Colonnade-Biswell exception in New York

1992Nevertheless, only three years later, the Court substantially broadened the exception, holding that it is not limited to industries having a long tradition of government regulation (Donovan v Dewey, 452 US 594, 605-606 ).

1992Nevertheless, only three years later, the Court substantially broadened the exception, holding that it is not limited to industries having a long tradition of government regulation (Donovan v Dewey, 452 US 594, 605-606 ).

1985“Even in closely regulated industries, the inspection provisions still must be tailored to the state’s proper objectives, and they must minimize the dangers inherent in the unbridled exercise of administrative discretion.” (Bionic Auto Parts & Sales v Fahner, 721 F2d 1072, 1079.) Moreover, the theories of implied consent and conditional privilege, which have been considered to be doctrinal underpinnings of the Colonnade-Biswell analysis (see, in this respect, Marshall v Barlow’s, Inc., 436 US 307, 313 ; Almeida-Sanchez v United States, 413 US 266, 271 ; 3 LaFave, Search and Seizure § 10.2 [c])

1985“Even in closely regulated industries, the inspection provisions still must be tailored to the state’s proper objectives, and they must minimize the dangers inherent in the unbridled exercise of administrative discretion.” (Bionic Auto Parts & Sales v Fahner, 721 F2d 1072, 1079.) Moreover, the theories of implied consent and conditional privilege, which have been considered to be doctrinal underpinnings of the Colonnade-Biswell analysis (see, in this respect, Marshall v Barlow’s, Inc., 436 US 307, 313 ; Almeida-Sanchez v United States, 413 US 266, 271 ; 3 LaFave, Search and Seizure § 10.2 [c])

1985(See, dissenting opn in People v Pace, supra, at p 343 , distinguishing State v Galio, 92 NM 266 , 584 P2d 44 .) It is a matter of common knowledge, not only to our law enforcement authorities but to the general public as well, that there are a great number of thriving illegal stolen car operations and that numerous stolen cars are predestined for “chop-shops” to be used as parts.

1985(See, dissenting opn in People v Pace, supra, at p 343 , distinguishing State v Galio, 92 NM 266 , 584 P2d 44 .) It is a matter of common knowledge, not only to our law enforcement authorities but to the general public as well, that there are a great number of thriving illegal stolen car operations and that numerous stolen cars are predestined for “chop-shops” to be used as parts.

1985(See, Donovan v Dewey, 452 US 594 ; Sokolov v Village of Freeport, 52 NY2d 341, 346-347 ; Matter of Finn’s Liq.

1985(See, Donovan v Dewey, 452 US 594 ; Sokolov v Village of Freeport, 52 NY2d 341, 346-347 ; Matter of Finn’s Liq.

1984Accordingly, I agree with the decisions rendered by several nisi prius courts in this State as well as appellate decisions of our sister States which have held that the junkyard and vehicle dismantling industries fall within the Colonnade-Biswell exception and that warrantless administrative searches of these industries are valid (People v Ruggieri, 85 Misc 2d 141 ; People v Tinneny, supra; People v Garcia, 111 Misc 2d 550 ; People v Camme, supra; People v Lopez, 116 Cal App 3d 600; People v Woolsey, 90 Cal App 3d 994; People v Easley, 90 Cal App 3d 440, cert den 444 US 899 ; People v Grey, 23

1984Accordingly, I agree with the decisions rendered by several nisi prius courts in this State as well as appellate decisions of our sister States which have held that the junkyard and vehicle dismantling industries fall within the Colonnade-Biswell exception and that warrantless administrative searches of these industries are valid (People v Ruggieri, 85 Misc 2d 141 ; People v Tinneny, supra; People v Garcia, 111 Misc 2d 550 ; People v Camme, supra; People v Lopez, 116 Cal App 3d 600; People v Woolsey, 90 Cal App 3d 994; People v Easley, 90 Cal App 3d 440, cert den 444 US 899 ; People v Grey, 23

1984Accordingly, I agree with the decisions rendered by several nisi prius courts in this State as well as appellate decisions of our sister States which have held that the junkyard and vehicle dismantling industries fall within the Colonnade-Biswell exception and that warrantless administrative searches of these industries are valid (People v Ruggieri, 85 Misc 2d 141 ; People v Tinneny, supra; People v Garcia, 111 Misc 2d 550 ; People v Camme, supra; People v Lopez, 116 Cal App 3d 600; People v Woolsey, 90 Cal App 3d 994; People v Easley, 90 Cal App 3d 440, cert den 444 US 899 ; People v Grey, 23

