23-00029-CV, 2023 WL 7381409 , at *6 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Nov. 8, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting Rohrmoos, 578 S.W.3d at 498 ). “[T]he fact[-]finder’s starting point for calculating an attorney’s fee award is determining the reasonable hours worked multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate, and the fee claimant bears the burden of providing sufficient evidence on both 2026“The Texas Supreme Court has explained that it intends ‘the lodestar analysis to apply to any situation in which an objective calculation of reasonable hours worked times a reasonable rate can be employed.’” In re H.T.S., No. 06-23-00029-CV, 2023 WL 7381409 , at *6 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Nov. 8, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting Rohrmoos, 578 S.W.3d at 498 ). “[T]he fact[-]finder’s starting point for calculating an attorney’s fee award is determining the reasonable hours worked multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate, and the fee claimant bears the burden of providing sufficient evidence on both | 11 | 28 |
El Apple I, Ltd. v. Olivasgreen2 sentences2020Without at least some indication of the time spent on various parts of the case, a court has little basis upon which to conduct a meaningful review of the fee award. 370 S.W.3d at 763 ; see also City of Laredo v. Montano, 415 S.W.3d 731, 736 (Tex. 2013) (where the high court held that an attorney’s representation that he generated “thousands and thousands of pages,” spent “a lot of time getting ready for the lawsuit,” and conducted “a lot of legal research” was insufficient evidence under the lodestar analysis to establish reasonable attorney’s fees); Long v. Griffin, 442 S.W.3d 253, 255 (Tex. 2019Rohrmoos clarified “[i]t should have been clear from our opinions in El Apple, Montano, and Long that we intended the lodestar analysis to apply to any situation in which an objective calculation of reasonable hours worked times a reasonable rate can be employed.” Id. at 497-98. 37 Accordingly, Rohrmoos instructed that “the fact finder’s starting point for calculating an attorney’s fee award is determining the reasonable hours worked multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate, and the fee claimant bears the burden of providing sufficient evidence on both counts.” Id. at 498 (citing El Apple, 370 S | 9 | 12 |
Long v. Griffingreen2 sentences2020Without at least some indication of the time spent on various parts of the case, a court has little basis upon which to conduct a meaningful review of the fee award. 370 S.W.3d at 763 ; see also City of Laredo v. Montano, 415 S.W.3d 731, 736 (Tex. 2013) (where the high court held that an attorney’s representation that he generated “thousands and thousands of pages,” spent “a lot of time getting ready for the lawsuit,” and conducted “a lot of legal research” was insufficient evidence under the lodestar analysis to establish reasonable attorney’s fees); Long v. Griffin, 442 S.W.3d 253, 255 (Tex. 2019The Supreme Court of Texas recently explained: It should have been clear from our opinions in El Apple [I, Ltd. v. Olivas, 370 S.W.3d 757 (Tex. 2012)], [City of Laredo v.] Montano[, 414 S.W.3d 731, 736 (Tex. 2013) (per curiam)], and Long [v. Griffin, 442 S.W.3d 253, 255 (Tex. 2014) (per curiam),] that we intended the lodestar analysis to apply to any situation in which an objective calculation of reasonable hours worked times a reasonable rate can be employed. | 5 | 5 |
Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equipment Corp.green2 sentences2026Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812, 818 (Tex. 1997). 2020Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812, 818 (Tex. 1997). 15 Shouldice argues that the testimony regarding attorney’s fees was too general to support a lodestar analysis. | 3 | 3 |
Blanchard v. Bergerongreen2 sentences2011See Blanchard, 489 U.S. at 93 , 109 S.Ct. at 944 . 2011See Blanchard, 489 U.S. at 93 , 109 S.Ct. at 944 . | 2 | 2 |
