claimed vice instruction in New Mexico

2021Corp., 2011-NMCA-024, ¶ 36 , 150 N.M. 283 , 258 P.3d 1075 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2021Corp., 2011-NMCA-024, ¶ 36 , 150 N.M. 283 , 258 P.3d 1075 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2021Generally, “to preserve error it is necessary either to tender a correct instruction and to alert the mind of the trial court to the fact that the tendered instruction corrects the defect complained of or to point out the specific vice in the instruction given by proper objection thereto.” Zamora v. Smalley, 1961-NMSC-004 , ¶ 13, 68 N.M. 45 , 358 P.2d 362 . “[M]ere assertion that the given instruction is not an accurate statement of the law is insufficient to alert the mind of the trial judge to the claimed vice of the instruction.” Grassie v. Roswell Hosp.

2021Generally, “to preserve error it is necessary either to tender a correct instruction and to alert the mind of the trial court to the fact that the tendered instruction corrects the defect complained of or to point out the specific vice in the instruction given by proper objection thereto.” Zamora v. Smalley, 1961-NMSC-004 , ¶ 13, 68 N.M. 45 , 358 P.2d 362 . “[M]ere assertion that the given instruction is not an accurate statement of the law is insufficient to alert the mind of the trial judge to the claimed vice of the instruction.” Grassie v. Roswell Hosp.

2006We, therefore, limit our review to the question of whether it was proper to permit the comparison of fault between Defendant and Plaintiff in determining the amount that Defendant would pay as damages on Plaintiffs son’s claims. {27} Plaintiff contends that the submission of UJI 13-302, including Defendant’s affirmative defense based upon Plaintiffs negligence, “violated the principle that the negligence of the parent cannot be imputed to the child to bar recovery.” In support of her argument, Plaintiff cites to the case of Montoya v. Winchell, 69 N.M. 177 , 364 P.2d 1041 (1961), which, despit

2006We, therefore, limit our review to the question of whether it was proper to permit the comparison of fault between Defendant and Plaintiff in determining the amount that Defendant would pay as damages on Plaintiffs son’s claims. {27} Plaintiff contends that the submission of UJI 13-302, including Defendant’s affirmative defense based upon Plaintiffs negligence, “violated the principle that the negligence of the parent cannot be imputed to the child to bar recovery.” In support of her argument, Plaintiff cites to the case of Montoya v. Winchell, 69 N.M. 177 , 364 P.2d 1041 (1961), which, despit

1981See Morris v. Dodge Country, Inc., 85 N.M. 491 , 513 P.2d 1273 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 85 N.M. 483 , 513 P.2d 1265 (1973); McBee v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co., 80 N.M. 468 , 457 P.2d 987 (Ct.App.1969).

1981See Morris v. Dodge Country, Inc., 85 N.M. 491 , 513 P.2d 1273 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 85 N.M. 483 , 513 P.2d 1265 (1973); McBee v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co., 80 N.M. 468 , 457 P.2d 987 (Ct.App.1969).

1972The appellant first contends that the court committed prejudicial error in giving the following instruction: “In order to find the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity you must be satisfied that, at the time of committing the act, the accused, as a result of disease of the mind (a) did not know the nature and quality of the act or (b) did not know that it was wrong or (c) was incapable of preventing himself from committing it.” The claimed vice in the instruction is the term “you must be satisfied.” This instruction precisely tracks the language suggested by this court in the case of Sta

1972The appellant first contends that the court committed prejudicial error in giving the following instruction: “In order to find the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity you must be satisfied that, at the time of committing the act, the accused, as a result of disease of the mind (a) did not know the nature and quality of the act or (b) did not know that it was wrong or (c) was incapable of preventing himself from committing it.” The claimed vice in the instruction is the term “you must be satisfied.” This instruction precisely tracks the language suggested by this court in the case of Sta

1972The appellant first contends that the court committed prejudicial error in giving the following instruction: “In order to find the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity you must be satisfied that, at the time of committing the act, the accused, as a result of disease of the mind (a) did not know the nature and quality of the act or (b) did not know that it was wrong or (c) was incapable of preventing himself from committing it.” The claimed vice in the instruction is the term “you must be satisfied.” This instruction precisely tracks the language suggested by this court in the case of Sta

1972The appellant first contends that the court committed prejudicial error in giving the following instruction: “In order to find the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity you must be satisfied that, at the time of committing the act, the accused, as a result of disease of the mind (a) did not know the nature and quality of the act or (b) did not know that it was wrong or (c) was incapable of preventing himself from committing it.” The claimed vice in the instruction is the term “you must be satisfied.” This instruction precisely tracks the language suggested by this court in the case of Sta