1984Accordingly, I agree with the decisions rendered by several nisi prius courts in this State as well as appellate decisions of our sister States which have held that the junkyard and vehicle dismantling industries fall within the Colonnade-Biswell exception and that warrantless administrative searches of these industries are valid (People v Ruggieri, 85 Misc 2d 141 ; People v Tinneny, supra; People v Garcia, 111 Misc 2d 550 ; People v Camme, supra; People v Lopez, 116 Cal App 3d 600; People v Woolsey, 90 Cal App 3d 994; People v Easley, 90 Cal App 3d 440, cert den 444 US 899 ; People v Grey, 23

1984Accordingly, I agree with the decisions rendered by several nisi prius courts in this State as well as appellate decisions of our sister States which have held that the junkyard and vehicle dismantling industries fall within the Colonnade-Biswell exception and that warrantless administrative searches of these industries are valid (People v Ruggieri, 85 Misc 2d 141 ; People v Tinneny, supra; People v Garcia, 111 Misc 2d 550 ; People v Camme, supra; People v Lopez, 116 Cal App 3d 600; People v Woolsey, 90 Cal App 3d 994; People v Easley, 90 Cal App 3d 440, cert den 444 US 899 ; People v Grey, 23

1984Accordingly, I agree with the decisions rendered by several nisi prius courts in this State as well as appellate decisions of our sister States which have held that the junkyard and vehicle dismantling industries fall within the Colonnade-Biswell exception and that warrantless administrative searches of these industries are valid (People v Ruggieri, 85 Misc 2d 141 ; People v Tinneny, supra; People v Garcia, 111 Misc 2d 550 ; People v Camme, supra; People v Lopez, 116 Cal App 3d 600; People v Woolsey, 90 Cal App 3d 994; People v Easley, 90 Cal App 3d 440, cert den 444 US 899 ; People v Grey, 23

1984Accordingly, I agree with the decisions rendered by several nisi prius courts in this State as well as appellate decisions of our sister States which have held that the junkyard and vehicle dismantling industries fall within the Colonnade-Biswell exception and that warrantless administrative searches of these industries are valid (People v Ruggieri, 85 Misc 2d 141 ; People v Tinneny, supra; People v Garcia, 111 Misc 2d 550 ; People v Camme, supra; People v Lopez, 116 Cal App 3d 600; People v Woolsey, 90 Cal App 3d 994; People v Easley, 90 Cal App 3d 440, cert den 444 US 899 ; People v Grey, 23

1984Accordingly, I agree with the decisions rendered by several nisi prius courts in this State as well as appellate decisions of our sister States which have held that the junkyard and vehicle dismantling industries fall within the Colonnade-Biswell exception and that warrantless administrative searches of these industries are valid (People v Ruggieri, 85 Misc 2d 141 ; People v Tinneny, supra; People v Garcia, 111 Misc 2d 550 ; People v Camme, supra; People v Lopez, 116 Cal App 3d 600; People v Woolsey, 90 Cal App 3d 994; People v Easley, 90 Cal App 3d 440, cert den 444 US 899 ; People v Grey, 23

1984The majority is of the view that the warrantless search by the police of defendants’ junkyard, i.e., inspecting VIN numbers on several engines, which would otherwise be valid if motivated by an intent to conduct an administrative search under section 436 of the New York City Charter (Colonnade Corp. v United States, supra; United States v Biswell, supra), was unconstitutionally infirm in view of the fact that the police admitted that their mission in going to the junkyard was to gather evidence of a crime rather than to administer any regulatory scheme.

1984The majority is of the view that the warrantless search by the police of defendants’ junkyard, i.e., inspecting VIN numbers on several engines, which would otherwise be valid if motivated by an intent to conduct an administrative search under section 436 of the New York City Charter (Colonnade Corp. v United States, supra; United States v Biswell, supra), was unconstitutionally infirm in view of the fact that the police admitted that their mission in going to the junkyard was to gather evidence of a crime rather than to administer any regulatory scheme.

