common-law public interest privilege in New York

1992Corp., 35 NY2d 113, 117 , quoting People v Keating, 286 App Div 150, 153 ), the Commission has not, either in the November 10, 1989 affirmation of Susan Shepard in support of its motion or in the supplementary January 31, 1991 affirmation of Karen Greve, factually buttressed its claim that the disclosure sought by plaintiffs would jeopardize the public interest; hence, no such privilege attaches (see, Cirale v 80 Pine St.

1990Corp. ( 35 NY2d 113, 117-119 ).

1992First, as urged by the Commission, we find that the letters exchanged between it and its attorneys concerning the progress of this and the related Court of Claims litigation (specifically, the Fuera Bush document Nos. 51, 52, 53, 54 and 55) are not subject to disclosure because of the attorney-client privilege (see, Rossi v Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 73 NY2d 588, 593 ).

1992Corp., 35 NY2d 113, 117 , quoting People v Keating, 286 App Div 150, 153 ), the Commission has not, either in the November 10, 1989 affirmation of Susan Shepard in support of its motion or in the supplementary January 31, 1991 affirmation of Karen Greve, factually buttressed its claim that the disclosure sought by plaintiffs would jeopardize the public interest; hence, no such privilege attaches (see, Cirale v 80 Pine St.

1983(Cf. Matter of Dunlea v Goldmark, 54 AD2d 446, 449 .) If the materials covered by item No. 5 would be discoverable, despite a claim of confidentiality, under the common-law public interest privilege, then the fact that the records may be intra-agency materials under the Freedom of Information Law (Public Officers Law, § 87, subd 2, par [g]) would not preclude disclosure inasmuch as subdivision 6 of section 89 of the Public Officers Law provides “[njothing in this article shall be construed to limit or abridge any otherwise available right of access at law or in equity of any party to records.”

1981(See Wunsch v City of Rochester ( 108 Misc 2d 854 ) decided herewith.

1979However, it has been held that the common-law public interest privilege was not abolished by the Freedom of Information Law (Young v Town of Huntington, 88 Misc 2d 632, 639 ; Cirale v 80 Pine St.

1976Investigatory records were shielded by legislation applicable to specific civil subdivisions of the State (see, e.g., Matter of Cherkis v Impellitteri, 307 NY 132 ; Blaikie v Borden Co., 47 Misc 2d 180 [New York City Charter, § 1114]; Scott v County of Nassau, 43 Misc 2d 648 [County Government Law of Nassau County, § 2207]), specific departments of government (see, e.g., Mental Hygiene Law, § 13.09; Family Ct Act, § 784; Banking Law, § 36, subd 10), or where a common-law public interest privilege could be sustained (see Cirale v 80 Pine St.

1976Investigatory records were shielded by legislation applicable to specific civil subdivisions of the State (see, e.g., Matter of Cherkis v Impellitteri, 307 NY 132 ; Blaikie v Borden Co., 47 Misc 2d 180 [New York City Charter, § 1114]; Scott v County of Nassau, 43 Misc 2d 648 [County Government Law of Nassau County, § 2207]), specific departments of government (see, e.g., Mental Hygiene Law, § 13.09; Family Ct Act, § 784; Banking Law, § 36, subd 10), or where a common-law public interest privilege could be sustained (see Cirale v 80 Pine St.

1976Investigatory records were shielded by legislation applicable to specific civil subdivisions of the State (see, e.g., Matter of Cherkis v Impellitteri, 307 NY 132 ; Blaikie v Borden Co., 47 Misc 2d 180 [New York City Charter, § 1114]; Scott v County of Nassau, 43 Misc 2d 648 [County Government Law of Nassau County, § 2207]), specific departments of government (see, e.g., Mental Hygiene Law, § 13.09; Family Ct Act, § 784; Banking Law, § 36, subd 10), or where a common-law public interest privilege could be sustained (see Cirale v 80 Pine St.