action within rule in New York

1947It may be said that Matter of Keep (supra), (involving the time to review an assessment) falls more closely than the present action within the doctrine of Hill v. Supervisors ( 119 N. Y. 344 ) where the limitation of time was part of the statute which created the right to be enforced, and yet it is believed that such a conclusion would be erroneous.

1947It may be said that Matter of Keep (supra), (involving the time to review an assessment) falls more closely than the present action within the doctrine of Hill v. Supervisors ( 119 N. Y. 344 ) where the limitation of time was part of the statute which created the right to be enforced, and yet it is believed that such a conclusion would be erroneous.

1928(Wessel v. Schwarzler, No. 1, 144 App. Div. 587 ; Wessel v. Schwarzler, No. 2, Id. 589 .

1928(Wessel v. Schwarzler, No. 1, 144 App. Div. 587 ; Wessel v. Schwarzler, No. 2, Id. 589 .

1928(La Fourrure v. Newman, 150 App. Div. 920 ; Richards v. Whiting, 127 id. 208.) Defendant, however, attempts to bring this action within the rule applied to suits for alienation of affections, breach of promise, and torts in general, in which it is the established practice of this department to deny a general examination on grounds of policy.

1919Held, we think defendant’s testimony brings the action within the rule laid down in the case of Jamestown Business College Assn. v. Allen ( 172 N. Y. 291 ), and that the case was correctly disposed of at the trial.

1911(Selser Brothers v. Potter Produce Co., 80 Hun, 554 ; affd., 144 N. Y. 646 ; Crowns v. Vail, 51 Hun, 204 .) The respondent also contends that the warrant of attachment was properly vacated on the ground that the plaintiff did not show that his assignor was authorized to do business, in the State of New York, as required by section 9 of the Insurance Law, and on the further ground that the defendant was prohibited by section 50 of the Insurance Law from acting as its agent.' (See Gen.

1911(Selser Brothers v. Potter Produce Co., 80 Hun, 554 ; affd., 144 N. Y. 646 ; Crowns v. Vail, 51 Hun, 204 .) The respondent also contends that the warrant of attachment was properly vacated on the ground that the plaintiff did not show that his assignor was authorized to do business, in the State of New York, as required by section 9 of the Insurance Law, and on the further ground that the defendant was prohibited by section 50 of the Insurance Law from acting as its agent.' (See Gen.

1911The account ‘ stated rendered the defendant liable on contract for the payment of a specific amount, the same as on a promissory note, or on a bond, and the fact that part of the indebtedness due on the obligation has been paid does not bring the action within the exception to the rule.' (Acharan v. Samuel Brothers, 144 App. Div. 182 .) It .was sufficient, therefore, for the plaintiff to allege nonpayment, without presenting proof thereof, on his application for a warrant of attachment. ■ The plaintiff sufficiently shows that he is entitled to recover the amount ovér and above all counterclaim

1911(Selser Brothers v. Potter Produce Co., 80 Hun, 554 ; affd., 144 N. Y. 646 ; Crowns v. Vail, 51 Hun, 204 .) The respondent also contends that the warrant of attachment was properly vacated on the ground that the plaintiff did not show that his assignor was authorized to do business, in the State of New York, as required by section 9 of the Insurance Law, and on the further ground that the defendant was prohibited by section 50 of the Insurance Law from acting as its agent.' (See Gen.

1903This conclusion renders it unnecessary to discuss the further very interesting question which the appellant’s counsel has presented as to whether such an invasion of the plaintiff’s person or property has been shown as is necessary to sustain this action within the rule laid down in Paul v. Fargo ( 84 App. Div. 9 ).

1874The plaintiff, I think, is fully entitled to maintain this action within the principle asserted in the case of Gray v. Durland, supra, and of Fensler v. Moyer, 3 Watts & Leavy, 416; Manvell v. Thomson, 2 C. & P. 303; Ingersoll v. Jones, 5 Barb. 663 ; Sargent v. Dennison, 5 Cow. 106 ; and notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff is a married woman within the case of Badgley v. Decker, 44 Barb. 577 .

1874The plaintiff, I think, is fully entitled to maintain this action within the principle asserted in the case of Gray v. Durland, supra, and of Fensler v. Moyer, 3 Watts & Leavy, 416; Manvell v. Thomson, 2 C. & P. 303; Ingersoll v. Jones, 5 Barb. 663 ; Sargent v. Dennison, 5 Cow. 106 ; and notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff is a married woman within the case of Badgley v. Decker, 44 Barb. 577 .