City of Laredo v. Montanogreen2 sentences2022See Rohrmoos, 578 S.W.3d at 505 (reversing and remanding for redetermination of attorney’s fees where evidence was legally insufficient to establish amount of fees); Long v. Griffin, 442 S.W.3d 253, 256 (Tex. 2014) (per curiam) (reversing and remanding where “no legally sufficient information support[ed] the amount of attorney’s fees the trial court awarded”); Montano, 414 S.W.3d at 736–37 (Tex. 2013) (per curiam) (reversing and remanding where party’s attorney’s fee testimony lacked the level of detail required by El Apple); El Apple, 370 S.W.3d at 764 (“Because the affidavits and other evide 2019The Supreme Court of Texas recently explained: It should have been clear from our opinions in El Apple [I, Ltd. v. Olivas, 370 S.W.3d 757 (Tex. 2012)], [City of Laredo v.] Montano[, 414 S.W.3d 731, 736 (Tex. 2013) (per curiam)], and Long [v. Griffin, 442 S.W.3d 253, 255 (Tex. 2014) (per curiam),] that we intended the lodestar analysis to apply to any situation in which an objective calculation of reasonable hours worked times a reasonable rate can be employed. | 1 | 3 |
Hunsucker v. Fustokgreen1 sentence2024See Hunsucker, 238 S.W.3d at 432 (citing Ragsdale, 801 S.W.2d at 882 ). 12 In reviewing the sufficiency of the attorney-fee evidence in this case, the lodestar analysis applies. | 1 | 1 |
Ragsdale v. Progressive Voters Leaguegreen1 sentence2024See Hunsucker, 238 S.W.3d at 432 (citing Ragsdale, 801 S.W.2d at 882 ). 12 In reviewing the sufficiency of the attorney-fee evidence in this case, the lodestar analysis applies. | 1 | 1 |
Gisbrecht v. Barnhartgreen1 sentence2019Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 803, 808-09 (2002). | 1 | 1 |
Sentinel Integrity Solutions, Inc. v. Mistras Group, Inc., Jody W. Olson and Carey Robertsgreen1 sentence2016See El Apple, 370 S.W.3d at 764 ; Sentinel Integrity Sols., Inc. v. Mistras Grp., Inc., 414 S.W.3d 911, 930 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied). | 1 | 1 |
Betty Black v. SettlePou, P.C.green1 sentence2015App’x at 225 (quoting Perdue, 559 U.S. at 558 ); see also Black v. SettlePou, P.C., 732 F.3d 492, 502 (5th Cir. 2013) (under abuse of discretion standard, a court of appeals is to inspect the trial court’s lodestar analysis to determine if the court sufficiently considered the proper criteria). | 1 | 1 |
Vista Chevrolet, Inc. v. Lewisgreen1 sentence2015Vista Chevrolet, Inc. v. Lewis, 709 S.W.2d 176, 176 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam) (reiterating well-settled rule Civil Procedure > Rem edies > Costs & Attorney Fees > that [HN1] "no evidence" points require rendition in Attorney Expenses & Fees > General Overview favor of appealing party); Elias v. Mr. Yamaha, Inc., 33 Legal Ethics > Client Relations > Attorney Fees > S.W.3d 54, 59 & n.6 (Tex. App.--El Paso 2000, no pet.) General Overview (construing appellant's challenge as a legal sufficiency [HN5] Attorneys are encouraged to use the lodestar challenge because he asked appellate court to render m | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
M.D. Anderson Hospital & Tumor Institute v. Willrich
green
1 sentence2026Id. at 497–98. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. and Brien Garcia v. Nury Chapa
green
1 sentence2021Chapa, 212 S.W.3d at 314 ; Young, 2016 WL 4536407 , at *10. 53 As to Patriot’s and Travelers’ complaint that Shelter and Kancor failed to adduce sufficient evidence under the “[l]odestar requirement” to support their attorney’s-fees awards, we note that the lodestar analysis applies when a party seeks recovery of attorney’s fees under any fee-shifting statute. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
cluster 2358
green
1 sentence2015App’x at 225 (quoting Perdue, 559 U.S. at 558 ); see also Black v. SettlePou, P.C., 732 F.3d 492, 502 (5th Cir. 2013) (under abuse of discretion standard, a court of appeals is to inspect the trial court’s lodestar analysis to determine if the court sufficiently considered the proper criteria). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.