1984Accordingly, I agree with the decisions rendered by several nisi prius courts in this State as well as appellate decisions of our sister States which have held that the junkyard and vehicle dismantling industries fall within the Colonnade-Biswell exception and that warrantless administrative searches of these industries are valid (People v Ruggieri, 85 Misc 2d 141 ; People v Tinneny, supra; People v Garcia, 111 Misc 2d 550 ; People v Camme, supra; People v Lopez, 116 Cal App 3d 600; People v Woolsey, 90 Cal App 3d 994; People v Easley, 90 Cal App 3d 440, cert den 444 US 899 ; People v Grey, 23

1984Accordingly, I agree with the decisions rendered by several nisi prius courts in this State as well as appellate decisions of our sister States which have held that the junkyard and vehicle dismantling industries fall within the Colonnade-Biswell exception and that warrantless administrative searches of these industries are valid (People v Ruggieri, 85 Misc 2d 141 ; People v Tinneny, supra; People v Garcia, 111 Misc 2d 550 ; People v Camme, supra; People v Lopez, 116 Cal App 3d 600; People v Woolsey, 90 Cal App 3d 994; People v Easley, 90 Cal App 3d 440, cert den 444 US 899 ; People v Grey, 23

1982This court agrees with the conclusion reached in United States v Anile (supra). 2 When the search in question is not a routine, periodic search, but rather, a search undertaken because government officials have “cause to believe” they will find evidence of a crime, the Colonnade-Biswell exception to the requirement that a warrant be obtained prior to a search does not apply.

1982This court agrees with the conclusion reached in United States v Anile (supra). 2 When the search in question is not a routine, periodic search, but rather, a search undertaken because government officials have “cause to believe” they will find evidence of a crime, the Colonnade-Biswell exception to the requirement that a warrant be obtained prior to a search does not apply.

1982Indeed, pursuant to Michigan v Tyler (supra), it may be that a warrant may be obtained “only upon a traditional showing of probable cause applicable to searches for evidence of crime.” ( 436 US, at p 512 .) ECL 71-0525 (subd b) authorizes a warrantless search when there is “cause to believe” a violation has been or is being committed.

1982Indeed, pursuant to Michigan v Tyler (supra), it may be that a warrant may be obtained “only upon a traditional showing of probable cause applicable to searches for evidence of crime.” ( 436 US, at p 512 .) ECL 71-0525 (subd b) authorizes a warrantless search when there is “cause to believe” a violation has been or is being committed.

1979Liquor (Colonnade) and firearms (Biswell) are industries of this type; when an entrepreneur embarks upon such a business, he has voluntarily chosen to subject himself to a full arsenal of governmental regulation.” Other industries have similarly been exempted under the Colonnade-Biswell doctrine. 1 While it is well settled that a businessman’s private commercial property is entitled to Fourth Amendment protection (See v City of Seattle, 387 US 541 ; People v Spinelli, 35 NY2d 77 ); it is equally clear that a businessman engaged in licensed and regulated enterprise accepts the burden as well as

1979Liquor (Colonnade) and firearms (Biswell) are industries of this type; when an entrepreneur embarks upon such a business, he has voluntarily chosen to subject himself to a full arsenal of governmental regulation.” Other industries have similarly been exempted under the Colonnade-Biswell doctrine. 1 While it is well settled that a businessman’s private commercial property is entitled to Fourth Amendment protection (See v City of Seattle, 387 US 541 ; People v Spinelli, 35 NY2d 77 ); it is equally clear that a businessman engaged in licensed and regulated enterprise accepts the burden as well as

1979Liquor (Colonnade) and firearms (Biswell) are industries of this type; when an entrepreneur embarks upon such a business, he has voluntarily chosen to subject himself to a full arsenal of governmental regulation.” Other industries have similarly been exempted under the Colonnade-Biswell doctrine. 1 While it is well settled that a businessman’s private commercial property is entitled to Fourth Amendment protection (See v City of Seattle, 387 US 541 ; People v Spinelli, 35 NY2d 77 ); it is equally clear that a businessman engaged in licensed and regulated enterprise accepts the burden as well as

1979Liquor (Colonnade) and firearms (Biswell) are industries of this type; when an entrepreneur embarks upon such a business, he has voluntarily chosen to subject himself to a full arsenal of governmental regulation.” Other industries have similarly been exempted under the Colonnade-Biswell doctrine. 1 While it is well settled that a businessman’s private commercial property is entitled to Fourth Amendment protection (See v City of Seattle, 387 US 541 ; People v Spinelli, 35 NY2d 77 ); it is equally clear that a businessman engaged in licensed and regulated enterprise accepts the burden as well as