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6 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1994–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Loftingreen2 sentences1999See Loftin II, supra, 157 N.J. at 322-23 , 724 A. 2d 129 . 1999See Loftin II, supra, 157 N.J. at 322-23 , 724 A. 2d 129 . | 2 | 2 |
State v. DiFriscogreen2 sentences1999"We have declined to set a numerical standard to determine at what point defendants `generally' receive the death penalty, because such a determination would introduce undesirable arbitrariness into proportionality review." DiFrisco III, supra, 142 N.J. at 160 , 662 A. 2d 442 (citing Martini II, supra, 139 N.J. at 20 , 651 A. 2d 949 ). 1999"We have declined to set a numerical standard to determine at what point defendants `generally' receive the death penalty, because such a determination would introduce undesirable arbitrariness into proportionality review." DiFrisco III, supra, 142 N.J. at 160 , 662 A. 2d 442 (citing Martini II, supra, 139 N.J. at 20 , 651 A. 2d 949 ). | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Marshall
green
2 sentences1994We have declined to set a numerical standard to determine at what point defendants “generally” receive sentences of death, Marshall II, supra, 130 N.J. at 152-53 , 613 A.2d 1059 , because such a standard would introduce unacceptable arbitrariness into proportionality review. 1994We have declined to set a numerical standard to determine at what point defendants “generally” receive sentences of death, Marshall II, supra, 130 N.J. at 152-53 , 613 A.2d 1059 , because such a standard would introduce unacceptable arbitrariness into proportionality review. | 3 | 1994–1999 |
State v. Martini
green
2 sentences1999"We have declined to set a numerical standard to determine at what point defendants `generally' receive the death penalty, because such a determination would introduce undesirable arbitrariness into proportionality review." DiFrisco III, supra, 142 N.J. at 160 , 662 A. 2d 442 (citing Martini II, supra, 139 N.J. at 20 , 651 A. 2d 949 ). 1999"We have declined to set a numerical standard to determine at what point defendants `generally' receive the death penalty, because such a determination would introduce undesirable arbitrariness into proportionality review." DiFrisco III, supra, 142 N.J. at 160 , 662 A. 2d 442 (citing Martini II, supra, 139 N.J. at 20 , 651 A. 2d 949 ). | 3 | 1995–1999 |
State v. Bey
green
2 sentences1995Precedent-seeking review avoids the numerical analysis of frequency review, and instead requires the Court to engage in a “more traditional case-by-case comparison of similar death-eligible cases.” Bey IV, supra, 137 N.J. at 366, 645 A.2d 685 . 1995Precedent-seeking review avoids the numerical analysis of frequency review, and instead requires the Court to engage in a “more traditional case-by-case comparison of similar death-eligible cases.” Bey IV, supra, 137 N.J. at 366, 645 A.2d 685 . | 2 | 1995–1999 |
Js v. Jf
green
1 sentence2017In J.S. v. J.F. , 410 N.J. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Gill
green
2 sentences1998“It is well established that in construing a statutory provision, courts must seek to fulfill the statutory objective ‘so far as the terms of the legislation and proper consideration of the interests of those subject to it will fairly permit.’” State v. Haliski, 140 N.J. 1, 9 , 656 A.2d 1246 (1995) (quoting State v. Gill, 47 N.J. 441, 444 , 221 A.2d 521 (1966)). 1998“It is well established that in construing a statutory provision, courts must seek to fulfill the statutory objective ‘so far as the terms of the legislation and proper consideration of the interests of those subject to it will fairly permit.’” State v. Haliski, 140 N.J. 1, 9 , 656 A.2d 1246 (1995) (quoting State v. Gill, 47 N.J. 441, 444 , 221 A.2d 521 (1966)). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
State v. Haliski
green
2 sentences1998“It is well established that in construing a statutory provision, courts must seek to fulfill the statutory objective ‘so far as the terms of the legislation and proper consideration of the interests of those subject to it will fairly permit.’” State v. Haliski, 140 N.J. 1, 9 , 656 A.2d 1246 (1995) (quoting State v. Gill, 47 N.J. 441, 444 , 221 A.2d 521 (1966)). 1998“It is well established that in construing a statutory provision, courts must seek to fulfill the statutory objective ‘so far as the terms of the legislation and proper consideration of the interests of those subject to it will fairly permit.’” State v. Haliski, 140 N.J. 1, 9 , 656 A.2d 1246 (1995) (quoting State v. Gill, 47 N.J. 441, 444 , 221 A.2d 521 (1966)). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.